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Abstract 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF AN ENERGY RESOURCE: 
QUEENSLAND'S COKING COALS 
Richard J. Koerner 
Aims 
Queensland's export performance is significantly determined 
by developments in global markets for energy resources. 
Concerns have been voiced regarding the presence of 
distortions in and the functional performance of such 
markets. In particular, the Pacific coking coal market, which 
is dominated by Japanese steel industry purchasing policies, 
has been the subject of some investigation and debate. The 
resolution of this issue for the Pacific coking coal trade is 
an aim of the thesis. 
All products and process technologies have a finite 
lifecycle. Blast furnace ironmaking is no exception. 
Pressures arising from increasing volatility of demand for 
steel and increased environmental controls on heavy 
industrial manufacturing processes, will ultimately lead to 
the replacement of the blast furnace as the preferred 
technology for ironmaking. An evaluation of the impact of 
such a change, and the managerial strategies which 
Queensland's coking coal industry participants can adopt in 
the face of such changes is a complementary research 
objective. 
IV 
Scope 
Central issues addressed in this study are the history, price 
formation, and supply/demand equilibrium characteristics of 
world coking coal markets, and the roles played by the 
Australian, American and Canadian coal industries. Modelling 
studies of Japanese demand for coking coal provide a vehicle 
for examining the impact of the Japanese steel industry 
purchasing policies on market behaviour. 
Other market related issues examined include pricing 
relationships between energy commodities and the behaviour of 
internationally traded coking coal prices since the early 
sixties. Modelling studies of American energy markets are 
used to investigate price behaviour which could be expected 
in competitive markets. 
Substitution of steel by other material inputs in many 
consumer durable goods is changing the relationship between 
steel consumption and economic growth in OECD countries. 
Shifts in patterns of demand growth for steel input 
commodities are examined in the light of such change. 
Major restructuring of OECD steel manufacture has also taken 
place. The economic forces and industrial policy actions 
influencing the dynamics of restructuring of major 
OECD steel manufacturers are investigated. 
Process technology developments in iron and steelmaking are 
undergoing significant change. These developments will impact 
the future use of bituminous coal in ironmaking. Technology 
driven qualitative and quantitative changes in steel industry 
demand for Queensland's hard coking coals are evaluated. 
Conclusions 
Recognition and acceptance of the realities of Pacific and 
European energy market distortions is required by all 
Australian coal industry participants. This is necessary for 
effective export strategies to be developed to cope with a 
restructuring of the Queensland and New South Wales coking 
coal industries. 
Restructuring of both the Australian and Canadian coking coal 
industries is required to cope with a persistent oversupply 
situation in a future industry environment of declining 
demand for coking coal. Prevention of a spiral of destructive 
competition, which could drive export prices for Australia's 
coking coals to parity or below that of thermal coals, will 
require coordinated intervention by federal and state 
government regulatory agencies. 
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Introduction 
Overview 
A great deal of recent business community discussion and 
economic debate concerns Australia's trade performance. The 
annual current account balance has declined from a surplus of 
1.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1973 to a deficit 
outcome in all later years, reaching 6% of GDP in 1989. This 
is a serious matter and current government policy is 
attempting to encourage exports and import replacement to 
arrest the trend. 
One of the few export success stories in this generally 
discouraging picture has been that of Queensland's coking 
coal industry. One objective of this research is to 
investigate the economic forces and trade developments which 
have resulted in Australia's emergence as the largest 
supplier of traded coking coal and the part that regional 
steel industry growth has played in these events. 
A second research objective is to analyse and explain the 
substantial real price perturbation which has occurred for 
all traded energy commodities, and particularly for coking 
coal over the last quarter century. A hypothesis to be 
examined is the proposition that the trade and business 
strategies practised by Japanese and other regional consumers 
of Australia's steel input commodities has resulted in a 
distortion of the distribution of surplus between producers 
and consumers in the past, and the continued failure to 
develop countervailing strategic responses may result in the 
collapse of the price premium which Queensland's coking coals 
have historically commanded over thermal coals. 
The final study objective is to suggest industry strategies 
designed to correct market distortions and attenuate the 
product lifecycle for coke and coking coal. 
The study is presented in the following form: Chapter 1 
reviews the development of the supply side of the energy 
commodity trade with emphasis on coal and coking coal; 
Chapter 2 examines energy commodity price relationships and 
the behaviour of coking coal prices; Chapter 3 investigates 
economic related changes in steel demand which creates a 
demand for coke; Chapter 4 describes the changing patterns of 
steel manufacture and the industry policies and strategies 
which have influenced such changes; Chapter 5 examines the 
process technology of iron and steelmaking; Chapter 6 
investigates price/quality relationships and the historic 
behaviour of Japanese hard coking coal markets; Chapter 7 
describes the differing response of American and Queensland 
coking coal exporters to the price cycle discussed in Chapter 
2; finally. Chapter 8 analyses production and market 
strategies of the major exporters, and suggests some possible 
strategic responses available to Queensland's coking coal 
industry participants, in an era of increasing business 
uncertainty. 
Chapter 1 
HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF THE COKING COAL TRADE 
An understanding of the importance that coking coal exports 
plays in the Queensland economy requires some background 
knowledge of the historic evolution of the energy commodity 
trade, specifically that of coking coals. Also important are 
the factors which have influenced the patterns of this trade 
since World War II. In this chapter the changing mix of 
energy commodities being traded internationally, the changing 
end use patterns for traded coals, the changing profile of 
suppliers to seaborne markets, and the growth of coking coal 
as a major export for Queensland will be described. 
1.1) International Energy Commodity Trade History 
1.1.1) Energy Commodity Substitutions 
Prior to the turn of the century coal was the most widely 
traded energy commodity, and the United Kingdom (UK) its 
principal supplier. Just prior to World War I, coal began to 
loose favour as the preferred energy commodity to oil except 
for specialized uses, one of which was for coke manufacture 
in metals smelting. From the early nineteen twenties until 
reaching a peak in 1979, oil steadily replaced coal as the 
principal traded energy commodity. From 1938 to 1979, the 
annual quantity of internationally traded oil grew from 91 
million tonnes (in crude oil equivalent tonnes) to 1,752 
million tonnes. Since 1979, annually traded oil shipments 
have fallen to 1,189 million tonnes in 1985, and by 1987 had 
recovered to 1,209 million tonnes^*-'-. 
Increased consumption of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon fuels 
supplied most of the primary energy demand growth in the non 
communist world from the end of World War I until the first 
oil price shock in 1973. Since then, coal and nuclear fuels 
have increased their shares of the primary energy fuel mix at 
the expense of oil, especially for electricity generation. 
Oil fuels usage is now more focussed in the transportation 
and petrochemical feed-stock energy sectors, and this 
tendency is likely to continue. 
Prior to World War II (WW II), the United States of America 
(US) was self sufficient in oil, and the international energy 
trade was primarily in oil from the Middle East to Western 
Europe and North Asia (Japan,South Korea,Taiwan). American 
oil imports grew steadily after the end of the war to 29 
million tonnes by 1950, 83 million tonnes in 1960, 170 
million tonnes in 1970, and peaked at 394 million tonnes in 
1979. By 1987, US imports had fallen to 271 million tonnes. 
Canada and other Western Hemisphere producers now provide 
most of the oil and refined products imported by the US, and 
oil patterns of trade are again primarily between the Middle 
East and Western Europe and North Asia. 
1.1) This discussion draws on world energy statistics 
published annually in British Petroleum (B.P.) -
Statistical Review of World Energy - Various annual 
issues 1950 to 1988. 
In recent years, natural gas has also become a more widely 
internationally traded energy commodity. The United States 
imports significant quantities of pipeline gas from Canada 
and Mexico. Japan imports gas in the form of liquefied 
natural gas from Indonesia, Borneo, the Middle East, Alaska, 
and most recently Australia. Western Europe imports pipeline 
gas from Russia and Algeria, as well as using North Sea 
production. 
The reason that oil replaced coal as the preferred energy 
commodity of trade until the seventies, relates to the fact 
that oil is a more concentrated form of energy commodity and 
therefore less costly to transport. One tonne of oil has the 
heating value of approximately 1.5 tonnes of coal. Oil also 
has handling and storage advantages, being readily pumped 
from producing wells to storage tanks to seagoing tankers and 
finally to receiving storage tanks. Coal, on the other hand, 
requires mechanical handling facilities and larger storage 
areas which create environmental problems in heavily 
populated areas. 
The use of coal^'^ for primary energy generation in the 
US peaked in 194 3 due to the high level of war effort related 
industrial activity, to commence a decline in use due to its 
replacement as the preferred industrial fuel by oil and 
natural gas, and the phasing out of coal fired locomotives by 
1.2) US coal usage data is derived from W.Peirce's 
contribution in Gold B., W.Peirce, G.Rosegger, M.Perlman 
"Technological Progress and Industrial Leadership : The 
Growth of the US Steel Industry 1900-1970" Lexington 
Books (1984) Chapter 8, p.199-204. 
US railways. This decline was arrested in 1959, and coal 
utilization again began increasing due mainly to greater coal 
use for electricity generation. In 1979, the total 
consumption of coal in the US finally surpassed 1943's annual 
total. A similar pattern of fuel substitution occurred in 
Western Europe, except that the replacement of coal use in 
the fifties and sixties by oil imports was more pronounced, 
and Western European coal consumption, although increasing, 
still remains below the peak levels of 1940. 
1.1.2) Changing Patterns in the Western World's Coal Trade 
Prior to WW II, Great Britain (UK) •'••-^  provided most of the 
internationally traded coal. In 1913, the UK produced 55% of 
the world's traded coal including ship's bunkers. This 
dominance continued until the outbreak of WW II, although the 
UK market share was declining and had eroded to 38% of world 
trade by 1938. 
In 1923, British coal exports (excluding bunkers) reached a 
peak of 86 million tonnes, an impressive total even by 
present day standards, compared with US exports of 18 million 
tonnes in that same year. However by 1939, UK exports had 
fallen to 37.5 million tonnes, and held a reduced market 
share. 
1.3) A comprehensive discussion of the decline of the UK as a 
coal supplier to international trade is given in Supple 
B. "The History of the British Coal Industry : The 
Political Economy of Decline 1913-1946" Clarendon Press 
(1987) 
International trade in coal immediately after WW II became 
dominated by the US, as the UK coal industry ceased to be a 
significant exporter in 1941, and the British coal industry 
never recovered its pre-war export competitive status after 
the cessation of hostilities. The US coals which were traded 
to Canada and Western Europe were primarily coking coals, as 
oil had become the preferred thermal energy commodity of 
international trade. The bulk of seaborne traded coal was 
with Western Europe, although as the Japanese steel industry 
began reconstruction and expansion, increasing quantities of 
US coking coals were exported to North Asia. 
Having described in broad terms the trends in primary energy 
consumption by type of fuel, and the trading patterns which 
evolved immediately after WW II, more detailed historic data 
pertaining to international coal trade developments for the 
period since 1960 will be provided. 
1.1.3) More Recent Patterns in the International Coal Trade. 
World hard coal production has increased significantly since 
1960. Table 1.1 provides world statistics for selected years 
for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) members and other of the larger coal producers. 
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TABLE 1.1 
WORLD HARD COAL PRODUCTION 
(Millions of Metric Tonnes) 
Year 
World Total 
OECD Total 
Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
UK 
US 
Other OECD 
NON - OECD 
South Africa 
China 
India 
Poland 
U.S.S.R. 
Other 
Source : Coal 
1960 
1967 
936 
22 
6 
148 
197 
392 
171 
1031 
38 
420 
53 
104 
356 
60 
1973 
2181 
915 
56 
12 
104 
132 
530 
81 
1266 
68 
399 
78 
159 
461 
101 
Information( 
1978 
2546 
944 
70 
17 
90 
123 
577 
67 
1602 
95 
591 
102 
193 
502 
119 
1990) 
1981 
2732 
1099 
86 
22 
95 
128 
701 
67 
1633 
131 
598 
124 
163 
481 
136 
1983 
2827 
1051 
98 
23 
90 
119 
657 
64 
1776 
143 
685 
138 
191 
487 
132 
1985 
3127 
1135 
118 
34 
89 
94 
736 
64 
1992 
170 
840 
154 
192 
494 
142 
- International En* 
1987 
3288 
1183 
148 
33 
82 
104 
762 
54 
2105 
173 
891 
180 
193 
516 
152 
srgy A( 
1989 
3426 
1216 
148 
39 
77 
101 
805 
46 
2210 
180 
980 
194 
177 
518 
161 
:jency 
(lEA) Paris. 
Over the period, production has increased 3 0% in the OECD 
countries, while more than doubling in non-OECD countries due 
principally to major output expansions in China, India, and 
South Africa. The output of the European OECD producers has 
fallen, and production growth within the OECD is concentrated 
in Australia, Canada and the US, nations which are also 
significant exporters of coal. Despite such growth, 
internationally traded coal quantities still remain a small 
proportion of world production, increasing from only 6% in 
1960, to 11% in 1988 and 1989. 
1.1.4) Coking Coal Trade Development 
From the end of WW II until the early seventies coal trade 
developments can be summarized simply as follows: the US 
assumed a role previously held by the UK in providing the 
bulk of internationally traded coals, which were then 
principally coking coals due to the replacement of most of 
the thermal coal component of the energy trade by oil. 
The decades of the sixties and seventies then saw Australia 
and Canada emerge as major competitors to America as 
suppliers of coking coals to the then rapidly growing 
Japanese steel industry. Most of that growth in production 
capacity occurred in the Bowen Basin of central Queensland 
and in Alberta and British Columbia in Canada in the late 
sixties, throughout the seventies and in the early eighties. 
Since 1973, the US, Australia, and Canada have collectively 
provided in excess of 80% of the supply to the seaborne 
coking coal trade. Poland's market share has declined 
significantly, but there has recently been growth in Chinese 
and USSR Siberian exports into Asian markets. Table 1.2 
summarizes total seaborne coking coal quantities for selected 
years, and the changes in market share experienced by the 
major exporters of coking coals since 1963. 
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TABLE 1.2 
MAJOR COKING COAL EXPORTERS - MARKET SHARE TRENDS 
SEABORNE TRADE 
(Million Tonnes) 
Years 1963 1973 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1990 
Quantity 40 87 104 122 112 140 146 161 164 
Market Shares % 
USA 60.3 36.0 37.3 44.2 34.8 34.5 28.2 30.6 32.7 
Australia 5.6 32.3 33.4 33.4 37.6 35.5 37.6 34.8 34.7 
Canada 1.5 12.3 12.2 11.1 12.9 16.1 15.0 17.2 16.4 
Poland 5.8 7.5 7.4 2.7 5.2 3.9 6.0 5.6 5.4 
South - .1 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.2 
Africa 
Others 26.8 11.8 7.5 5.9 6.8 6.6 9.6 8.9 8.6 
(USSR, UK, China etc.) 
Source: Simpson,Spence & Young, Shipbrokers Ltd. 
Growth in Australia's importance as a coking coal exporter 
was primarily due to the rapid expansion of Queensland's hard 
coking coal export capacity in the seventies and early 
eighties, although some expansion of New South Wales (NSW) 
soft coking coal export capacity took place over the same 
time frame. 
The principal non communist importers of coking coal have 
been the steel manufacturers of North Asia and the EEC, and 
Table 1.3 provides details of the patterns of world imports 
from 1963 to 1989. 
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TABLE 1.3 
REGIONAL COKING COAL IMPORTS 
Year 1963 1973 1979 1981 1983 1985 1988 1989 
World Total 69.9 117.1 129.6 140.1 134.8 165.0 182.7 184.3 
(Million Tonnes) 
Industrialized Countries - % import share 
Canada 6.4 6.0 5.3 3.8 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.1 
EEC 56.8 31.3 26.7 24.9 21.4 22.9 23.6 23.5 
Other 
Western Europe 3.1 4.4 6.2 5.6 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.7 
Japan 13.3 47.7 43.3 46.6 44.3 42.5 37.6 37.3 
Developing Countries - % import share 
Latin America 3.3 2.8 4.9 3.8 5.4 6.7 6.4 6.2 
Asia .9 .5 4.6 6.3 7.6 8.2 11.6 11.8 
Africa/Mid East .9 .5 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.9 
Centrally Planned Economies - % import share 
Europe 15.3 6.8 6.9 6.6 8.1 8.1 n/a n/a 
Asia - - 1.2 1.0 1.0 .9 n/a n/a 
Sources : World Coal Outlook (198 6) - Vincent J. Calarco 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Coal Information (1990) - lEA. 
As Table 1.3 indicates, the steel producers of Europe and 
Japan are the principal importers of coking coal, and as 
Table 1.2 has shown, Australia, the US, and Canada are the 
major coking coal suppliers to these centres of steel 
manufacture. 
The changing patterns of coking coal trade associated with 
the growth of steel manufacture in North Asia are graphically 
depicted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, which highlight world 
imports and regional import share of the world total for the 
years of 1963, 1973, and 1989. 
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In the decade from 1963 to 1973, the annual rate of world 
wide imports of coking coal increased 47.2 million tonnes. 
Growth of imports into the North Asian region was 4 6.9 
million tonnes in that decade. In the sixteen year period 
from 1973 to 1989, the rate of world imports increased a 
further 67.2 million tonnes. The increase in North Asian 
imports was 34 million tonnes. Unlike the previous decade 
when growth was concentrated in North Asia, emerging steel 
industries in other regions such as Latin America, the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian subcontinent, accounted 
for a significant portion of the import growth in this latter 
period. 
1.1.5) Thermal Coal Trade Development 
Alternative energy commodities such as oil have had little 
direct impact on ironmaking demands for coking coal, as coke 
is an essential input for smelting using the blast furnace 
process. However the energy price shocks of 1973 and 1979 
which resulted both in major real price increases and supply 
uncertainty for both oil and gas, arrested the displacement 
of coal as an energy commodity for uses other than 
ironmaking. As has been described, and Table 1.4 confirms, 
a rapid expansion of the international thermal coal trade 
occurred between 1973 and 1981, and again in 1985. 
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TABLE 1.4 
MAJOR THERMAL COAL EXPORTERS - MARKET SHARE TRENDS 
SEABORNE TRADE 
(Million Tonnes) 
Years 
Quantity 
Market 
USA 
Austral 
South 
Africa 
Poland 
UK 
Others 
1963 
13 
Share % 
ia 
n/a 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
1973 
19 
9.5 
.5 
7.9 
60.5 
14.2 
7.4 
1979 
53 
5.8 
9.6 
39.6 
35.3 
4.0 
5.7 
1981 
86 
36.7 
12.3 
29.5 
4.7 
10.1 
6.7 
1983 
88 
18.2 
20.7 
29.8 
11.7 
7.1 
12.3 
1985 
133 
15.3 
27.9 
29.3 
10.3 
2.3 
14.9 
1986 
138 
15.1 
31.9 
29.8 
6.9 
2.0 
14.3 
1988 
145 
13.0 
29.3 
27.6 
3.6 
1.2 
25.3 
1990 
177 
16.0 
27.8 
25.9 
3.6 
1.2 
25.5 
(China, Columbia etc.) 
Sources: Simpson,Spence & Young, Shipbrokers Ltd. 
Coal Information (1990) - lEA. 
The small amount of international trade in thermal coals 
which did take place in the sixties occurred in Europe with 
Poland as the major exporter, and in North America, where 
some US thermal coals were exported to Canada and western 
Europe. There was little growth in the trade of thermal coals 
until after the initial oil price shock of 1973, which was 
later reinforced in 1979 with the commencement of the 
Iraq/Iran war and the second oil price increase. 
Despite the more modest growth of recent years, seaborne 
thermal coal trade volumes have increased by a factor of 
eleven since 1963 to approximately equal current coking coal 
traded quantities, with the major suppliers being Australia 
and South Africa. Since 1984, Columbia and China have 
expanded exports significantly: in 1990, each supplied about 
16 
7.5% of seaborne trade, and plans for substantial expansions 
have been announced by both nations. Indonesia has also 
announced the intention to develop several large export 
orientated thermal coal mines situated in the state of 
Kalimantan. 
Despite such spectacular growth, the thermal coal trade 
remains small relative to liquid hydrocarbons as the 
preferred internationally traded energy commodity. In 1979, 
the peak year for the oil trade, thermal coal was only 2% of 
the oil tonnage shipped (expressed in crude oil equivalent 
tonnes). In 1987, thermal coal traded tonnage had increased 
to about 8% of the internationally traded liquid hydrocarbon 
tonnage. 
The expansion of world trade in hard coal and the market 
share gained by Australia's export mines in both user 
segments of seaborne trade, are the major reasons for the 
large hard coal production increases indicated for Australia 
in Table 1.1. In 1989, Australia exported 66.5% of the total 
hard coal produced, 58% of exports being coking coal, and 42% 
as thermal coal. A similar situation occurred in Canada in 
1989, where 84% of the hard coal produced was exported, with 
87% of such exports being coking coal. Much of South Africa's 
coal production expansion was also export orientated, 
although the proportion is not so high as for Canada or 
Australia. In 1989, South Africa exported 25.6% of its hard 
coal production, with 92% of such exports being as thermal 
coal. In comparison, US exports to the seaborne trade 
17 
amounted to only 11.3% of hard coal production, with 65% 
being coking coal, while China's exports were only 1.5% of 
hard coal production, with 76% of these exports being thermal 
coal in 1989. 
Since the 1974/5 Australian financial year, the export of 
bituminous coals has been Australia's largest single 
commodity generator of export earnings, with mines from NSW 
and Queensland providing the output. 
The focus of this study is on Queensland's coking coal trade 
and its performance relative to international competition. 
Further analysis of historic production and trade development 
details will concentrate on the US, Canadian and Australian 
coking coal industries, and Queensland's place in the 
Australian industry. 
1.1.6) Recent Patterns of Trade for Coking Coals 
Annual coking coal exports for the three dominant world 
suppliers are shown for the years 1965 to 1989 in Figure 1.3. 
The US export trend shown by series "A", clearly indicates 
the importance of American supplies to world steel 
manufacturers early in the period. The steady growth of 
Australian supplies (series "B") over the entire duration 
demonstrates the patterns of demand substitution which 
resulted in America's displacement by Australia as the 
largest supplier to world markets in 1986. Series "C" shows 
Queensland's contribution to the growth of Australian 
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exports. It is clear that production expansion in Queensland 
has been the major factor behind the Australian penetration 
of international coking coal market share outlined in Table 
1.2. Also of interest is the similarity between the Canadian 
and Queensland patterns of export growth as shown by series 
"D" and "C" of Figure 1.3. Further comments relating to the 
influence of Japanese industrial policy on the parallel 
nature of these developments will be made in Chapters 4 and 
6. First the supply histories of each of the three major 
exporters will be examined in more detail. 
1.2) American Coking Coal Supply Industry 
1.2.1) American Export Industry 
The US has been a significant exporter of bituminous coals 
since WWII as a major supplier of coking coals (see Table 
1.2), and a swing supplier of thermal coals (see Table 1.4). 
US coal exports are sourced primarily from the Appalachian 
coal province, and in 1985 coals from this producing region 
accounted for 97% of America's exports. Coking coal 
production is concentrated in the states of West Virginia, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania in predominantly underground mines 
(96% in 1983). West Virginia is the largest producing state 
of the three with 56% of the combined total production of 233 
million tonnes in 1988. The remainder of production is split 
fairly evenly between Virginia (20%), and Pennsylvania (24%). 
Thermal coals are produced from a number of the states having 
Appalachian coal reserves, with mines from Eastern Kentucky 
20 
providing about 60% of the volumes exported, from both 
surface and underground operations. 
The US coking coal industry is unlike that of Queensland and 
Canada in that until fairly recently domestic consumption of 
coking coals exceeded exports. The annual trends in end use 
for US coking coals are shown in Figure 1.4, for the period 
from 1965 to 1989. 
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Figure 1.4 shows that a significant change has occurred in 
the US industry since 1965. Over the period, domestic 
consumption has generally declined, whilst exports have 
increased. Since 1981, exports of US coking coals have 
exceeded domestic consumption. With this change has come a 
restructuring of mine ownership within the US industry. 
Vertical integration by US steel makers into coal and iron 
ore production used be the norm. From the end of WW II until 
the mid sixties, captive mines supplied between 60 and 70% of 
the coking coal recjuirements of the domestic steel industry. 
These proportions have now reduced substantially. In 1988, 
captive mines supplied only 6.3% of the bituminous coal 
produced in the states of West Virginia, Virginia, and 
Pennsylvania which are Appalachia's largest coking coal 
producing states. This compares with a much larger proportion 
of 19.6% in 1965. 
The changes in the proportions of domestic coking coal 
consumption to exports, and the divestment of captive coal 
mining subsidiaries by the US steel industry has had 
important consequences as far as the international 
competitiveness of the US coking coal industry is concerned. 
No longer do US exports take place on the margin of domestic 
demand which was the case until the early eighties. The US 
coking coal industry is now export orientated with little 
vertical integration with steel manufacturers, as was the 
previous tradition. The implications of these changes will be 
addressed in greater detail in Chapter 7, when mine 
23 
production costs and labour productivity trends are examined. 
Figure 1.4 also shows significant fluctuations in exports 
from year to year. The reason that US consumption and exports 
suffered so severely in 1978 was due to a four month miner's 
strike in Appalachia. More recently, as exports from 
Australia and Canada have increased, US producers have 
assumed more of a swing supply role in the international 
coking coal trade, particularly in Pacific markets. 
Having outlined the growth in importance of exports to the US 
coking coal industry relative to domestic consumption, which 
is a fact not widely appreciated in Australian coal mining 
circles-'-*'*, recent changes in the patterns of trade will be 
examined. 
1.2.2) American Coking Coal Patterns of Trade 
As Table 1.3 has shown, the two largest import regions for 
coking coals are Western Europe and Japan. The United States 
is a significant supplier to both of these regions, as is 
indicated in Figure 1.5. 
1.4) Australian Coal Industry Working Party on Coal Demand 
- Department of Primary Industry and Energy "Demand for 
Australian Black Coal" AGPS Canberra (1989) p.75. 
FIGURE 1 . 5 
24 
in 
o > ^ 
X 
w 
h - ^ 
< 
o 
o 
o 
X, 
h—1 
o 
o 
(/D p 
1 — 1 
06 
fl 
fl 
fl 
< 
m 
CD 
fl 
fl 
o 
E-H 
fl 
o 
• r — 1 
•1 1 
S 
CO 
(D 
• i - i 
U 
(D 
CO 
[ ] 
o 
DO 
(p 
CO 
YK 
pq 
CO 
(P 
CP 
C 
0 
•H 
•p 
03 
• H 
O 
O 
to 
% 
*<: 
H 
nJ 
0 
U 
H 
(T3 
O 
• H 
4J 
nJ 
CO 
CO 
0 ^ 
o 
.VD 
O 
c 
o 
(f l '^ 
(fleH "• 
I 
u 
H 
O H I 
CIHO '— 
O o CJ^  
3 CO 
(S' - i (^ 
rt rH 
o 
H 
CO 4J 
" (C 
a 
(U 
u 
<13 
I 
a 
u 
>^  
CO 4J 
rH 
o 
O H U 
OH 
« .. 
CO 
O 
u 
I o 
ra CO 
i-H (fl 
- • J 
o 
25 
Coking coal exports from the US have fluctuated over the 
period from a low of 27.3 million tonnes in 1978, due to the 
extended miner's strike, to a high of 59.3 million tonnes in 
1981. In periods of high levels of pig iron production in 
both Western Europe and Japan, such as 1973 and 1974, and 
again in 1979 and 1980, US coking coal exports have risen 
rapidly. In periods of declining levels of pig iron 
production, such as occurred in Japan from 1975 to 1978, US 
exports were reduced markedly. In comparison with Australia 
and Canada, Figures 1.3 and 1.5 show clearly that US coking 
coal exporters have acted in the role of a swing supplier to 
the two major steel commodity import centres. This has been 
particularly the case for the Japanese steel industry for 
reasons to be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
However, steel manufacturers of Western Europe and Japan 
continue to be the largest importers of US coking coals along 
with Canada , South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil. In 1988, these 
users collectively imported 93% of America's exports. 
Although suffering losses in market share in the Pacific Rim 
to both Australia and Canada, and market share losses in 
Western Europe to Australia, the US remains a highly 
significant participant in the international coking coal 
trade. In 1989, total US export volumes of 59 million tonnes 
again exceeded those of Australia at 57 million tonnes. 
The recent volume history and patterns of trade for the 
Appalachian producers of the US, have been examined. The role 
that the coking coal exporters of western Canada have had in 
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the international coal trade will now be addressed. 
1.3) Canadian Coking Coal Export Industry 
1.3.1) Development of Export Trade 
Before 1969, Canadian production of coking coals was limited 
to modest volumes of hard coking coals from Alberta, destined 
for export to the Japanese steel industry. Canadian blast 
furnace production facilities are located mainly in the Great 
Lakes and eastern regions of the country. Due to the 
significance of transportation costs for a low value bulk 
commodity such as coal, coking coals are imported from the US 
to service these demands, rather than shipping western 
Canadian production the long distances to domestic steel 
plants. As a result, Canada remained a nett importer of 
coking coals until 1970. In that year, the rapid build up of 
exports from new large capacity western Canadian open cut 
mines dedicated to service Japanese steel industry demands 
finally offset coking coal imports from Appalachia. 
Canadian coking coal exports to Japan for the Japanese fiscal 
years (April 1st to March 31st) of 1963 to 1968 are compared 
with those of the US and Australia in Table 1.5. 
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TABLE 1.5 
SELECTED COKING COAL IMPORTS BY JAPAN 
(Million Tonnes per Fiscal Year) 
Japanese 
Fiscal Year 
Canada 
USA 
Australia 
1963 
.581 
5.324 
3.012 
1964 
.736 
5.474 
4.597 
1965 
.793 
6.489 
6.337 
1966 
.827 
7.377 
7.669 
1967 
.803 
10.933 
8.499 
1968 
.884 
14.590 
11.710 
Source: Coal Manual 1969 - The Tex Publishing Co. Tokyo 
The decline in Canada's percentage share of Japanese supplies 
evident in Table 1.5, resulted in efforts by the Japanese 
steel industry (JSI) via trading companies such as Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi, to improve diversity of supply by encouraging new 
mine developments in Alberta and British Columbia. The 
success of these efforts is borne out by the expansion of 
Canadian exports from 1969 to 1973, and the later expansion 
from 1983 to 1988, as evidenced in Figure 1.3 (series D). 
1.3.2) Canadian Mining Technolocrv 
Unlike US production from Appalachia which is predominantly 
underground, western Canadian coking coal is produced from 
comparatively shallow coal resources using open cut mining 
methods. Production first involves blasting and the removal 
of earth or weathered rock overburden with large earth moving 
machines to expose the coal seams. Raw coal is then removed 
from the exposed coal seam with smaller scale equipment and 
loaded into large capacity coal haulers for transport to a 
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preparation plant at the mine site for upgrading into a 
beneficiated export product. The overburden is then 
reinstated and surface contouring and vegetation 
reinstatement performed according to standards prescribed in 
mine lease agreements with various regulatory agencies. 
These operations involve the movement of very large 
quantities of materials. An open cut mine producing five 
million tonnes of product coal annually might frequently 
handle ten times that amount in bulk cubic metres of 
overburden. As a result, open cut operations tend to be 
large scale capital intensive facilities with high labour 
productivities relative to underground coal mines. Western 
Canada's export coking coal mines are predominantly of this 
type. As such they are best compared with similar open cut 
mines of the Bowen Basin of Queensland and the Hunter Valley 
of New South Wales when assessing competitiveness, rather 
than with the underground mines of Appalachia. 
1.3.3) Canadian Coking Coal Patterns of Trade 
For logistical reasons, and the nature of the development 
process for such large scale capital intensive ventures, 
Canada's trade was initially focussed towards the North Asian 
region. The oversupply situation in the international coking 
coal trade which occurred in the early eighties then forced 
exporters to seek alternative markets. 
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North Asian markets (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) 
accounted for essentially all the Canadian coking coal 
exports until the mid seventies. In 1976 sales to Sweden 
commenced, and in 1977 the Brazilian steel industry began 
importing Canadian coals. Since 1985, when 91% of exports 
were still shipped to North Asian steel manufacturers, the 
proportions have reduced each year so that in 1989, North 
Asian shipments were reduced to 8 0% of the total coking coal 
exports. Western European steelmakers as well as those of 
Brazil and Pakistan now import western Canadian coking coals 
despite the higher transportation costs involved relative to 
North Asian destinations. 
The two coking coal production industries of North America 
are cjuite different. The US industry is mature, and until 
the early eighties, domestically oriented. It consisted of 
many underground mines of modest capacity having cjuite 
different operating characteristics to the large open cut 
mines of western Canada. Due to the importance of logistics 
in the international coal trade, Atlantic markets offer 
advantages for American exporters, whereas the Pacific Rim 
has been the preferred market area for Canadian output. 
Australia is the third of the major players in the world 
coking coal trade, and Queensland's role in the Australian 
industry will be described. 
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1.4) Australian Coal Export Industry Development 
1.4.1) Coal Export Contributions 
Like western Canada, Australia is a comparative newcomer to 
the international coal trade, but since 1965 coal exports 
have expanded rapidly to become the largest single commodity 
contributor to the balance of trade, as shown in Table 1.6. 
TABLE 1.6 
AUSTRALIA'S PRINCIPAL COMMODITY EXPORTS 
(Annual Revenues - $A millions) 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Coal 
neg. 
• • 
76 
102 
142 
179 
210 
267 
325 
489 
890 
1185 
1394 
1479 
1608 
1683 
2290 
2533 
3343 
3937 
5061 
5318 
5043 
4612 
5080 
Wool 
779 
801 
754 
747 
797 
651 
511 
776 
1307 
921 
846 
1260 
1257 
1337 
1606 
1641 
1776 
1873 
1894 
1915 
2894 
3062 
4314 
5869 
5048 
Wheat 
337 
235 
448 
255 
324 
363 
432 
361 
201 
868 
1062 
919 
926 
765 
1515 
1976 
1471 
1974 
1156 
2454 
2570 
2877 
2006 
1409 
2562 
Beef 
neg. 
. . 
193 
206 
253 
295 
340 
507 
796 
340 
383 
550 
740 
972 
1545 
1257 
950 
1256 
1355 
1023 
1287 
1585 
1983 
1994 
2106 
Iron Ore 
neg. 
46 
73 
140 
230 
325 
405 
394 
453 
590 
748 
832 
952 
908 
1008 
1161 
1123 
1432 
1579 
1611 
2147 
1850 
1674 
1743 
2049 
Total 
Exports 
2683 
2831 
3105 
3148 
3768 
4259 
4599 
5419 
6719 
7685 
9123 
10774 
12050 
12591 
16711 
19269 
18684 
21032 
21417 
26417 
32601 
33792 
37798 
42176 
47533 
Source : International Financial Statistics - October 1990 
International Monetary Fund 
Coal is now the largest single commodity generator of export 
earning for Australia, exceeding wool (except for 1988), 
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wheat (except for 1980), beef, and iron ore, which are the 
other most significant single commodity items. As such, the 
future performance of this industry, and the maintenance of 
its international competitiveness, will be crucial in 
resolving the nation's current balance of trade and foreign 
debt difficulties. 
1.4.2) Queensland's Coal Industry Development 
Coal exports are also of great importance to the foreign 
earnings for Queensland as is indicated in Table 1.7. 
TABLE 1.7 
MAJOR COMMODITY CONTRIBUTORS TO QUEENSLAND EXPORT EARNINGS 
% CONTRIBUTION 
Fiscal 
Year 
1970/1 
1971/2 
1972/3 
1973/4 
1974/5 
1975/6 
1976/7 
1977/8 
1978/9 
1979/0 
1980/1 
1981/2 
1982/3 
1983/4 
1984/5 
1985/6 
1986/7 
1987/8 
1988/9 
Coal 
Coking 
9.4 
10.4 
12.4 
14.0 
20.4 
26.7 
27.2 
30.0 
24.1 
21.8 
23.4 
27.9 
34.2 
31.4 
32.6 
29.6 
28.5 
25.7 
21.3 
Thermal 
_* 
-
-
— 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.6 
2.7 
7.6 
10.3 
11.1 
9.1 
7.8 
Sugar 
18.4 
21.0 
18.8 
16.3 
30.9 
24.2 
22.4 
18.7 
13.5 
15.5 
25.2 
17.2 
12.4 
11.3 
8.7 
7.8 
8.0 
8.1 
9.0 
Beef 
19.2 
19.3 
22.6 
19.9 
7.6 
9.8 
9.9 
12.0 
17.4 
14.2 
10.9 
11.4 
12.7 
11.5 
9.3 
9.6 
11.5 
12.0 
10.1 
Metals 
11.2 
8.9 
7.0 
18.6 
8.3 
6.5 
6.5 
6.4 
7.1 
10.8 
11.6 
9.0 
20.9 
12.4 
11.3 
10.8 
10.6 
9.8 
13.5 
* Negligible amount 
Sources : Australian Bureau of Statistics #5402.3, #8502.3 
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Although thermal coal production and sales have contributed 
to recent export revenue growth, coking coals provided 73% of 
coal export earnings in 1988/89, and coal is by far the 
largest single commodity contributor for the state at 29.1% 
of foreign earnings. 
The rapid build up of foreign trade earnings from coal 
exports were the result of the rapid, and apart for 1985/86 
and 1988/89, sustained growth of export tonnages throughout 
the period beginning in Australian financial year 1955/56 to 
1988/89, as shown in Figure 1.6. Australian bituminous coal 
exports are made from both New South Wales and Queensland 
mines and Figure 1.6 also shows the Queensland contribution 
to the national total. 
Prior to 1963/64-'-'^, the Queensland coal industry was 
domestically oriented with most production concentrated in 
the south east corner of the state with underground mines in 
the Ipswich district servicing the electricity demands of 
Brisbane. Australia's exports were then primarily from NSW 
and were also sourced from underground mines in the southern 
1.5) Source materials used in developing this discussion 
include:"Black Coal in Australia"- The Joint Coal Board 
and the Queensland Coal Board Annual Reports for the 
years 1969 to 1989, Hince, K."Conflict and Coal" 
University of Queensland Press (1982), and personal 
notes of the author. 
FIGURE 1 .6 
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coastal coal districts adjacent to Port Kembla. These early 
mines were developed to serve the domestic demands of the 
Broken Hill Propriety Company (BHP) steel works and the hard 
caking quality of the coals was favourable for export. In the 
early seventies, Queensland's exports increased quite rapidly 
due to the commencement of operations of several large open 
cut coking coal mines in central Queensland's Bowen Basin 
managed by Utah International, an American multinational 
mining and construction group. 
1.4.3) Changing Export Trends and Queensland's Contribution 
The second phase of Australia's coal export expansion 
occurred from the mid seventies onwards, and was due to the 
expansion of thermal coal exports from the Hunter Valley and 
Newcastle regions of NSW together with the establishment of 
several new large scale open cut coal mines in the Bowen 
Basin in the late seventies and early eighties. 
The changing mix of Australia's coal exports can be gleaned 
from Figure 1.7, which shows both the total coal exports and 
coking coal exports for the period. Until 1974/75, thermal 
coal exports were negligible in comparison to coking coal. 
Following the first oil price shock of late 1973, thermal 
coal exports have been the principal contributors to total 
export growth. Until the start-up of the Newlands mine in 
1984, and the expansion of Blair Athol in 1985, most of 
Australia's thermal coal export expansion came from NSW. As 
was the case for Queensland, the NSW coal expansions have 
FIGURE 1 . 7 
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been due mainly to the establishment of large open cut mines 
in the Hunter Valley coal region which produce both thermal 
coals and also high volatile or "soft" coking coals primarily 
for North Asian export markets. 
An understanding of Queensland's coking coal industry 
performance requires a breakdown of Australia's coking coal 
exports by state. Apart from the very early years, 
Queensland's exports of hard coking coals have provided most 
of Australia's growth in the international coking coal trade. 
The contribution from NSW has been mainly due the expansion 
of soft coking coal exports which occurred in the late 
seventies in competition with South Africa to serve growing 
demands from North Asia. 
Queensland has contributed two phases of quite rapid export 
expansion. The first was in the early seventies with the 
startup of several large Utah operated mines. The second 
phase occurred in the early eighties when production from a 
number of new open cut facilities commenced. 
1.4.4) Australian Coking Coal Patterns of Trade 
The Japanese steel industry (JSI) is an acknowledged leader 
in coking coal blending, and has been instrumental in 
initiating changes in coal quality demands which have caused 
major changes in the patterns of trade for Australia's 
exports. The effect of such changes, as well as the results 
of market diversification efforts by Queensland's coking coal 
FIGURE 1 . 8 
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exporters on Australia's patterns of trade, will now be 
described^•^. 
The development of the Australian and Queensland coking coal 
patterns of trade are shown in Figure 1.8. 
In the initial period from financial years 1955/56 to 
1960/61, coking coals were exported to Japan from the 
Burragorang Valley and South Coast mining districts of NSW 
near Port Kembla south of Sydney. These mines had been 
developed primarily to service the BHP steelworks at Port 
Kembla, and exporting was very much a secondary activity 
relative to supplying domestic coking coal demands. In these 
initial stages a reasonable analogy could be drawn between 
the Australian and US coking coal industries, with both 
having a high level of vertical integration in an industry 
which consisted mainly of captive underground mines having 
the primary purpose of servicing domestic steel industry 
demands. 
In the early sixties the first fully export orientated coking 
coal mine was developed at Moura in the southern Bowen Basin 
of Queensland. The Moura project was operated by the Peabody 
Coal Company of the US (50% equity), and had Australian and 
Japanese minority interests (25% Thiess, 25% Mitsui). The 
1.6) Source materials used for this discussion include "Black 
Coal in Australia" the Joint Coal Board - 1978/79 to 
1988/89, and Queensland Coal Board Annual Reports years 
1968/69 to 1989/90. 
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financing of the development was based on a long term sales 
agreement with annual sales quantities defined, and a pricing 
formula based on the recovery of production costs. This 
export mine development was important as it set the precedent 
for a number of new export oriented coking coal mines to be 
constructed in both central Queensland and western Canada 
over the next twenty years to supply growing demands of the 
JSI. The strategic management implications of the Moura 
project will be discussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 8. 
1.4.5) Queensland's Patterns of Coking Coal Trade 
Due mainly to this pattern of mine development, Queensland's 
coking coal exports remained totally dedicated to the 
Japanese steel industry (JSI) until the end of the decade. 
In financial years 1969/70 and 70/71, small quantities of 
Queensland coking coal first began to be exported to Europe, 
initiating a period of market diversification. The patterns 
of Queensland's exports from 1969/70 to 1989/90 are shown in 
Figure 1.9. 
FIGURE 1 . 9 
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All Queensland coking coal exports were shipped to Japan 
(shown in Series "C" of Figure 1.9) from the commencement of 
operations of the Moura mine in 1959/60, until a cargo of 
26,000 tonnes was shipped to Western Europe in 1969/70. 
Another small shipment was made the following year, and in 
1971/72 shipments to Europe commenced in earnest. 
Coking coal exports to the two main steel manufacturing areas 
of Japan and Western Europe (which includes Yugoslavia and 
Romania), then accounted for all Queensland's shipments until 
1974/75, when the first cargo was shipped to Latin America 
(Argentina). 
In 1975/76 shipments to other North Asian customers (South 
Korea and Taiwan) commenced, and two years later shipments 
were made to the US and Brazil (series "E"-Other, of Figure 
1.9). North Asian markets now include mainland China as well 
as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and the Japanese share of 
this market was 78% in 1989/90. 
Since 1984/85 considerable growth has occurred in the "other" 
market category, which includes sales to Egypt, Turkey, Iran, 
and India as well as Brazil and other Latin American 
destinations. The future ability of Queensland's exporters to 
diversify into new non-OECD markets is of importance, as it 
will be shown in Chapter 3 that world demand for coke in 
steel manufacture is in a process of transition from the 
industrialized OECD countries of Europe, North America and 
Japan, to the developing countries of Asia, the eastern 
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Mediterranean, and Latin America. 
Dependence on the JSI as principal customer for coking coals 
has been reduced since the inception of Queensland's 
industry. However the influence of the Japanese industry on 
North Asian coking coal prices remains highly significant, 
and the possible presence of market distortion in the various 
regional importing markets will be further examined in 
Chapter 6. 
1.5) Summary of Findings 
Patterns of international trade in energy commodities are 
dynamic. Since WW II, oil has displaced coal as the principal 
traded energy commodity, and coal's share of energy use in 
OECD countries was declining until the oil shocks of the 
seventies. Since the first oil shock of 1973 the pattern of 
declining coal consumption for stationary energy generation 
has been reversed within OECD countries. 
The US displaced the UK as the world's leading exporter of 
coal following WW II. Australia became a significant exporter 
of coking coals in the sixties, and South Africa rapidily 
expanded its thermal coal exports in the seventies. The 
international coking coal trade is currently dominated by the 
US, Australia, and Canada. All three major suppliers are now 
predominantly export market oriented (the US since the 8 2/8 3 
recession). 
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With the decline in US steel industry demands for coking coal 
has come reductions in vertical integration, and changes of 
ownership of coking coal mines. US exports no longer take 
place on the margin of domestic demands, which was the case 
until the early eighties. 
The coking coal producers of Appalachia have become swing 
suppliers of coking coal to Pacific markets, while Australian 
and Canadian producers supply the base load demands of North 
Asian steel producers. 
The bulk of world demands for internationally traded coking 
coals are associated with steel manufacture in North Asia and 
the EEC, although much of the more recent demand growth has 
been from steel industry growth in lesser developed 
countries. 
Coal is the largest single commodity export for Australia, 
and by far the largest export earning activity in Queensland. 
The state has provided most of the increase of Australia's 
coking coal exports. In the twenty year period from 1967/68 
to 1987/88, Queensland's coking coal exports have averaged an 
annual compound growth rate of 17.38%. Compound growth in the 
last two years is less than 1% per annum. 
The next topic of the dissertation is concerned with price 
behaviour in energy commodity markets, an investigation of 
possible linkages between oil and coal prices, and the 
relationship between coking and thermal coal prices. 
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Chapter 2. 
ENERGY COMMODITY PRICE EVOLUTION 
This chapter examines overall pricing behaviour, and the 
interrelationship between price movements of the various 
internationally traded energy commodities from the early 
sixties to 1988. The price behaviour and user response of US 
energy markets is examined in some detail, as the US was 
shown in Chapter 1 to be the dominant supplier of traded 
coking coal in the sixties and seventies. The US remains a 
significant supplier and competitor for Queensland in both 
the coking and thermal coal trades to the major importing 
regions of Asia and Western Europe. Coal price movements in 
the US domestic market have therefore influenced all 
internationally traded coal prices, including those obtained 
for Queensland's exports. 
2.1) International Energy Price Movements 
As was described in Chapter 1, liquid petroleum remains the 
most widely traded energy commodity despite the recent growth 
in the thermal coal trade. In 1987, international trade in 
oil and refined products supplied about six and one half 
times the energy equivalence of traded coal. Because of this 
dominant role in the energy trade, one cannot ignore oil 
prices movements and the influence such movements may have on 
other energy commodities when examining international energy 
price trends and trade patterns. 
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2.1.1) Oil Price History 
Oil is a commodity with a history of violent price 
fluctuations over the years, and a long record of attempts 
by various public and private sector entities to defeat 
competitive market pricing mechanisms. Soon after the oil 
industry's birth in the mid nineteenth century in 
Pennsylvania, J.D. Rockefeller had formed the Standard Oil 
Trust, which by the turn of the century had virtually 
acquired a monopoly of the US industry. Much of Standard 
Oil's success was due to an early recognition of the 
importance of the transportation element and oligopsony power 
in the control of energy industries. By gaining monopoly 
control of the rail and pipeline systems necessary for crude 
oil and product distribution. Rockefeller was able to dictate 
the price of oil obtained by producers. As a result of the 
destructive competition amongst producers which followed, 
and use of market power afforded by the control of the 
transportation segments, he was eventually able to take over 
all operations in the processing chain, to monopolize the 
entire industry^ * •'-. 
The Standard Oil monopoly was broken by anti-trust 
legislation passed by the US government at the turn of the 
century. Then new discoveries of large oil fields in Texas 
2.1) An account of the formation of the Standard Oil Trust 
and Rockefeller's business strategies can be found in 
Sampson, A. "The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies 
and the World They Shaped" Viking Press (1975) New York 
Chapter 2. 
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and Oklahoma caused a glut of oil supply in the US. The 
sustained period of excess production capacity which followed 
these discoveries resulted in a collapse of oil prices which 
eventually led to control of the industry by the Texas 
Railroad Commission and other state regulatory agencies by 
the mid nineteen thirties. The Texas Railroad commission 
introduced strict production proration rules to limit the 
supply of US crude oil to refiners, thus balancing supply 
with demand, and preventing destructive competition between 
low marginal cost producers with excess production capacity. 
Eventually, due to declining discovery rates and ever 
increasing oil use, US domestic oil production at full 
capacity was unable to keep pace with the demand growth of 
the fifties and sixties. The price control of oil was then 
shared between US state regulatory agencies and a group made 
up of seven international oil companies later to be known as 
the "Seven Sisters", consisting of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, 
Gulf, Standard of California, Shell, and British Petroleum. 
These companies with their many production supply arrangement 
and refining interests, effectively exercised oligopoly 
control of oil from the Middle East^*^. 
In 1973, the power of the Seven Sisters was broken by the 
Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) which assumed 
control of the facilities previously owned and operated by 
2.2) For a comprehensive discussion of oil price behaviour 
between the end of WWII and 1971, see Adelman M. A., 
"The World Petroleum Market" The John Hopkins University 
Press (1972) 
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the international oil companies, and dictated world oil 
prices until 1982, when market forces which had long been 
absent from this industry, began to re-assert themselves. In 
1986, Saudi Arabia ceased to accept the role of swing 
supplier to balance world oil supply with demand, and the 
resulting glut caused oil prices to drop to below 
$10.0 per barrel, price levels not experienced since national 
sovereignty over their oil was established by the OPEC 
nations in 1973. Oil prices fluctuated wildly during the 
1990/91 Gulf conflict, exceeding $40 per barrel for a short 
time, and by mid 1991 settled back to the $18 to $20 per 
barrel range. 
Such a history of supply control and price manipulation over 
the years makes the selection of realistic market clearing 
prices for oil difficult. The international oil company 
posted prices for Middle East production in the fifties and 
sixties were not necessarily reflective of true arm's length 
transactions, as most oil produced by these companies was 
sold to captive downstream operations. Posted prices were 
often a transfer price device which could be used to move 
profits between operating entities to satisfy corporate tax 
or book profit objectives. Furthermore, these prices had no 
systematic relationship with the costs of discovery, 
development, and production of oil in the Middle East, and 
would have proved unsustainable had competitive markets 
existed in the international oil industry. 
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2.1.2) Other Fuel Prices in US Energy Markets 
The events of late 1973 and 1979, which resulted in real US 
dollar price increases of 700% for Middle East crude oil 
between 1973 and 1980, have been followed by periods of rapid 
decline when prices have fallen close to levels last seen 
prior to the first oil shock of 1973. Figure 2.1 shows the 
fluctuations between 1960 and 1989 (in 1987 constant $US 
terms), of fuel oil prices paid by the US electricity 
generating industry, together with the real price movements 
of thermal and coking coals produced and sold for domestic 
consumption and export. It should be noted that in Figure 
2.1, oil prices include ocean transportation costs to the 
customer (or cif prices), whereas thermal coal prices are 
given at the mine load-out with no transportation, and coking 
coal prices are export prices to Japan at the port of export 
(fob including rail transportation). 
2.2) Energy Commodity Price Relationships 
A question which immediately arises from the trends shown in 
Figure 2.1 concerns the close similarity of price behaviour 
between fuel oil and coal in US energy markets at the time of 
the first oil price shock of 1974, compared with the lack of 
response of coal prices during the 1979 to 1981 fuel oil 
price rises. Some effort to investigate the reasons behind 
such apparently unrelated behaviour is warranted because of 
the possibility that world oil prices in the nineties may 
repeat the cycle of the seventies with a large stepwise 
FIGURE 2 . 1 
4 9 
o 
o " 
o 
kD 
C\2 
O 
O 
C\2 
O 
kD 
T—1 
O 
O' 
t—I 
o 
I D 
a> 
OD 
r-
P 
ip 
Tf 
CO 
C\2 
1—1 
o 
CO 
a> 
CO 
r-
P 
\p 
Tt< 
CO 
w 
1—( 
o 
cx> 
CO 
r-
CD 
*^  
!P 
r^  
CO 
C\2 
1—1 
O 
CD 
H 
CO 
(P 
(P 
w 
>k 
c:^  
CO 
G^ 
^ 
o 
CO 
(P 
c (P 
w 
-2 ^ 
o 
CD 
C5:) 
T — 1 
UI 
^ 
L;> 
CO 
tp 
c (P 
CO ^ 
CD 
f 
c 
/ 
E| 
CO 
CP 
(P 
/2 
- I -H 
o 1 
C4 
(ao 
d 
• r H 
o 
u 
1 
Q 
00 
(U o 
PH 
<v 
• i-H 
s 
1—( 
g 
l~, 
<D 
^ 
H 
pq 
PQ 
CO 
tD 
1 
to 
Ad 
o O 
< 
H 
1 
G 
^ o 
rfl 
<D 
>H 
to 
H 
(fl 
U 
4J 
0 
a 
'C 
o 
u (^ 
(U H 
C 
•H 
s 
to 
<D 
0 
So
ur
 
ffl 
0 
< 
H 
J 
—. 
CO 
H 
— 
•H 
J> 
<D 
ct; 
^ 
b M 
Q) 
c 
w 
H (fl 
3 
C 
d 
CJ < 
50 
increase sometime later in the decade. This has been a 
scenario proposed by some energy experts due to declining oil 
exploration and production development activity in non 
OPEC producing countries with low oil prices. Such trends 
cause increased dependence on Middle East supplies. Cartel 
manipulation of oil prices as OPEC market power increases 
towards the end of the decade, or severe price fluctuations 
due to supply disruptions associated with civil unrest or war 
in the region are envisaged under this scenario. 
At first sight there would seem little economic rationale for 
price interaction between thermal coal and oil in the 
electricity generating industry in the short term. Most 
fossil fuelled power stations are designed to burn either 
coal, oil, or natural gas. Once a generating facility is 
constructed there is little flexibility to switch fuels 
without capital investment in plant alterations, which can be 
quite substantial when changing from oil or gas firing to 
coal. 
A less obvious but potentially more significant cross 
elasticity of demand relationship can occur between fuel oil 
and thermal coal through fuel switching in thermal 
electricity energy markets, if the presence of underutilized 
coal fired generating capacity permits thermal coal usage to 
be increased in the short term to offset increases in fuel 
oil price. The economic circumstances and sequence of events 
supporting such interactions will now be described. 
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2.2.1) Fuel Substitution in the Electricity Industry 
It is common in electricity industry practice that supply is 
generated from a number of different power plant facilities, 
categorized in groups depending on the short run economics of 
operation of each power station. The newest most efficient 
plants having the greatest economies of scale in generation 
and the lowest average costs of energy delivery to the larger 
centres of demand are considered base load suppliers. Such 
facilities may be nuclear powered with low average cash costs 
of generation, or the newer fossil fuel plants where the 
necessary fuel supplies are predictable and have been 
contracted under long term supply agreements at low prices to 
reflect the security of offtake to the fuel supplier in such 
supply arrangements. For these reasons, base load facilities 
are not likely to be impacted by interfuel price competition 
in the short run. Base load plants tend to be operated for 
sustained periods at steady levels of output which are at or 
close to full rated capacity, and they provide the largest 
portion of electrical energy generated for the entire system. 
The next category of generating facilities ranked with 
respect to energy delivered to the system, is known as the 
intermediate group. Units in this category will operate at 
full capacity at times of peak daily demand at certain times 
of the year in periods of maximum seasonal demands such as 
mid winter for heating demands, or the mid summer for maximum 
air conditioning load in warmer regions. The forecasting of 
fuel requirements for these plants is more difficult as their 
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total output will be a function of the business cycle as well 
as the weather patterns, and both are somewhat unpredictable. 
Fuel supplies for the intermediate segment of the generating 
system may have long, intermediate, and short term 
contractual components, depending on the forecasting 
confidence and risk taking attitudes of the utility company 
management. Therefore some potential for interfuel 
competition and a short run cross elasticity of demand 
relationship with fuel price changes between fuel types 
might exist within this generating segment. 
The remaining category of generating plant is the peak load 
supply segment. Generating units in this category may consist 
of those older less fuel efficient fossil fuelled plants 
lacking economies of scale, whose operating and maintenance 
costs are high, as well as hydroelectric (or pump storage) 
plants having limited water supplies, or low capital cost 
specialty peak generating units perhaps having fuel 
substitution capabilities which have been built close to 
concentrated demand centres. It is mainly in this first group 
of peak load generating facilities that one might expect to 
detect short run cross elasticity of demand behaviour, 
especially in situations where a long term trend in fuel 
substitution had been taking place prior to a sudden price 
increase in the newly favoured fuel. 
In the mid sixties and early seventies, the electricity 
generation industry of the Atlantic seaboard region of the 
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United States^ * -^  was a good example of a system which might 
exhibit such short run cross elasticity of demand between oil 
and coal in the manner just described. 
2.3) US Electrical Energy Substitutions between Oil and Coal 
After 1966, when the import controls which had prevented the 
import of cheap foreign sourced residual oil were effectively 
removed, electricity producers along the Atlantic seaboard 
rapidly moved to oil fired power generation for their new 
base load capacity additions. For the New England generating 
region, consisting of the states of Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, oil 
fuelled steam generation increased from 42% of total steam 
generation in 1966 to 85% by 1971. Over the same period coal 
use for steam generation declined from 56% to 13%. In the 
Middle Atlantic generating region consisting of the states of 
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, oil use for steam 
generation increased from 21% in 1966, to 40% in 1971. Again 
coal use for steam generation declined from 73% in 1966 to 
54% in 1971. Finally in the South Atlantic generating region 
made up of the states of Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North and South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and the District of Columbia, oil fuelled steam generation 
increased from 12% in 1966, to 23% by 1971. In that same time 
frame, coal use declined from 80% to 62%. 
2.3) Detailed descriptions of fuel use trends for 
electricity generation in the US prior to 1973 can be 
found in Gordon, R.L."U.S. Coal and the Electric Power 
Industry" Johns Hopkins University Press (1975) Table 
2.4, p.22-23. 
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To achieve the rapid changes in the patterns of fuel use 
described within these generating regions, new base load 
facility additions were being constructed to use fuel oil, 
and existing coal fired power plants were being retired or 
downrated to intermediate and peak load status. Many of these 
coal fired plants could have been moved to these lower 
utilization categories quite early in the normal operating 
life for such facilities, which can be twenty five years and 
more. 
The late 197 3 crude oil price rise and oil embargo from Arab 
producers then caused a sharp reversal in the trends of an 
increasing use of fuel oil for electricity generation 
along the Atlantic seaboard, with coal becoming the only 
practical replacement source of fuel in the short term. The 
older underutilized coal fired facilities, which had been 
placed into the peak and intermediate load generating 
categories in the era of cheap fuel oil, could then be 
operated as intermediate or base load facilities as soon as 
additional coal supplies could be obtained. Such actions 
enabled the rapid substitution of coal fired generation for 
oil in each local region served by individual companies and 
the opportunity to sell coal generated electricity to 
neighbouring regions through inter-regional grid connections. 
Such actions by power company managements, together with the 
construction of new coal fired facility additions resulted in 
increased demands for thermal coals throughout the US 
electricity generating industry, as evidenced by the 
statistics presented in Table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.1 
UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION AND FOSSIL FUEL USAGE 
Electricity Generated (Terrawatt hours per year) 
Year Total Coal Generation Oil Generation Gas Generation 
1959 
1971 
1973 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
710 
1614 
1975 
2316 
2362 
2401 
2411 
2377 
2449 
2563 
2622 
2640 
2733 
2872 
2954 
378, 
714, 
907, 
1019, 
1134, 
1225, 
1269. 
1275. 
1347. 
1435. 
1499. 
1482. 
1566. 
1645. 
1660. 
.4 
.7 
.4 
.4 
.7 
.9 
.8 
,6 
.9 
,6 
,0 
,8 
,2 
,9 
,5 
0 
6 
2 
5 
6 
2 
2 
1 
146. 
375, 
364, 
326, 
347, 
365. 
364. 
326, 
293, 
318. 
312, 
265. 
291. 
270. 
283. 
7.27 
-1.6E 
.6 
.9 
,9 
.8 
.6 
.3 
.8 
,6 
,3 
,2 
,4 
,9 
7 
5 
5 
'% 
i% 
46.8 
218.2 
336 
390 
320 
259, 
217.8 
157.1 
154 
128 
107. 
146, 
126.8 
159.2 
169.3 
Average Annual % Change '59 to '73 
8.18% 6.96% 16.37% 
Average Annual % Change '73 to '89 
2.72% 4.1% -4.5% 
Sources: Coal Information (1983 to 1990) Annual Publications 
of the International Energy Agency (lEA) 
Gordon, R.L."US Coal and the Electric Power 
Industry" Johns Hopkins University Press (1975) 
Table 2.3, p.21. 
Since 1973, coal use for electrical generation has increased 
steadily at an average annual rate of 4.1%, while total 
electricity generation has averaged only 2.72% annual growth. 
The fossil fuel showing the greatest decline in contribution 
to electricity generation has been fuel oil^*^. However in 
the period from 1959 to 1973, prior to the first oil shock, 
the reverse situation occurred. Growth in coal use lagged 
2.4) Further discussion of the replacement of fuel oil by 
coal for power generation in the US can be found in 
Gordon, R.L. " The Rise and Fall of Oil Generation in 
the USA : A Study in Institutional Adaptability " Energy 
Economics (7), No.2, (April 1985), p.66-76. 
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overall electricity growth, and the use of fuel oil for power 
generation (16.37% annual average growth) grew at twice the 
rate of growth of overall electricity generation (8.18%). 
A final observation should be made with respect to the 
existence of short run cross elasticity of demand and the 
option for fuel switching in the US electrical generating 
industry. The very recent reversal of the decline in fuel oil 
use shown since 1986 can be readily understood when the data 
shown in Table 2.1, and the fuel oil price trends shown in 
Figure 2.1 are considered in conjunction. The presence of 
underutilized oil fired generating capacity or dual coal /oil 
fired capacity which now exists in areas of the US such as 
the New England generating region, permits rapid switching 
back to fuel oil when oil prices fall, as occurred in 1985. 
Should oil prices stay in the range of $18 to $20 per barrel, 
as is the conventional wisdom, no move back to oil use for 
new capacity additions is likely with recent US domestic 
steaming coal prices. It would take a long period of the 
coal/oil price relativities similar to the sixties, together 
with the conviction that such relativities are likely to 
continue over the life of new facilities, to cause a reversal 
back to oil as the preferred fuel for new plant additions. 
2.3.1) Historic Behaviour Relative to Micro-Economic Theory 
In competitive markets having an inelastic price elasticity 
of supply in the short term, one would anticipate that the 
1973/74 rise in coal demands arising from the sequence of 
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events described above, would cause price increases until the 
higher prices attracted increased supply capacity, and a new 
market equilibrium was established. Recognizing the time 
needed to construct new mines and logistical infrastructure, 
the short run elasticity of supply for coal tends to be 
inelastic. This means that additional supplies available in 
the short run will tend to come from those least efficient 
highest marginal cost mines having spare productive capacity 
just prior to the first oil shock. Prices for thermal coal 
are then likely to rise beyond the long run marginal costs of 
production which micro-economic theory would predict as the 
long run etjuilibrium price in competitive markets. The coal 
utilization and price statistics for the Atlantic seaboard 
region will now be examined to see if the sequence of events 
just described is supported by actual coal usage patterns and 
price behaviour. 
2.4) Appalachian Thermal Coal Utilization and Price Behaviour 
2.4.1) Data Sources and Limitations 
Coal production, price, and end use statistical data is 
published by state, by production district, and in some years 
by county, in Minerals Yearbooks published annually by the US 
Bureau of Mines (USBM) until 1976. After 1976, the US Energy 
Information Administration's (EIA) annual publication, "Coal 
Production" provides such coal statistics, although not in an 
identical format to that of the Minerals Yearbooks. This lack 
of continuity has complicated efforts to develop trend 
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analyses for the duration of this study. 
Several problems exist in using annual USBM and EIA pricing 
data as being representative of market prices. Firstly, the 
prices are annual averages for producing areas containing 
many mines which produce both coking and thermal coals of 
differing qualities which impact value to the various 
consumers and therefore price. Secondly, these average prices 
are calculated by simply dividing annual mine sales revenues 
by sales quantities, so the data contains both short term or 
"spot" sales, as well as longer term contract sales. 
Depending on the proportions of spot versus longer term sales 
in any particular year, this annual price may be reflective 
of short run supply/demand forces, or the expected 
equilibrium of price with long run marginal cost beliefs 
existing in the market when the long term contracts were 
initially agreed. However no other comparable sources of 
price data are available over the duration necessary for use 
in this investigation in which the trends in coal and oil 
price over a twenty nine year period are of interest. So USBM 
and EIA statistics have been used in this study of US coal 
markets, despite the shortcomings associated with annual 
averaged prices and the difficulty in distinguishing between 
coking and thermal coal market price behaviour. 
The US coal statistics which have been published annually in 
a reasonably consistent fashion over the period from 1960 to 
1988, are those reported for the various coal producing 
states. This study is primarily concerned with the 
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international trade and price behaviour of coking coals. 
It would seem that the American state which would be best 
selected to test the setjuence of events proposed to account 
for the similarity of oil and coal price behaviour in 1973/74 
would be West Virginia. This state is the second largest 
Appalachian coal producer after Kentucky, it is the largest 
producer of coking coals for both domestic consumption and 
export, and it is a significant producer of thermal coals for 
the Middle and South Atlantic generating regions. 
The problem with using West Virginian statistics to examine 
usage and price behaviour in the electrical generating 
industry lies in the difficulty of separating the coking coal 
demand and price trend behaviour from that of thermal coals. 
One possible solution to this difficulty lies in selecting 
statistics from other states or regions having coal 
production dominated by one or other of these end use 
markets. Kentucky is one such producing state, having only a 
small proportion of coking coal sales (about 10% in 1976) 
relative to the sales of thermal coal to power plants. Also, 
the little coking coal which is produced tends to be from 
captive mines owned by steel manufacturers located in the 
eastern counties of the state. Open market price statistics 
can thus be used for Kentucky from 1960 to 1972, and for 
Eastern Kentucky after 1972, as shown in Figure 2.2, to 
provide a reasonable representation of thermal coal price 
trends for mines serving Atlantic seaboard thermal coal 
demands. A comparison of these trends with oil prices, can 
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then determine if industry statistics actually support the 
sequence of events postulated to have linked short run 
thermal coal price behaviour with that of fuel oil. 
2.4.2) Appalachian Thermal Coal Price History 
Several observations can be made regarding the price trends 
presented in Figure 2.2. Firstly, the decade of the sixties 
was remarkably stable for thermal coal and fuel oil prices. 
Real open market mine prices in the state of Kentucky 
gradually declined from 1960 to 1969, despite production 
rising from 60.6 million tonnes to 110.2 million tonnes over 
the same period, indicating the likelihood that long run 
marginal costs were also declining for the industry at that 
time. 
The initial departure from this trend of declining real coal 
prices which came in 1970 has been associated with the 
increased costs incurred by underground mines in meeting the 
more stringent mine health and safety regulations first 
introduced by the US Federal government in 1969^*^. It will 
be shown in Chapter 7, when the micro-economic response of 
the US coal industry to the large fluctuation in prices is 
examined, that the 1969 safety and health regulations had the 
initial effect of contributing to lower labour productivities 
in underground operations throughout the Appalachian coal 
2.5) Zimmerman, M.B."Long Run Mineral Supply : The Case of 
Coal in the United States" Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1975). p.81. 
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province. Prices subsequently increased over the period from 
1970 to 1973, perhaps reflecting increased long run marginal 
costs as operators adjusted to a new regulatory environment. 
A sudden two hundred and thirty two percent real increase in 
thermal coal prices then occurred from 1973 to 1974, the same 
year that fuel oil prices also increased quite dramatically 
due to the actions of the OPEC cartel. A fifteen percent 
increase in coal production also occurred in East Kentucky in 
in 1974 due to increased coal demands of the power industry 
to replace fuel oil lost from the OPEC embargo. 
These statistics are consistent with the sequence of events 
postulated for the electrical generating industry during the 
first oil shock of 1973/74. Short run cross elasticity of 
demand between coal and oil apparently did exist in the 
region at the time, and some fuel switching was possible. 
The chain of events linking the 1974 thermal coal price 
increases to oil price increases in the electricity supply 
industry which has been described is consistent with industry 
data. However, the reasons behind the quite similar behaviour 
of coking coal prices apparent in Figure 2.1, also require 
explanation. 
2.5) Appalachian Coking Coal Price and Demand Behaviour 
As far as the steel industry is concerned, oil cannot fully 
substitute for the essential role which coke plays in the 
blast furnace ironmaking process. Consequently a short run 
63 
cross elasticity of demand between oil and coking coals might 
not exist through fuel switching as was the case for thermal 
coals and fuel oil in the power generation industry. However 
there is some room for partial substitution of coal (or coke) 
as a source of energy to the blast furnace in situations 
where oil is being injected as a method for reducing coke 
consumption per tonne of pig iron produced. In 197 3, this 
approach had become widely adopted in Japan, and that year 
oil supplied about 18% of the energy required for blast 
furnace ironmaking. Although an 18% contribution is 
significant in an operating sense, a rapid substitution of 
coke for oil and the resulting increased Japanese demand for 
US coking coals, does not seem sufficient to explain the 
substantial real coking coal price increase in the US which 
actually occurred in the same time frame as that of the fuel 
oil and thermal coal price rises. 
2.5.1) Data Sources and Limitations 
To investigate coking coal price behaviour in US markets, a 
region having a high proportion of coking coal production 
must be identified. The USBM coal producing District #7 is a 
region which essentially produces coking coals both for 
export and domestic consumption^*^. A detailed list of the 
counties of the states of Virginia and West Virginia included 
in District #7 can be found in the annual "Coal Production" 
reports of the US Energy Information Administration. The 
2.6) Ibid. p.28. 
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average mine price statistics for District #7 from 1960 to 
1988 are illustrated in Figure 2.3, together with fuel oil 
and the Kentucky/East Kentucky. 
2.5.2) Comparison of Thermal and Coking Coal Prices 
Several comments regarding the trends shown in Figure 2.3 are 
warranted. It should be noted that bituminous coal prices in 
the US for which this data is typical, had commenced 
increasing in real terms in 1969, well before the first oil 
price shock. This has been attributed to the cost impact on 
underground mining operations of the health and safety 
regulations promulgated in that year. Then in 1974, prices 
for all three energy commodities increased in unison. Coking 
coal prices peaked in real terms in 1975, and have been 
declining since. The traditional premium commanded by coking 
coals in Appalachian markets has now eroded to the point that 
in 1988 both coking and thermal coals received comparable 
prices at the mine-loadout. Reasons for simultaneous oil and 
thermal coal price increases have already been suggested, but 
what are the reasons which could explain coking coal's price 
behaviour in US energy markets? 
2.6) Coal Washing in the US Coking Coal Industry 
From 1950 to 1960, the proportion of all coals used for coke 
making in the US which had been upgraded by mechanical 
cleaning to reduce the ash content, increased from 31% to 
FIGURE 2 . 3 
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84%. By the early seventies^*^, practically all coking coal 
produced in the US (>95%), was upgraded through physical 
separation processes which involved removal of much of the 
ash inherent in raw coking coal by "washing". The output from 
these preparation plants usually consists of several streams. 
The prime product produced is coking coal low in ash (4 to 8% 
ash). An intermediate product or "middlings" higher in ash 
content which is generally sold as thermal coal, and a 
tailings stream having very little coal content is also 
produced. 
Recognizing this joint production process, had coking coal 
prices not risen in sympathy with thermal coal prices in 
1974, coking coal producers would have had the option of 
changing the degree of washing and thus the proportions of 
their output with the view of producing a higher yield of 
thermal quality coal for the power generation market. As an 
extreme position, some producers had the option of bypassing 
the washing process entirely, and producing unwashed thermal 
coal instead of coking coal from their coal resources. As 
most premium coking coals are also low sulphur coals, this 
business option was made even more attractive by a premium 
offered to producers of low sulphur coals by power companies 
as a result of sulphur content restrictions placed on the US 
electricity generating industry at the time^*°. 
2.7) Minerals Yearbooks, 1960 to 1973, US Bureau of Mines, 
Chapter "Coke and Coal Chemicals" 
2.8) Zimmerman, M.B."Long Run Mineral Supply : The Case of 
Coal in the United States" Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1975). p.17. 
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This short run cross elasticity of supply flexibility option 
available to most coking coal producers was not usually 
available to thermal producers because the unique "caking" 
property of coals required for coke making is not present 
in most thermal coals. Lacking the caking characteristics, 
most thermal coal producers cannot then sell into coking coal 
markets should a change in the differential in price favour 
such sales. The importance of the caking property of coking 
coals, and the value of this and other coal properties to the 
ironmaker will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
In summary then, the price increase for thermal coals in 
US domestic markets resulting from the 197 3/74 oil shock 
also influenced coking coal prices through a cross elasticity 
of supply relationship, which exists in the short term via 
the coal washing process. 
The focus of this study is the international coking coal 
trade, so events which have been described in US domestic 
coal markets must now be related to the international coking 
coal market, and price movements in that market. 
2.7) The US Coking Coal Supply/Demand/Price History 
As Figure 2.3 indicates, the decade of the sixties seems to 
have been one of price stability for America's coking coal 
producers. Normal profits appear to have been achieved, and 
no lack of capital availability impeded production capacity 
additions in District #7. Production increased from 30.5 
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million tonnes in 1960 to 36.5 million tonnes in 1967, while 
mine prices declined from $23.20 per tonne in 1960 to $20.81 
in 1968. In 1969, the more stringent mine safety and health 
legislation introduced by the US Federal Government increased 
underground production costs and caused some operators, 
especially the higher cost small mines, to abandon the 
industry. Such mines provide a significant proportion of 
Appalachia's reserve productive capacity, and a decreased 
short term elasticity of supply most likely resulted. By 
1971, production in District #7 had fallen to 28 million 
tonnes from the peak of 36.5 million tonnes achieved just 
four years earlier, and was slightly below the levels 
produced in 1962. 
2.7.1) Rationale for Coking Coal Price Increase 
Economic circumstances were ripe for the dramatic real coking 
coal price rise of 1973/74, shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. 
Firstly, a decrease in the short term elasticity of supply 
had occurred as a consetjuence of the mine safety and health 
legislation. Secondly, increased demand and prices for 
thermal coals resulting from the fuel oil price shock in the 
domestic electricity generating market, had effected the 
supply of coking coal through the cross elasticity of supply 
option existing in the coal preparation process. Finally, 
world pig iron production increased in 1973 and 1974 over 
prior years, causing unusually high spot purchasing demands 
from both Japan and the EEC for US coking coals. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 1 (Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3), that the 
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US was the major world supplier of coking coal to 
international trade at that time, and the only supply source 
available to the Japanese steel industry in the short term. 
Pig iron production and the annual consumption of coke in the 
blast furnace process increased simultaneously in all three 
major centres of Western steel manufacture at that time. The 
US domestic increase in coking coal demand was up 13% from 
1972 to 1973. Demand for US coking coal exports from Japan 
was up 23% from 1972 to 1973, and demand from Europe was up 
9% in 1973 and a further 6% in 1974. Such large demand 
increases within a short period would probably have assured a 
significant demand driven price increase by the US coking 
coal industry irrespective of the oil price shock occurring 
in that same year. There is no doubt that the oil and thermal 
coal price linkage in US markets reinforced the coking coal 
price increase through the cross elasticity of supply 
function implicit in the coal washing process. 
Such rapid price increases were then the result of short term 
inelasticity of supply amongst US coal producers, and the 
inelasticity of coal demand exhibited by both the steel 
manufacturing and electricity generation industries in the 
short term. 
Short run inelasticity of supply and demand can therefore 
explain the rapid peaking of US coking coal prices in 1975, 
but the subsecguent steady erosion which has followed requires 
further analysis. Before attempting this, it is necessary to 
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briefly review the economic theory of depletable mineral 
resources. 
2.8) Long Run Economics of Energy Minerals Supply 
As every mineral deposit is finite, any unit produced today 
incurs the opportunity cost of delaying production until a 
later date. This is particularly the situation for fossil 
fuel minerals which cannot be recycled as can many non-fuel 
minerals. 
According to general micro-economic theory, output in the 
short run will be increased to the point at which the price 
of the last unit sold (marginal revenue) , equals the cost of 
producing that last unit sold (marginal cost) . At this point, 
the production and sale of that last unit has made no profit 
contribution, and a profit maximizing firm will not operate 
beyond this break-even production level. 
If in the case of energy minerals^•^, marginal revenue is 
perceived to increase over time at a greater rate than the 
marginal production costs of the individual firm due to the 
depletion of the finite reserves of energy resources, it may 
be better to postpone production provided the discount rate 
to be applied to future profits does not eliminate the 
benefits of the increase in the future profit margin. For 
2.9) This discussion draws on Chapter 1 of Adelman M., 
Houghton J., Kaufman G., and M. Zimmerman, (eds.), 
"Energy Resources in an Uncertain Future" Ballinger 
Publishing Company (1983). 
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this reason, a premium known as minerals rent can be 
extracted by minerals producers over and above marginal 
production cost. 
The economic theory of depletion of limited resources has 
been expounded in the seminal works of Gray^ *-'-^  and 
Hotel 1 ing^ •-^ •^ . According to such theory, the economic 
response to increasing scarcity is higher real prices for 
exhaustable minerals over time. 
The practical reality is that real prices for nonrenewable 
minerals such as coal have, apart from the decade of the 
seventies, actually been in decline in US markets. A modern 
theory of resource depletion^ • •'•^  has evolved to explain this 
phenomenon as follows: 
In any given mineral deposit and for all deposits taken 
together, there is a constant movement toward equating price 
with marginal cost in several stages: 
2.10) Gray, L.C."Rent under the Assumption of Exhaustibility" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 28 (1914) p.466-489. 
2.11) Hotelling, H. "The Economics of Exhaustable Resources" 
Journal of Political Economy 39 (1931) p.137-175. 
2.12) Gordon, R.L. "A Reinterpretation of the Pure Theory of 
Exhaustion" Journal of Political Economy 75 (1967) 
p.274-286. 
Herfindahl, O.C. "Depletion and Economic Theory" in 
Gaffney, M. (ed.) "Extractive Resources and Taxation" 
Madison : University of Wisconsin Press (1967) 
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1. The current operating margin, or rate of production, 
which is governed by the proportion of the reserve 
already depleted. 
2. The intensive development margin, which includes 
investment costs for the already known deposits and is 
governed by the trade-off between rising investment 
requirements and quicker realization of revenue. 
3. The extensive development margin, where exploitation is 
begun of known but previously uneconomic deposits. 
4. The exploration margin, where the search for new deposits 
is conducted. The expected cost per unit is highly 
uncertain, and the certain costs of many failures must be 
balanced against the chance of finding something worth 
finding, that is something with total marginal costs no 
higher than at margins 1-3. 
5. The technology margin, which interacts with the first 
four. 
The Gray-Hotelling theory is a special case because it covers 
only stages 1 to 3 of the above, setting stages 4 and 5 to 
zero. Yet the last two stages in the long run can be of great 
importance as illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
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If the five functions are aggregated into one supply curve, 
the true paradigm can be stated as follows: 
"At any given moment, mankind is unwillingly crawling up 
generally rising supply curves toward higher mineral costs 
due to stages 1 to 3, but is also pushing the curve over to 
the right toward lower costs due to stages 4 and 5 as shown 
in Figure 2.4. The outcome is indeterminate at any particular 
time. So far the human race has won almost every round and 
minerals have become cheaper." 
The above passage does not mean that Adelman et al. are 
taking the position that exploration success and/or 
technology advances will always occur at convenient times. 
Nor are they affirming that such success will always be of 
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sufficient magnitude to offset the tendency for increasing 
marginal costs due to depletion of existing reserves, to 
ensure smooth ever declining average long-run production 
costs for minerals. On the contrary, there will be periods of 
high costs and the resulting price increases will then 
provide the stimulus for added exploration and technology 
efforts which, so far, have resulted in a successful long run 
outcome in economic terms, and so declining real costs. 
The energy minerals industry tends to be both capital 
intensive and long run in nature. As far as investment 
decisions in this industry are concerned there is the problem 
of accurately forecasting the overall price trends which 
develop within the industry as a result of the integration of 
the trends of marginal costs in the five stages associated 
with the exhaustion of finite resources. This problem is made 
more difficult because of differing levels of uncertainty in 
predicting marginal cost trends in each of the five stages, 
and the need to forecast over quite long periods (up to 
twenty years for coal mines). 
2.8.1) Bias in Energy Price Forecasting 
Clearly the most predictable trends are those associated with 
stages 1 and 2. In stage 3 knowledge of the resource is less 
certain, making marginal cost prediction more difficult, and 
stages 4 and 5 are highly unpredictable. 
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Perhaps for these reasons, there seems a persistent tendency 
for long term forecasts of energy commodity prices to 
indicate increases in real terms from the price levels 
pertaining at the time the forecast was developed. For 
example a Gulf Oil corporate planning forecast for oil prices 
prepared in 1978, predicted prices in constant '73 $US/Bbl. 
to rise from $8.27 in 1978 (the price level at that time), to 
$8.81 in 1985, and $11.24 in 1990. Atlantic Richfield's long 
range planning forecasts of 1981 predicted real oil prices in 
constant '81 $US/Bbl. to rise from $33.20 (the price in 1981) 
to $34.25 in 1985, and $38.90 in 1990. Similar forecasts have 
been common throughout the oil industry and demonstrate both 
the difficulty of predicting stage 4 and 5 success, and in 
the case of forecasts made in the late seventies and early 
eighties, the transitory nature of oil prices in effect at 
the time those forecasts were made. 
Numerous examples of the overestimation of future real prices 
can also be found in the coal industry for much the same 
reasons. Indeed, a recent forecast of thermal coal prices to 
Europe^ •-'-•^  indicates that landed prices will increase in real 
'87 $US/tonne terms from $41.00 in 1987, to $53.30 in 1995 
and $56.40 in the year 2000. 
When relating the above economic theory to coal and the real 
price trends of Figure 2.3, the effects of stages 4 and 5 do 
2.13) Jolly L., Beck T., and E. Savage "International Coal 
Protection:Implications for Australia and World Trade" 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics - Discussion Paper 90.1 (1990) AGPS. 
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explain the decline in real thermal coal prices from 1960 to 
1969, and again from 1979 to 1987. It seems that the sudden 
impact of the mine safety and health legislation and the oil 
shocks did reverse a general tendency for declining real 
thermal coal prices in US energy markets resulting from 
technology evolution in mining operations and transportation 
logistics. The price shock resulting from such developments 
enabled the commercial development of the vast open cut coal 
deposits of Wyoming and Montana to service growing 
electricity demands in southern and eastern states of the US, 
and were also fundamental to Queensland's emergence as a 
major coking coal exporter. 
If viewed from this perspective, the high real coal prices 
experienced from 1974 to 1979 were an aberration due to price 
overreactions seen frequently when markets are subjected to 
shock, rather than a reflection of long term cost increases 
due to the economics of exhaustion of finite resources as 
propounded by Gray and Hotelling. 
The transition across the five stages of ecjuating price with 
marginal cost is not likely to result in smooth and easily 
predictable price behaviour for energy commodities. This is 
particularly so when the world's principal fuel commodity, 
oil, is so prone to arbitrary supply interruption and price 
fluctuations. The economic dislocations that were felt 
throughout the energy industry, and were described for US 
electricity producers earlier in this chapter, can be 
confirmed by performing statistical analyses of the commodity 
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confirmed by performing statistical analyses of the commodity 
price trends of Figures 2.1 and 2.3. 
2.9) Relationship between Thermal Coal and Oil Prices 
2.9.1) Oil and Thermal Coal Price Regression Eguation 
Prices received at the mine by US thermal coal producers is 
shown by series "B" and "C" of Figure 2.1. The annual real 
change in price expressed as a percentage of annual average 
price has been calculated from these statistics for thermal 
coals and fuel oil (series "E"). The presence of pricing 
linkages between thermal coal and fuel oil in the US power 
generation industry can be investigated using a regression 
model of the form : 
TCCH = fn(OILCH) 
where: TCCH, the dependent variable, is the percentage 
annual real change in thermal coal price. 
OILCH, the independent variable, is the percentage 
annual real change in fuel oil price, by year, over 
the period from 1960 to 1988. 
The model was tested for structural change at the time of the 
first and second oil shocks along the lines suggested by 
Chow^ •-^ ^ using methods described in detail by Doran. 
2.14) Chow, G.C."Tests of Equality between Sets of 
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions" Econometrica 
(1960) 28(3) pp.591-605. 
Doran, H.E."Applied Regression Analysis in 
Econometrics" Marcel Dekker Inc. New York (1989) 
Chapter 6 pp.114-119, and Chapter 7 pp.146-147. 
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These tests support the view that a significant structural 
change in the regression equation took place in 1973/74, 
suggesting that the first oil shock altered the relationship 
between thermal coal and fuel oil price changes. Dummy 
variables^ •-^ ^ were introduced into the regression model to 
allow this in 1973/74, as the work of Toyoda et. al. with 
Chow testing and Gujarati's approach, suggests that a 
structural change in the relationship between thermal coal 
and fuel oil annual percentage price changes occurred due to 
the first oil price shock (1973/74) , but not at the second 
oil price shock. The results of such modelling exercises are 
as follows: 
TCCH = -1.596 + .849 OILCH - .771 DIOILCH 
(-0.70) (6.186) (-3.810) 
F/2 25) =19-40'^, R-square =.6082, R-square =.5769, D-W =2.616 
values in parenthesis are "t" values 
* signifies significance at at least 5% level of significance 
two tailed tests, # signifies at least 5% level one tailed 
test. 
where : DIOILCH is DlxOILCH, and Dl = 1 between 1974/75 and 
1987/88, and zero elsewhere. 
2.15) Toyoda T., K. Ohtani and S. Katayama "Structural Change 
in Oil Consumption in Japan: An Econometric Analysis of 
the Effects of the Two Oil Crises" Kobe University 
Economic Review #33 (1987) pp.33-47. 
Gujarati, D. "Use of Dummy Variables in Testing for 
Equality between sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions: A Note" The American Statistician, 
February (1970) pp. 50-52. 
Detailed results of these and other like tests are 
available upon request. 
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This result indicates that a significant relationship between 
changes in oil price and thermal coal price existed between 
1960 and the first oil shock of 1973/74. However the 
relationship was much reduced following the first oil shock, 
as evidenced by the negative coefficient of the slope dummy 
DIOILCH. In fact the nett impact of OILCH on TCCH, as 
indicated by the coefficient of OILCH is not significantly 
different from zero (0.078) from 1974 to 1988. 
The model cannot be used as a useful predictor of future oil 
and thermal coal price behaviour, as coal and fuel oil prices 
seem no longer to be related in US electricity markets. It 
seems doubtful, given the long history of oil price 
manipulation, that such a model would ever be appropriate for 
the prediction of future thermal coal prices, although the 
steady decline in fuel oil prices occurring in the early 
sixties may have influenced thermal coal prices through 
interfuel competition. 
Visual inspection of the fuel oil price trend of Figure 2.3 
(series "C") shows that prices seem to be settling back to a 
consistent pattern to that of thermal coal (series "B") for 
the most recent several years of data. Should this trend 
continue and the coming decade does not become one of major 
oil price disruptions, as were the seventies, a relationship 
between fuel oil and thermal coal prices may reappear. 
A final comment should be made regarding the oil and thermal 
coal pricing patterns of Figures 2.2 and 2.3. It is quite 
80 
noticeable that thermal coal price movements from 1978 to 
1981 failed to match the large fuel oil price increases of 
those years, and in fact commenced the steady decline which 
has continued ever since. This behaviour is totally different 
from that of 1974, when thermal coal and oil prices increased 
simultaneously in US energy markets. What reasons account for 
so different a thermal coal price response during the second 
oil shock from that which occurred just four years earlier? 
2.9.2) Reasons for Differing Price Behaviour 
A possible explanation can be suggested by reference to the 
theoretical work of Adelman et al., the long run mineral cost 
trends shown in Figure 2.4, and the propensity of energy 
business planners to forecast price trends which rise in real 
terms from the levels current at the time of their forecasts. 
The thermal coal price rise of 1974 was certainly above the 
long run marginal costs of US production, as the benefit of 
hindsight clearly shows in Figure 2.3. However the stimulus 
of the 1974 increase, which was wrongly interpreted as being 
indicative of a sustainable real price increase related to 
that of oil, was sufficient to bring on the development of a 
number of large open cut mines in Wyoming and Montana^'^^ 
which were for the most part financed by those oil companies 
which enjoyed substantial windfall profit gains from the 
2.16) Sources: Minerals Yearbooks 1973 to 1976 - USBM. 
Monthly Energy Review August 1988 - Energy 
Information Administration - US Department of 
Energy. 
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first oil shock. Consequently coal production from these two 
states increased from 22.9 million tonnes in 1973, to 51.7 
million tonnes in 1976, and 94.5 million tonnes in 1979. In 
terms of market share of the total US electrical generating 
industry's use of coal, the Wyoming and Montana combined 
share increased from 6.5% in 1973, to 12.7% in 1976, and 
19.8% in 1979. 
Clearly, a significant increase of inexpensive short term 
marginal cost production capacity from the Western states 
coming on stream from 1976 to 1982, reduced the potential for 
any increase of thermal coal prices due to cross elasticity 
of demand impacts of the second oil shock. Furthermore, rapid 
fuel switching from oil to coal which was possible at the 
time of the first oil shock had already occurred within the 
electricity generation industry by 1978, so little increased 
demand for coal actually took place as a result of the second 
oil shock. Considered together, these factors explain much of 
the breakdown in any previous relationship between fuel oil 
and thermal coal prices existing in US energy markets. 
The trend data of Figure 2.3 can also be tested for 
statistical evidence supporting a price relationship between 
coking and thermal coals postulated earlier because of the 
ability to change preparation plant yields, and even the 
direct sale of coking coal for power plant consumption 
without washing. 
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2.10) Price Relationships between Coking and Thermal Coals 
A representative trend of the prices received at the mine by 
US coking coal producers is shown by series "A" of Figure 
2.3. The trend of annual real change in price expressed as a 
percentage of annual average price can be calculated from 
these statistics for coking coals (series "A") and for 
thermal coals (series "B"). 
2.10.1) Coking and Thermal Coal Price Regression Relationship 
Following similar methodology to Section 2.9.1, the presence 
of pricing linkages between coking and thermal coals in the 
US can then be tested by determining if there is a 
statistically significant regression model of the form : 
CCCH = fn(TCCH) 
where: CCCH, the dependent variable, is the % annual real 
change in coking coal price. 
TCCH, the independent variable, is the % annual real 
change in thermal coal price, by year, over the period 
from 1960 to 1988. 
Dl, a dummy variable introduced due to intercept 
structural change, is one from 1974 to 1988, and D2, 
an intercept discontinuity dummy variable, is one at 
the first oil shock (1973/74). 
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The results of such a modelling exercise are as follows: 
CCCH = 2.45 + .632 TCCH - 9.232XD1 + 50.592XD2 
(1.549) (9.537)* (-4.09) (8.49)* 
F/3 24) =57.02'^, R-square =.877, R-square =.8616, D-W =1.573 
* significant at 5% level of significance two tailed tests, 
# significant at 5% level of significance one tailed test. 
Chow tests suggested that a structural change occurred in the 
relationship between annual price changes in 1973/74. Such 
testing also confirmed that the source of such change was 
intercept differences due to the fact that coking coal prices 
increased whilst thermal coal prices decreased significantly. 
Consequently an intercept dummy variable (Dl) is introduced 
which has the value Dl = 1 between 1974 and 1988, and zero 
elsewhere. Also, an intercept discontinuity dummy (D2) is 
introduced having a value of one at the first oil shock and 
zero elsewhere. Unlike the situation for the relationship 
between changes in thermal coal price and oil, no change in 
slope occurred at the first oil shock. Chow testing does not 
suggest that a structural change in the relationship occurred 
due to the second oil shock. 
Visual inspection of the trends of the coking and thermal 
coal prices of Figure 2.3, confirms an intercept structural 
change in the relationship in 1973/74. This change was due to 
the first oil shock and the relationship between oil price 
and thermal coal price changes which existed up to the first 
oil shock. 
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These results are consistent with our expectations based on 
the earlier description of possible areas of production 
switching between coking coals and thermal coals by 
alteration of the yields achieved in the coal washing 
process, and the robust nature of the model supports the 
hypothesis of a relationship between prices of thermal coals 
and coking coals in US energy markets which has survived the 
oil shocks of the seventies. 
2.11) Summary of Findings 
This study of the behaviour of American energy commodity 
markets has yielded the following findings: 
The behaviour of the US electricity generating industry and 
interfuel pricing is in accordance with microeconomic theory 
for competitive markets, but the regression relationship 
between annual percentage changes in US thermal coal and fuel 
oil prices is now no longer of value, particularly for future 
predictions of interfuel price relationships. 
Coal washing process technology explains the linkage between 
thermal and coking coal prices in US markets, and a long term 
regression relationship between percentage changes in thermal 
coal prices and coking coal prices exists which has survived 
the energy dislocations of the seventies, and consequently: 
The monitoring of future Appalachian thermal coal price 
behaviour in US energy markets may be warranted as a useful 
85 
predictor of future US coking coal price behaviour. 
Due to the importance of the US as a coal supplier of both 
coking and thermal coals to international trade, future price 
movements in domestic markets will influence prices for 
Queensland's coking coal exports, particularly in European 
markets. 
This chapter has examined coal price behaviour in US energy 
markets in some detail and provided some explanation of 
historic trends as well as developing a statistically 
significant relationship between domestic coking and thermal 
coal annual price changes. In Chapter 7, the dissertation 
pursues the microeconomic response of US coal producers to 
the quite large real price movements described in this 
chapter, and the response of the Queensland coking coal 
industry to movements in international price which occurred 
in sympathy with US export coking coal price changes. 
Attention is now turned from the supply side of the coking 
coal industry to examine the substantial restructuring of 
world steel manufacturing occurring in the sixties and 
seventies, which has altered world patterns of demand for 
steel input commodities, much to the benefit of Australia's 
mining industry. 
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Chapter 3_ 
CHANGING DEMANDS AND MANUFACTURE OF STEEL 
This chapter investigates the changing relationships between 
economic growth and steel demands which have occurred in the 
seventies, particularly for the mature OECD economies which 
import much of the internationally traded coking coal. Such 
changes in demand relationships, if permanent, will influence 
a large segment of the world's steel industry which provides 
some 8 0% of coke demands, and will impact future overall and 
regional patterns of demand for Queensland's coking coals. 
The significant changes in the regional configuration of 
OECD crude steel manufacturing capacity which have also taken 
place since the early sixties will be described. Such changes 
have altered regional patterns of coking coal demand, to 
advantage Queensland and western Canadian suppliers vis-a-vis 
the US. Finally, changes in the importance of ironmaking and 
the role of the blast furnace and pig iron production in that 
activity will be related to steel production in mature OECD 
economies. 
3.1) OECD Patterns of Steel Consumption and Supply 
An understanding of the historic and emerging patterns of 
coking coal demand requires some background knowledge of both 
the historic and changing relationships between economic 
activity and steel demand within the OECD group of countries. 
The gaining of such understanding involves examination of 
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historic statistics relating steel consumption with various 
elements of economic growth in the economy. From the 
knowledge of past relationships, and provided one can 
reasonably forecast the future behaviour of each of these 
economic elements, a logical methodology for forecasting 
future steel demands can be developed. 
3.1.1) Steel Demand Forecasting Methodologies 
A methodological approach is described in a report 
commissioned by the Steel Committee of the Economic 
Commission for Europe-^ ••^ , and also in earlier work of the 
International Iron and Steel Institute(IISI)-^-^. These 
studies have provided much of the source material for this 
discussion. 
The first difficulty which must be addressed in developing 
future forecasts is that of obtaining meaningful historic 
data for steel consumption for various countries. Steel 
consumption is not measured directly in most instances, but 
is derived from annual statistics of local steel production 
together with steel imports less exports. 
3.1) Steel Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe 
"The Evolution of the Specific Consumption of Steel" 
United Nations New York (1984). 
3.2) International Iron and Steel Institute Committee on 
Economic Studies "Steel Intensity and GNP Structure" 
Brussels (1974) 
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A problem which immediately arises with such an approach 
concerns inventory gains or losses which are ignored in the 
calculation and may distort data for individual years. Also, 
there is the matter of ensuring the consistency of the units 
of measurement used for production, imports and exports, and 
consumption. Production statistics are normally recorded in 
physical tonnes of crude steel. Imports and exports are 
normally measured tonnes of finished or semi-finished steel 
products, so these physical quantities must be converted to 
common units of measurement which can then be used in the 
calculation of steel consumption. 
The result of this calculation, which is all that is 
available for many countries, is known as apparent steel 
consumption (ASC), and is reported in tonnes of crude steel 
equivalence or ingot equivalence. 
The actual quantity of steel consumed is physical tonnes of 
finished steel product which is necessarily less than the 
crude steel physical tonnes by the scrap tonnage generated 
during finishing processes. Scrap proportions will vary with 
the degree of sophistication in steel manufacturing and 
finishing in each country, and will change over time. The 
IISI, which publishes such statistics for most countries on 
an annual basis, uses a conversion factor of 1.3/(1+0.175c) 
to convert finished and semi-finished product tonnage to 
crude steel equivalent tonnage. The factor "c" in the 
ec^uation represents the proportion of locally produced crude 
steel which is continuously cast per year for each country. 
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A variation on the IISI method is used by the OECD in which 
steel consumption statistics are expressed in ingot crude 
steel equivalent units. In this approach, crude steel 
production statistics are converted to ingot tonnes by the 
addition of an amount of .175 times the crude steel produced 
by continuous casting, to the recorded crude steel output 
tonnage. Steel mill products which are imported or exported 
in physical tonnes are also converted to ingot etguivalent 
tonnes by using a multiplication factor of 1.30, to enable 
calculation of apparent steel consumption in ingot equivalent 
tonnes. 
With this understanding of the units of measurement and the 
methods used to record steel statistics in a way to enable 
country comparisons, the production and apparent consumption 
history for the world and the major OECD centres of steel 
manufacture can be examined. 
3.1.2) Recent Steel Production History 
Figure 3.1 shows the crude steel production histories from 
1960 to 1989 for the total world (series "A"), and the 
combined production (series "E") of the three major steel 
manufacturing centres of the OECD made up of Japan, the 
United States, and the EEC(9) consisting of Belgium, Denmark, 
France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland and 
the UK. 
FIGURE 3 . 1 
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From 1960 to 1970, world crude steel production increased 
from 335.4 to 595.8 million tonnes, representing slightly 
more than a 5.9% average annual compound growth rate. The 
average growth rate for the combined three major OECD centres 
of production was somewhat lower at 5.25%. World production 
growth was continuous and reasonably predictable for that 
decade. Major OECD production growth was less regular on a 
year to year basis, but never-the-less continued throughout 
the period. 
The decade of the seventies and the eighties to date has 
demonstrated less regular patterns of world growth, and 
significant fluctuations in OECD production in 1971, 1975 and 
1982, reflecting the impact of the business cycle on steel 
consumption. Following the 1982 recession, recent world steel 
production has been again in a growth phase, although until 
the last two years, major OECD production had barely 
recovered from the low levels of 1982. Throughout the entire 
period, OECD production growth has lagged world growth. In 
1960, the three major OECD producing centres provided 62.6% 
of world production. In 1989, this proportion had fallen to 
41%. 
The shift in the geographic patterns of crude steel 
production away from the three major OECD centres has had 
important implications for exporters of coking coal. As a low 
value added commodity, ocean transportation costs are a large 
proportion of total delivered costs for all coals. Chapter 1 
provided details of the changes in the patterns of trade for 
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Queensland's exports to North Asia following the plateau in 
Japan's crude steel production since 1979. 
The changes in the shares of OECD steel production between 
the three major producing regions are highlighted in Figure 
3.2, which shows crude steel output trends separately for the 
US, Japan and the EEC(9) for the years 1960 to 1989. 
This comparison is noteworthy with respect to the quite 
remarkable growth of the Japanese steel industry relative to 
that of the US and the EEC(9) in the sixties, and the ability 
of Japanese steel producers to sustain high levels of 
production throughout the seventies and eighties. 
FIGURE 3 . 2 
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3.1.3) OECD Production and Consumption Trends 
The methodology used in determining apparent steel 
consumption (ASC) has been described, together with world 
and OECD production histories recording the decline in 
importance of OECD steel manufacture. The ASC and production 
trends within each of the three major OECD steel 
manufacturing regions will now be examined. 
Figure 3.3 shows the trends in ingot equivalent tonnes of 
both production and consumption in US steel markets. 
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The most significant observations regarding the trends shown 
in Figure 3.3 concern the fact that since the early sixties 
the US has changed in status from an exporter to a nett 
importer of steel, and that both ASC and production actually 
declined in the 1983 recession to levels below those of 1960. 
US production and ASC in 1989 is again only close to levels 
previously experienced in the early sixties, despite 
considerable real growth in the US economy in the intervening 
period. Such a behavioural trend indicates that significant 
changes in the relationship between steel consumption and 
economic growth have taken place in the American economy 
over the intervening period. 
The Japanese steel industry's production history and the ASC 
trend for Japan is shown in Figure 3.4. Unlike the US, Japan 
experienced spectacular growth in steel production throughout 
the sixties and early seventies. Although also suffering a 
decline in the 1975 recession, Japanese production has been 
maintained at a generally high level since. In this 
achievement Japan has become the world's largest exporter of 
steel products to the US and the developing economies of the 
Pacific region. 
FIGURE 3 . 4 
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Production and consumption trends for the other major 
regional centre of the OECD is shown in Figure 3.5. For 
consistency of comparison with the trends developed for the 
US and Japan, this data excludes statistics for Spain, 
Portugal and Greece which have become full members of the EEC 
in recent years, and includes only the production, imports 
and exports of the nine original members forming the EEC in 
1960. 
It can be seen from comparing Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 that 
EEC(9) trends of production and apparent steel consumption 
occupy a middle ground between the data for the US and that 
of Japan. The EEC(9) has slightly increased exports as a 
proportion of production over the period, as is evidenced by 
the increase in spread between the production and consumption 
trends, but nowhere to the extent of the Japanese steel 
industry. Production declined sharply in 1975 as was the case 
in the US and Japan, and has fallen slightly since, but not 
as significantly as that of America. 
FIGURE 3 . 5 
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In recognition of the extremes of behaviour exhibited in the 
steel production and consumption trends for Japan and the US 
compared with the EEC(9), the discussion of the relationships 
of steel demand and economic growth which follow will focus 
on the US and Japanese experiences to highlight behavioural 
differences. 
3.2) Steel Intensity of Economic Growth 
3.2.1) OECD Steel Intensity of Economic Growth 
The trend of steel intensity of gross domestic product 
(GDP) is a macro-economic parameter which can be calculated 
in Kg per 1987$US, by the division of ASC expressed in crude 
steel equivalent kilograms, and GDP expressed in 1987 
constant US dollars. Figure 3.6 shows the patterns of this 
ratio calculated separately from 1960 to 1988 for the US, 
Japan and the EEC(9). 
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The most striking behavioural trend of steel intensity per 
constant 1987 US dollar of GDP for these industrialized 
regions is the convergence of Japanese and EEC(9) trends 
towards the intensity levels of the US in recent years. 
Such a convergence can be partially explained from exchange 
rate movements of the yen and European currencies relative to 
the US dollar since the floating of the major trading 
currencies in the early seventies. For example, when 
comparing the behaviour of trends for the US and Japan, it 
should be realized that the yen was strengthening 
continuously from 1970 to 1978, which was also a period of 
rapid convergence of Japan's steel intensity with that of the 
US as shown in Figure 3.6. From 1978 to 1985 the yen weakened 
slightly, and steel intensity of the two countries diverged 
until the yen again resumed a strengthening trend from 1986 
to 1988, and Japanese steel intensity again resumed 
convergence with the US. 
Given the use of constant US dollars as the common currency 
of measurement for GDP, the prediction of future steel 
intensities per unit of GDP for countries other than the US 
is complicated by the need to forecast exchange rate trends, 
as the above discussion illustrates. 
The behaviour of steel intensity per unit of GDP for the US 
is certainly less complicated by exchange rate fluctuations 
than for other countries, but not totally immune due to the 
limitations associated with the calculation of apparent steel 
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consumption (ASC) within the US. Indirect steel imports in 
the form of finished durable goods are not captured in the 
calculation of ASC, leading to an understatement of steel 
intensity in the economies of those countries which are 
importers of finished products having a significant steel 
content, such as the US has been in recent years. 
Figure 3.6 shows a significant reduction of steel intensity 
per unit of GDP for the US in the 1982 recession, which was 
also accompanied by a fall in domestic crude steel 
production. The subsequent apparent failure of steel 
intensity to recover in the US may in part be due to 
increased imports of manufactures from Japan and the EEC 
having significant steel content, which is not captured in 
the calculation of ASC. 
Despite the limitations just described, an assumed trend of 
steel intensity per $US unit of GDP is fretjuently used in the 
econometric modelling of future steel demands in studies of 
the world coking coal trade-^ •-^ . 
Even with data limitations and the exchange rate influences 
associated with the calculation of ASC and GDP in constant 
$US, there is no doubt that steel intensity per unit of 
GDP has fallen significantly in these three industrialized 
regions of the OECD since the early seventies. With these 
3.3) Calarco V.J., "World Coal Outlook : Implications for 
Australia" presented at a symposium at Maccjuarie 
University 7th-8th August 1986. p.31-32. 
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changes has also come the decline of OECD crude steel 
production as a proportion of world production, which is so 
evident after 1975 (as illustrated in Figure 3.1). 
3.2.2) Steel Intensity of Use in Developing Countries 
In the last decade, the major growth in crude steel 
production capacity based on blast furnace ironmaking has 
been concentrated in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, China), and 
Latin America (Brazil). 
In the industrially mature western economies apparent steel 
consumption seems to reach a plateau in the range of 400 to 
500 kilograms of crude steel per capita. On this basis, the 
apparent consumption of steel per capita in South Korea and 
Taiwan may now be approaching upper limits. However this is 
far from the situation for China and Brazil, where apparent 
consumption of steel per capita is about one quarter the 
values of mature OECD economies. 
The South Korean experience is notable for a developing 
country and of relevance to Queensland's coking coal 
exporters. The growth of apparent steel consumption (ASC) for 
South Korea from 1960 is shown in Figure 3.7, together 
with that of India, to enable comparison with another 
developing country in the region which has become an importer 
of Queensland's coking coal in recent years. 
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Comparison of series "A" for South Korea and series "B" for 
India in Figure 3.8, provides a good illustration of the 
difficulties in predicting the rates of future economic 
development of less developed countries, and the changes in 
steel consumption which accompany economic growth. The 
differential behaviour of ASC growth for these two countries 
is best explained by comparing the changes in the steel 
intensive components of GDP, and steel consumption per 
capita, as indicated in Table 3.1. 
TABLE 3.1 
CHANGES IN ECONOMIC COMPOSITION AND STEEL INTENSITIES 
SOUTH KOREA - INDIA 
Years 1960 1969 1973 1980 
Manufacturing 
as % GDP 
Construction 
as % GDP 
Transport & 
Communication 
as % GDP 
Steel Consumpt 
per Capita 
S.Korea 
India 
S.Korea 
India 
S.Korea 
India 
ion Korea 
India 
8.7 
13.7 
2.2 
4.8 
2.0 
4.0 
6 
11 
16.6 
15.5 
5.7 
6.0 
4.7 
4.7 
34 
12 
23.8 
15.5 
5.1 
5.5 
6.1 
4.6 
62 
13 
33.8 
17.5 
6.3 
4.6 
8.3 
5.8 
134 
14 
Source:Steel Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe 
"The Evolution of the Specific Consumption of Steel" 
United Nations New York (1984). Tables 5.15 & 5.16. 
For 1987, the most recent year for which ASC crude steel 
ecjuivalent data is available, South Korean ASC is at a level 
of 327 kg. per capita, whereas India remains at a low level 
of 16 kg. per capita. Such great differences in behaviour 
amongst the developing countries makes the task of 
forecasting steel production and consumption trends in the 
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developing world as difficult as it is for industrialized 
countries. 
An issue of great importance for Queensland's coking coal 
producers and all other Australian exporters of steel input 
commodities, is the future course of steel developments in 
China. Will China's future demands for steel follow growth 
patterns more similar to South Korea, or those of India? 
Findlay and Xin-^*^ examined developments in China's steel 
industry and potential steel industry strategies for meeting 
national goals with regard to economic growth and industrial 
development, and the resulting demands for steel. A 
regression model in log form for apparent steel 
consumption, having independent variables GDP and population, 
was used to predict ASC in 1990 for China to be in the range 
of 66 to 81 million tonnes depending on the rates of economic 
and population growth. ASC in 1988 for finished steel has 
been estimated for China by the IISI at 55.8 million tonnes, 
and the 1990 ASC is unlikely to be within this predicted 
range as the pattern of consumption has actually been 
declining since reaching 58.6 million tonnes in 1986-^  •^. 
These examples serve to highlight difficulties in forecasting 
steel demands for both developed and developing nations since 
the disruptions of the seventies. 
3.4) Findlay C. and Xin L., "China's Iron and Steel Industry 
Policy: Implications for Australia" Pacific Economic 
Paper No.127, Australia-Japan Research Centre Canberra 
(October 1985) 
3.5) Metal Bulletin #7454 February 1st 1990 p.27. 
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3.2.3) Changing Steel Intensity/Economic Growth Linkages 
The reasons behind the changes of the relationship of steel 
consumption and economic growth have been investigated in 
depth in the Economic Commission for Europe study previously 
cited3.^, and can be summarized as follows: 
1) Steel intensive components of economic growth such as 
construction and manufacturing have been falling as a 
percentage of total GDP in the industrialized countries 
since the late sixties. 
2) The intensity of steel use in the three major GDP 
components of manufacturing, construction and 
transportation has also been in decline in OECD economies 
since the first oil shock in 1973. 
The compound effect of these factors, together with lower 
rates of economic growth following the oil shocks of the 
seventies have contributed to a decline of crude steel 
production within the OECD, and lower rates of growth world 
wide. 
Another parameter which is monitored frecjuently for the 
purpose of providing future forecasts of steel consumption 
is that of the trend in per capita apparent consumption of 
3.6) Steel Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe 
"The Evolution of the Specific Consumption of Steel" 
United Nations New York (1984). p.44-52. 
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steel. 
Examination of the long term development of per capita steel 
consumption leads to the following general conclusions, the 
magnitude of which may vary from one country to another: 
- Per capita consumption rises gradually during the initial 
stages of economic development in all countries; 
- The rate of increase is not the same for all countries; 
- The differences between countries are diminishing; and 
- The rate of increase is gradually slowing down and a 
certain stabilization is becoming apparent. 
The over-all volume of per capita steel consumption in 
individual countries depends on: 
- The over-all level of economic development in the country: 
- The share of the steel consuming sectors in GDP; 
- The structure of output in the steel consuming sectors; 
- The balance of indirect steel trade; and 
- The size of the population. 
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3.3) Steel Demand Forecasting Accuracy 
The conclusions from these studies are helpful in identifying 
the factors which are of importance in attempting to predict 
the demand for steel, but the prediction of the trend 
behaviour of each of these factors is itself highly 
problematical. In summary it can be said that the forecasting 
of steel demands is difficult and the record of experts in 
such forecasting is not good, as is evidenced by the 
predictions of world steel production and consumption for 
1985, made by experts-'*' in the years from 1978 to 1982 and 
shown in Table 3.2. 
TABLE 3.2 
EXPERT'S PREDICTIONS OF 1985 WORLD CRUDE STEEL 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
Year Source of Forecast Forecast Production/Consumption 
Million Tonnes 
1978 
. . 
• • 
. , 
• • 
. . 
^ ^ 
1979 
, , 
• • 
. . 
• , 
. . 
1980 
. . 
1981 
1982 
• • 
Actua 
Actua 
The Metal Society 
General Electric (Utah 
Ayres R.U. 
Cleveland Cliffs 
Amax 
EEC 
Citibank 
International) 
Stanford Research Institute 
Nijhawan B.R. 
Wienert H. 
Kono J. 
Hogan W.F. 
Ditzel 
Meindl G. 
Schenck H. 
Schenck H. 
Broken Hill Pty.Ltd. 
Hogan W.F. 
1 1985 Production 
1 1985 ADoarent Steel Cc )nsump tion 
1015 
949 
949 
920 
919 
910 
890 
970 
942 
921 
900 
900 
884 
900 
902 
870 
820 
750 
719 
727 
3.7) Ibid. Tables IX.6.& IX.7. Annex IX p.13-14 
Ill 
A consistent bias towards overestimation of world steel 
demand is demonstrated in this table. Even as late as 1982 
one forecast was significantly higher than actual. This 
tendency to overestimate demand seen throughout the seventies 
and early eighties, resulted in a number of new coking coal 
mine developments taking place in Canada and Australia to 
meet projected demands for the metallurgical coke associated 
with the manufacture of crude steel which did not eventuate. 
3.3.1) OECD Steel Demand Changes after 1975 Recession 
A detailed investigation of the 1975 collapse of steel 
consumption within the OECD group of countries has been 
performed by the IISI-^*^. The conclusion of this study was 
that no single major cause was responsible for the general 
economic recession of the mid-seventies, nor the steep fall 
and ensuing stagnation of steel consumption. Many factors 
contributed, acting in combination and reinforcing each 
other; the downturn in the business cycle, measures of 
government macroeconomic policy, the oil and energy price 
increases, and the changed monetary relationships after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system all deserve mention. 
These factors have influenced the expenditure patterns of 
investment, with greater stress on less steel intensive 
spending for efficiency increase in OECD countries. Most of 
3.8) "Causes of the Mid-1970's Recession in Steel Demand" 
International Iron and Steel Institute Publication 
Brussels,(1980). 
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these developments had already built up during the sixties, 
but due to intervention by cyclical economic forces or 
governmental actions, were prevented from exerting their full 
impact on economic growth. Due to these restraints the pent 
up reaction triggered by the 1973/74 energy crisis was all 
the more dramatic. 
3.3.2) Tilton's Forecasting Methodology 
Difficulties associated with metals use forecasting and the 
changes in metals consumption with economic growth have been 
subjects of research by Tilton and others at the Colorado 
School of Mines. Tilton-^'^ has examined the relationships 
between economic growth and metals consumption within OECD 
countries since 1950. He postulates that changes in the 
nature of the relationship occurred in the year of the first 
oil shock (1973), which was also been as an important 
consideration in the IISI study. 
According to the intensity-of-use approach of Tilton, the 
demand for a metal (D.^.) in year t can be expressed as: 
"t 
Dt = Y^e a^t X bit 
1=1 
where: Y is the national income and n the products in year t 
aj^-j. is the material composition of products in year t 
hi^ is the product composition of income in year t. 
3.9) Tilton J.E., " The New View of Minerals and Economic 
Growth " Proceedings of Australian Economic Congress 
Australian National University (1988) 28th August. 
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If intensity-of-use (lU^) is defined as D^/Y^, it is clear 
from the above ecjuation that intensity-of-use can be defined 
as a function of the product composition of income (bj^ .^.) and 
the material composition of products (a^t^• 
Tilton argues that the relationship between economic growth 
and mineral demand has not been severed, and the structural 
change which became apparent in the seventies for steel and 
many other metals, is the combined result of falling 
intensity of use together with slower economic growth within 
OECD economies. 
This view can best be illustrated by reference to Figure 3.8. 
FIGURE 3.8 
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According to Tilton, the relationship between percentage 
growth in metals demand and percentage growth in GDP can be 
represented by the solid sloping line in Figure 3.8, which 
has been displaced to the right as a result of the structural 
changes of the seventies from the previous relationship 
indicated by the dashed line. Now, at low rates of growth of 
GDP, metals growth may be negative in industrialized 
countries as suggested in the diagram, and quite robust rates 
of economic growth are retjuired to cause increasing demands 
for metals in the mature economies. 
Support for the general geometry of this postulated model is 
provided by the behaviour of steel demands during 
recessionary phases of the business cycle in the US and the 
EEC, where the reductions of ASC and production in the 1975 
and 1982 recessions were particularly severe (see Figures 3.3 
and 3.5). The current recession in much of the OECD will 
provide another opportunity to test Tilton's methodology. 
3.4) Comparative Steel Industry Performance 
One most significant aspect arising from this examination of 
OECD crude steel production trends has been the differential 
performance of Japan relative to the US. Japanese crude steel 
production grew at an average compound annual rate of 13.85% 
from 1960 to 1973. Since 1973, high rates of growth in the 
Asian region have been taken up by South Korea and Taiwan, so 
that the combined regional crude steel production of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan has continued on a growth trend 
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although at a more modest rate than previously, from 121 
million tonnes in 1973 to 143 million tonnes in 1990. 
By way of contrast, US crude steel production grew at a more 
modest annual rate of 3.25% from 1960 to 1973, and in 1990 
steel production was some 2% lower than in 1960, despite the 
fact that until 1989 the US remained the largest steel 
consumer of the three major regions within the OECD. 
Such significant differential production and export behaviour 
reflects changes in international competitiveness between 
Japanese and US steel producers, which shall be further 
investigated in Chapter 4. 
3.4.1) Impact of Differential Regional Growth on Suppliers 
Australian coking coal exporters have been significantly 
advantaged relative to US exporters by the changing regional 
configuration of crude steel manufacture taking place between 
these three major OECD production centres since 1960. 
The growth of steel production in North Asia was the reason 
behind the development of Queensland's coking coal industry 
in the sixties-^ • •'•*-*. Had it not been for the Japanese steel 
industry's search for less expensive coking coal sources and 
supply alternatives to the US, it is doubtful that the Bowen 
3.10) For a comprehensive history of the development of 
Queensland's export coking coal industry see Galligan 
B., "Utah and Queensland Coal" University of Queensland 
Press (1989). 
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Basin resources of central Queensland, and the western 
Canadian coking coal mines would have been developed. 
Prior to 1960, both the American and EEC steel industries had 
tended to be self sufficient as far as coking coal supplies 
were concerned. The little internationally traded coal 
demands that did exist were supplied by Appalachian producers 
in the US. 
The rapid expansion of the Japanese steel production in the 
sixties could not be supplied by indigenous coking coal 
production. In any case Japanese coking coals were of the 
soft coking variety and recjuired blending with imported hard 
coking coals to achieve the coke strengths recjuired for 
modern blast furnace operations. Consecjuently Japanese coking 
coal imports increased throughout the sixties with the US as 
the principal supplier, as was shown Figure 1.5 of Chapter 1. 
It was the regional nature of these developments which 
changed a comparative transportation disadvantage for 
Queensland, to serve EEC steel manufacturers because of high 
ocean freight costs relative to US sourced coking coals, into 
a comparative advantage relative to the US when serving the 
growing North Asian markets. The magnitude of this change and 
the influence on prices will be described in Chapter 7. 
Even should world and regional steel demands be predicted 
accurately, the forecasting of coking coal recjuirements 
remains difficult as coking coal use is related to 
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ironmaking which is a derived demand from steel consumption 
and production. To relate the impact of trends in steel 
consumption and production on the international coking coal 
trade and the future for Queensland's exports, the role of 
ironmaking in steel manufacture must be examined, for it is 
ironmaking using the blast furnace process which generates 
the bulk of world demand for coking coals. 
3.5) Ironmaking in Crude Steel Manufacture 
World and the major OECD crude steel production trends have 
been described and were illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.9 
shows both the total crude steel and pig iron manufacturing 
world trends since 1960. As it is the level of pig iron 
manufacture which most directly influences coke consumption 
in steel manufacture and the demand for coking coals, changes 
in these proportions due to technological or economic 
influences require scrutiny. 
FIGURE 3 . 9 
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3.5.1) Technology Evolution in Steelmaking 
For many years steelmaking included the recycling of steel 
scrap in the open hearth manufacturing process, which as late 
as 1965 provided 72% of crude steel production in the US. The 
JSI adopted the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) approach for steel 
manufacture during its rapid expansion of the sixties, 
because of shorter heat times and therefore higher capital 
and labour productivities per unit of output. The maximum 
proportion of steel scrap which can be economically charged 
with the BOF process is limited to 3 0%, with hot metal 
(molten pig iron from blast furnaces) making up the remainder 
of the feed material. Such technological changes have limited 
the demands for steel scrap for recycling in fully integrated 
large scale steel mills, while increasing the proportions of 
pig iron in crude steel manufacture in modern integrated 
steel plants. 
The trend of the proportions of pig iron to crude steel 
manufacture is shown in Figure 3.9. In 1960, world pig iron 
production was 72.8% of the crude steel production of that 
year. This proportion remained in excess of 70% until the 
1982 recession, after which the trend of proportional decline 
which had commenced in 1975 continued, so that in 1989 world 
pig iron output was 68.6% of that year's crude steel 
production. Changes in the proportions of pig iron used in 
crude steel manufacture have important implications for coke 
demand forecasting, and the trend of annual changes of this 
relationship is plotted in Figure 3.10. In Figure 3.10, the 
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zero value on the vertical axis represents a 70% proportion 
of pig iron to crude steel. Values as high as 72.9% are shown 
in 1962 and 1975, and the lowest proportion recorded is 68.2% 
in 1988. 
The trends of Figure 3.10 (following page) could indicate 
changes in the relationship between the annual production 
levels of pig iron and crude steel world wide due to 
technology substitution related to the economics of the 
electric furnace method of crude steel manufacture vis-a-vis 
the fully integrated blast furnace approach. This can be 
further examined by introducing variables in a regression 
model relating the annual changes of pig iron production (as 
dependent variable) with changes in crude steel production 
and an introduced variable which reflects the economic 
attractiveness of employing an alternate technology of crude 
steel manufacture using recycled steel scrap. Such modelling 
approaches can be used to investigate relationships between 
pig iron production and crude steel production world wide, 
and for the US, for which more detailed economic data are 
available comparing the fully integrated and electric furnace 
approaches. 
The issue of emerging steel manufacturing technologies, which 
do not require pig iron manufacture, is important when 
forecasting future coking coal demands, and a matter of 
significance in considering the strategic implications of 
technological change for Queensland's coking coal industry. 
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3.5.2) Relationship of World Pig Iron to Steel Production 
Pig iron is the major iron input for crude steel manufacture 
together with recycled steel scrap. Statistically significant 
relationships might therefore be expected in a regression 
model of steel input market behaviour having annual 
percentage changes in pig iron production as the dependant 
variable, and annual percentage changes in crude steel 
production and indicative steel scrap prices (in constant 
1987 US dollars per ton) as the independent variables. 
The US has long been the world's largest supplier of 
internationally traded scrap, with Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Turkey and Italy the major importing countries. 
An indicative US scrap price statistic will therefore be used 
in this regression model. 
The issue then is one of determining if there is a 
statistically significant regression model of the form : 
PICH = fn(CSCH,SPCH) 
where: PICH is the % annual change in world pig iron 
production. 
CSCH is the % annual change in world crude steel 
production. 
SPCH is the annual real change in an indicative steel 
scrap price (#1 Heavy Melting Scrap - Pittsburgh) by 
year. 
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The results of such a modelling exercise are as follows: 
PICH = -.111 +.880 CSCH +.022 SPCH 
(9.420) (1.026) 
F o 24) =94.46*,R-square =.8873, R-square =.8779, D-W =1.81 
Figures in parenthesis are "t" values. 
* indicates significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
Chow tests confirm the stability of the regression 
relationship throughout the duration. No structural change 
was associated with the first or second oil shocks. The low 
"t" value of SPCH in the world model suggests that the 
coefficient of this variable is not significantly different 
from zero. Such a result could be due to the use of a US 
scrap price as a proxy for the relative economic 
attractiveness of electric furnace versus integrated plant 
processes for crude steel manufacture world wide. 
The US domestic steel market is one in which electric furnace 
steelmaking has became an increasingly significant factor in 
total crude steel production, particularly since the 1982/83 
steel industry recession which saw the closing of 
substantial integrated plant capacity. The emergence of the 
small scale electric furnace manufacturer as a strong 
competitor to the large scale fully integrated steel mill in 
specialized product areas has been a major area of production 
capacity expansion in all three OECD centres of manufacture 
from the mid seventies, despite the stagnation of overall 
production in all three centres since 1973 (see Figures 3.1 
and 3.2). A comprehensive investigation of this phenomena in 
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US markets has been made by Barnett and Crandall^•^^. 
3.5.3) Relationship of US Pig Iron to Crude Steel Production 
Excellent historic statistics for scrap prices and the value 
of pig iron can be obtained for the US steel manufacturing 
industry from various trade journals and in the iron and 
steel and steel scrap chapters of the USBM annual Minerals 
Yearbook publication. The availability of such data enables 
modelling of behaviour of the US steel industry production 
ratio between pig iron and crude steel in greater detail than 
is possible for the world industry. 
US steel markets are larger and more responsive than most 
others. Such markets may demonstrate significant regression 
relationships. Steel industry economic statistics are also 
available in considerably greater detail from USBM Minerals 
Yearbooks than is available for other countries. A regression 
model having annual percentage changes in pig iron production 
as the dependant variable, and annual percentage changes in 
crude steel production and steel scrap prices in constant 
1987$US per ton expressed as a percentage of pig iron prices 
and a trend variable, as independent variables for the period 
from 1960 to 1988, can be estimated and tested for 
statistical significance for the US steel industry. 
3.11) Barnett, D.F. and R.W. Crandall "Up From The Ashes: 
The Rise of the Steel Minimill in the US" 
The Brookings Institution Washington D.C.(1986). 
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The postulated market model is of a form : 
USPICH = fn(CSCH,SCPIP) 
where: USPICH is the percentage annual change in US pig iron 
production. 
CSCH is the percentage annual change in US crude steel 
production. 
SCPIP is the annual ratio of an indicative steel scrap 
price to the value of pig iron in each year. 
The results of such a modelling exercise are as follows: 
USPICH = -4.869 + 1.057 CSCH + 9.268 SCRIP 
(32.429) (2.574) 
F(2,25) =571.66*, R-square =.9786, R-square =.9769, D-W=2.386 
* significant at at least the 5% level of significance. 
The reasoning for postulating the model in this form rests on 
an assumption that the amount of pig iron produced in any 
year will be related to overall crude steel production, and 
will be further influenced by the economics of producing pig 
iron in integrated steel mills relative to the acquisition 
costs of scrap for electric furnace steel producers. 
Chow testing again suggests that this regression relationship 
was not disrupted by the first or second oil shocks. The US 
regression model is similar to the world model (see page 
122), but demonstrates a more robust modelling relationship 
which is perhaps due to the availability of more appropriate 
and consistent annual real price series for pig iron and 
scrap, rather than changes in an indicative US real price of 
scrap (which was used as a proxy in the world model). 
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3.6) Summary of Findings 
Changes in historic linkages between steel consumption with 
economic activity, which occurred in the seventies, have made 
the task of demand forecasting for steel and iron input 
commodities more difficult within OECD countries. 
A shift in patterns of steel production growth from the three 
major OECD centres of production to the developing economies 
commenced in the early seventies. The trend has continued 
since with significant declines in US steel production 
overall, and particularly production from integrated plants. 
The dramatic growth of the JSI seen in the sixties and early 
seventies has now stabilized. US steel production has become 
more sensitive to the economic cycle with electric furnace 
production proportions increasing during the recessional 
phase. The influence of the business cycle on ASC is 
increasingly significant for the OECD economies. 
The contribution of blast furnace pig iron production to 
total crude steel production is important in forecasting coke 
demands. Blast furnace operations account for most of world's 
demand for coke and coking coals, but blast furnace demand 
for coke is itself a derived demand, depending the 
proportions of pig iron required in crude steel manufacture. 
Statistically significant time series regression 
models of pig iron and crude steel production change 
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behaviour were developed which are consistent with micro-
economic theory for US steel markets. 
It has been demonstrated that the proportion of pig iron to 
crude steel production changes over time depending on the 
technologies used in the various processes involved in 
steelmaking. It is now necessary to further examine the 
reasons behind Japan's emergence as the major international 
supplier of steel and the more recent developments in South 
Korea and Taiwan which have caused continued growth in coking 
coal demand for the region. 
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Chapter 4. 
RESTRUCTURING OF WORLD STEEL MANUFACTURING CAPACITY 
This chapter examines the economic factors which have 
resulted in changing patterns of steel manufacture within the 
OECD, and the decline in the proportion of steel production 
in industrialized countries relative to world production. 
As steel is a critical material factor cost for many 
elaborately transformed manufactures, a distinguishing 
feature of this industry is the history of extensive 
government intervention expressed in various forms of 
industrial policy in both the OECD and developing countries. 
The extent and forms of government intervention which have 
influenced the growth of the Japanese steel industry (JSI) 
will be examined, as these industrial policy mechanisms 
influenced world patterns of demand for coking coals to the 
benefit of Queensland's producers. Countervailing forms of 
industrial policy adopted by the US and other nations to 
resist changes in world patterns of steel manufacture also 
will be discussed. 
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4.1) Dynamic Comparative Advantage in Steel Production 
The development of the theory of comparative advantage 
and the economic benefits of international trade go back to 
the early nineteenth century writings of David Ricardo^ •-'-. 
Ricardo demonstrated that even if one country is superior to 
its trading partners in the production of all goods, mutual 
economic benefits result if each trading partner concentrates 
on the production and trade of those goods in which it is 
comparatively more efficient relative to other goods which 
may be produced. 
Ricardo's seminal model for the demonstration of comparative 
advantage in international trade considered only a single 
factor of production in determining such advantage. Later 
extensions to the theory by Heckscher and Ohlin'*'^ introduced 
multiple factors of production (labour, capital, land etc.) 
and the concepts of factor endowment and factor intensity of 
use to explain trade flows between countries. According to 
the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-0) theory, countries concentrate their 
production and export activities towards those goods 
retjuiring relatively large inputs of the country's abundant 
factor endowments. Where such factor inputs are depletable 
minerals resources, subject to increasing marginal costs. 
4.1) Ricardo, D. "Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation" - Reprint of 3rd edition (1821) 
New York: E.P. Dutton (1960). 
4.2) Ohlin, B. "Interregional and International Trade" 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., (1933) 
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as addressed by the theories of Gray^ *-^  and Hotelling^ • ^  , 
changes in comparative advantage may occur within a country's 
economy to change the status of a good from an export item to 
an import. With these trade theories in mind, changes in the 
costs of the principal factor inputs recjuired for steel 
manufacture in the US and Japan can be examined to gain some 
insight into the reasons for the emergence of the JSI at the 
expense of the US steel industry in the sixties and 
seventies. 
4.1.1) Steel Factor Input Cost Trends US vs Japan 
The US ceased to be self sufficient in steel production in 
1959, following a long and bitter steel strike. However 
problems in the industry had been building for many years. 
From 1947 to 1957, unit labour costs in the US steel industry 
increased 38% and the price of iron ore increased 69% in real 
terms. 
Despite the magnitude of these increases, US steel 
producers retained a factor cost advantage over the 
Japanese in the mill acquisition costs of the major input 
commodities recjuired for steel manufacture of $56.67 per 
tonne of finished steel in 1957. Advantages in delivered 
costs at the mill for the iron ore, steel scrap, and coking 
4.3) Gray, L.C."Rent under the Assumption of Exhaustibility" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 28 (1914) p.466-489. 
4.4) Hotelling, H."The Economics of Exhaustable Resources" 
Journal of Political Economy 39 (1931) p.137-175. 
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coal, were sufficient to offset lower labour production 
costs which afforded a labour cost advantage to the Japanese 
industry of $33.4 5 per tonne^*^, in that same year. 
Over the next decade the international competitiveness of the 
JSI improved relative to the US, and by the mid seventies 
Japan had become the world's largest exporter of steel and 
the US a substantial importer. The trends of differential US 
and Japanese factor costs for the period from 1956 to 1976 is 
shown in Figure 4.1 in constant 1987 dollars per tonne of 
production. In Figure 4.1, a consistently positive factor 
cost differential such as series "A", indicates that the US 
industry experienced higher real labour costs per unit of 
steel production than Japan. A negative factor cost 
differential such as that of series "B" in 1956, which 
becomes positive in 1976, indicates that the factor cost 
differential has been reversed over the period, and a 
disadvantage m 1956 has become an advantage by 1976. 
In the years from 1956 to 1970 the JSI achieved substantial 
reductions in delivered raw material costs. By 1968, the JSI 
had comparable input material costs per unit of production 
with US producers, whilst maintaining the advantage in unit 
4.5) Factor cost comparison statistics are taken from a study 
by the US Federal Trade Commission entitled "The United 
States Steel Industry and Its International Rivals : 
Trends and Factors Determining International 
Competitiveness" US Government Printing Office (1978) 
Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, p.113-117. 
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labour costs. This outcome was the result of Japanese 
producers maintaining a lower unit quantity input advantage 
per unit of finished steel produced, whilst eliminating a 
disadvantage in resource accjuisition costs relative to US 
producers. 
The reasons that the JSI was able to eliminate disadvantages 
in unit costs of energy commodity inputs in real $US terms 
relative to the US steel industry will now be examined. 
4.1.2) Energy Factor Cost Differentials US z. Japan 
Coking coal provides the principal energy input for 
ironmaking, which in turn is the most energy intensive 
process in steel manufacture. The trends of coking coal 
consumption and acquisition costs in constant 1987 $US per 
tonne is shown for the US and Japan in Table 4.1, for the 
years 1956 to 1976. 
134 
TABLE 4.1 
COKING COAL CONSUMPTION AND ACQUISITION COSTS 
US AND JAPAN 
Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
US 
Units/Tonne 
1.118 
1.073 
1.134 
0.945 
0.987 
0.942 
0.951 
0.888 
0.897 
0.919 
0.924 
0.950 
0.916 
0.868 
0.946 
0.900 
0.825 
0.800 
0.774 
0.903 
0.869 
JAPAN 
of Finish 
0.820 
0.797 
0.787 
0.724 
0.668 
0.693 
0.729 
0.676 
0.632 
0.695 
0.683 
0.655 
0.688 
0.717 
0.726 
0.783 
0.669 
0.637 
0.665 
0.771 
0.700 
US JAPAN 
1987$US per Tonne 
42 
44 
42, 
41, 
41, 
38. 
36. 
35. 
36. 
34. 
34. 
35, 
34. 
33. 
36. 
42. 
47. 
50. 
80. 
112. 
113. 
.16 
.57 
.64 
.72 
.31 
.12 
.93 
.09 
.42 
.91 
.40 
.16 
,51 
,37 
,11 
,78 
,55 
,34 
,02 
67 
97 
94.73 
108.51 
78.60 
64.90 
61.14 
60.11 
58.45 
55.31 
53.35 
51.61 
50.49 
48.37 
46.92 
45.97 
53.81 
54.40 
53.43 
54.98 
95.21 
108.73 
109.00 
Source: US Federal Trade Commission, "The United States Steel 
Industry and Its International Rivals:Trends and 
Factors Determining International Competitiveness" US 
Government Printing Office (1978) Tables 3.1 and 3.3. 
The data contained in Table 4.1 represents an example of 
dynamic comparative advantage. Lower consumption of coking 
coal per tonne of finished steel produced for Japan, reflects 
a consistently higher energy efficiency in its steel 
industry, which was a consecjuence of the lack of low cost 
domestic energy resources in Japan. This differential 
energy efficiency advantage was maintained from 1956 to 1976, 
although energy efficiency of both the Japanese and US steel 
industries improved over the period. For 198 5, the most 
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recent year for which comparative data is available^•^, nett 
average energy consumption per tonne of crude steel 
production for the US industry was 22.3 gigajoules (GJ), and 
for the JSI the nett average energy consumption was 17.7 GJ.. 
This indicates that Japan's energy efficiency remains some 
20% greater than that of the US industry. Due to a lowering 
of the proportion of electric furnace production relative to 
the US, the JSI's advantage has been eroded somewhat from the 
26% existing in 1956, but still remains substantial. 
The change of greatest significance with regard to relative 
energy cost competitiveness was that of the delivered cost of 
coking coal to these centres of steel manufacture over the 
period. In 1956, the Japanese were facing average coking coal 
delivery costs in excess of twice that of the US steel mills 
in real terms. By 1975, Japanese mills enjoyed both lower 
coking coal accjuisition costs than US steelmakers, as well as 
more energy efficient steel manufacturing facilities. 
A similar achievement in reducing relative input material 
costs was repeated for iron ore. In 1956, Japanese landed 
costs were 73% higher than the US. By 1976, US iron ore costs 
were 75% higher than Japan's. Australia's emergence as a 
major supplier of both coking coal and iron ore to Japan over 
this same period, played a significant role in these events. 
4.6) "Statistics on Energy in the Steel Industry 1980 - 1985" 
Committee on Statistics - IISI Brussels (April 1987). 
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4.2) Rationale for the JSI's Differential Performance 
A number of economic studies have been devoted to 
investigating the outstanding performance of the Japanese 
steel industry in the fifties and sixties relative to that of 
the United States. Various theories^•^ have been advanced to 
explain Japan's superior performance such as the influence of 
industrial policy, artificially low costs of capital due to 
Japanese financing practices, and the maintenance of 
favourable exchange rates to foster international 
competitiveness. The US Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.) 
study'* •^ of international steel competitiveness investigated 
these issues without finding any significant subsidy benefit 
to Japanese steel manufacturers for the duration of that 
study (only $.46 per tonne total subsidy benefit in 1975 
constant dollars at the end of the study period). 
In the F.T.C. study, five hypotheses were examined to explain 
the increase of US steel imports from Japan and the EEC: 
1) Changes in relative factor costs; 
2) longrun monopoly type price umbrellas of US producers, or 
counter-cyclical dual pricing behaviour by foreign 
producers (dumping); 
3) price controls on US producers that hampered domestic 
steel expansion and US ability to meet domestic steel 
demands; 
4.7) A comprehensive summary of such theories can be 
found in Johnson, C." M.I.T.I, and The Japanese Miracle 
: The Growth of Japanese Industrial Policy, 1925-1975" 
Stanford University Press (1982). p.1-19. 
4.8) US Federal Trade Commission, "The United States Steel 
Industry and Its International Rivals:Trends and Factors 
Determining International Competitiveness" US Government 
Printing Office (1978) p.324-332. 
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4) foreign government involvement in their steel industries 
enabling them to undercut US domestic producers; 
5) inefficient management in the US steel industry resulting 
in poor technological decisions and insufficient use of 
debt financing. 
Of the five hypotheses examined to explain the changes in 
steel trade flows, only the first relating to changes in 
relative factor cost was deemed significant. 
The F.T.C. study did not attribute any significant influence 
of Japanese industrial policy on the real changes of resource 
input factor costs shown in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1., 
despite conceding that industrial policy was certainly 
supportive of the development of an internationally 
competitive iron and steel industry in the fifties and 
sixties. However, in view of the remarkable differential 
performance of the Japanese industry, the possible influence 
of industrial policies on dynamic comparative advantage in 
steel manufacturing deserves further examination, despite the 
F.T.C. study's finding. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define the term 
"industrial policy" as used in the following discussion. The 
definition will be that proposed by Caves^*^, "as any 
government policy designed to the change the allocation of 
resources among sectors in the national economy." 
4.9) Caves R.E., "Industrial Policy and Trade Policy : A 
Framework" in Mutoh H., Sekiguchi S., Suzumura K., and 
I. Yamazawa (eds.) "Industrial Policies for Pacific 
Economic Growth" Allen & Unwin Sydney (1986). 
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4.2.1) Japanese Industrial Policy in Steel Manufacture 
All nations pursue broad forms of industrial policy in the 
sense that governments attempt to influence aggregate 
productive capacity and industrial structure for the 
betterment of the welfare and living standards of their 
citizens. Such forms of industrial policy can be macro or 
micro-economic in nature. The Japanese government has been 
very effective in encouraging domestic saving for industrial 
development investment, and research and development, and in 
controlling inflation by the employment of macro-economic 
policy. It is in the specific area of micro-economic 
industrial policy, where such policies might have resulted in 
a differential advantage to the Japanese steel industry, 
in which this investigation will concentrate. 
Komiya^ • •'•'^  describes Japanese industrial policy as an 
evolutionary process consisting of three principal phases: 
1) Reconstruction Era - 1945 to 1960. 
Objectives of industrial policy were the reconstruction of 
the Japanese economy and achieving economic independence. 
Policy emphasis was on establishing a priority production 
system, the promotion of basic industries (coal mining, 
electric power, iron and steel, and ocean transportation 
4.10) This discussion draws on Komiya K., M. Okuno, and K. 
Suzumura (eds.) "Industrial Policy of Japan" Academic 
Press Tokyo (1988) Chapter 1, p.5-10. 
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including shipbuilding), the supplying of critical raw 
materials at low and stable prices, and the encouragement 
of exports. During this period the basic industries (as 
defined above) were provided with subsidies, special rapid 
depreciation incentives, low interest finance, and were 
given priority in import allocations. 
2) High-Growth Era - 1961 to 1973. 
In this period the ruling principles of industrial policy 
became less clear cut and the ideology was symbolized by 
slogans such as "building heavy and chemical industry" and 
"improving the industrial structure" etc.. During the 
period, considerable gaps developed between the policies 
actually implemented, and guiding principles annunciated 
by the responsible government agency. 
3) Post OPEC Oil Crisis - 1973 to present 
The interventionist and direct control tendencies of the 
previous period of industrial policy declined. The 
economies of the advanced nations became more closely 
integrated. Japanese government policy makers became more 
confident that market forces will correctly allocate 
economic resources, and in any case foreign government 
pressures prevented obvious preferential treatment of 
individual industries by Japanese government agencies, 
particularly where such actions impeded international 
trade. 
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In discussing the possible influence of industrial policy on 
the differential performance of the Japanese steel industry, 
it is the reconstruction and rapid growth periods spanning 
the fifties and sixties which deserve further examination. 
The implementation of industrial policy specific to the 
JSI is described by Yamawaki^ • •'•-'•, and was administered by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) as three 
rationalization plans. There was intervention through a 
variety of protective and promotional policies. Initially, 
policies were designed to encourage the strategic allocation 
of resources to the steel industry as the core of the heavy 
and chemical industrialization programme. Collusion among 
firms was encouraged to stabilize investment, prices, output, 
and to prevent excessive competition. Later, improvement of 
international competitiveness was encouraged by increasing 
the size of firms through corporate mergers. 
Increased investment in the steel industry was coordinated in 
the following rationalization plans: 
1) The First Rationalization Plan - 1951 to 1955 
Investment was focussed on modernizing steel finishing 
facilities such as rolling mills. Very little expansion in 
capacity took place, and much of the technology was 
imported under licence, mainly from the US. Of the 128.2 
4.11) Ibid., Yamawaki, H. Chapter 11, p.281-305 
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billion Yen invested during the plan, 50% went for rolling 
mill upgrading, 13% for ironmaking, 11% for steelmaking, 
and the remainder for maintenance and repairs. 
2) The Second Rationalization Plan - 1956 to 1960 
Investment policy emphasised capacity expansion and 
increasing the scale of blast furnaces, steel converters, 
and the construction of large scale integrated facilities. 
The investment of 545.9 billion yen occurring during the 
second plan was directed more at ironmaking (18% versus 
13%), with slightly lower investments in rolling mills 
(48% versus 50%) and maintenance and repairs. The foreign 
component of steel manufacturing equipment was only about 
10% in the second plan, but the number of foreign 
technology licences taken out by Japanese steel firms was 
double that of the previous plan. 
3) The Third Rationalization Plan - 1961 to 1965 
During this plan existing facility capacities were 
expanded, and large scale integrated facilities were 
constructed in new coastal industrial zones. A total of 
859.2 billion yen was invested, of which 16% was for 
ironmaking, 9.2% was for steel production, 41.4% for 
rolling mills, and 33.4% for maintenance and repairs. 
The third plan differed from the first and second plans in 
the degree of government intervention in steel industry 
investment patterns. For the First Rationalization Plan, 
direct government regulation of investment occurred through 
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guidelines issued by the Industrial Rationalization Council 
of MITI. During the Second Rationalization Plan, investment 
was carried out with the guidance of, and coordination by 
MITI, under a longterm facilities plan that MITI compiled. 
However after 1960, steel industry investments were no longer 
directly coordinated by MITI, and guidance was promulgated 
through industry consultation and agreement amongst firms via 
the working committee meetings of the Japanese Iron and Steel 
Federation. Often the investment plans of individual firms 
exceeded the forecasts of MITI, and the powers of MITI to 
enforce industrial policy to prevent excess capacity and 
excessive competition in the steel industry were more 
limited. 
During the First and Second Rationalization Plans, MITI was 
able to use a number of laws and incentives to encourage 
cooperation by individual firms to accept industrial policy 
guidance. By the early sixties and the advent of trade 
liberalization, with Japan's admission into the OECD and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), many of the tools 
previously used to enforce industrial policy were no longer 
available to MITI, as a result of the removal of currency and 
import restrictions. 
Although the F.T.C. study'* *-*-^  does not attribute any great 
influence of steel industry industrial policy or government 
4.12) US Federal Trade Commission, "The United States Steel 
Industry and Its International Rivals:Trends and 
Factors Determining International Competitiveness" US 
Government Printing Office (1978) Table 6.1 p.369. 
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subsidies to the rise of Japan's export competitiveness as a 
result of lowered resource acquisition costs relative to the 
US, that analysis considered only those elements directed 
specifically at the steel industry. Two other industries 
benefiting from industrial policy and quite large 
subsidies^'^•^, were those of ocean transportation and 
domestic coal mining. Both these industries are also of 
considerable importance to the steel industry in providing 
crucial services and energy inputs, although the domestic 
coking coal industry is now being phased out. Ocean 
transportation remains a significant cost element in 
determining Japan's international competitiveness as a steel 
manufacturer. 
4.2.2) Coal Mining and Ocean Transportation Industrial Policy 
During the period of rapid economic growth in Japan (1955 to 
1975), the government promoted industrial development by 
public expenditures on industrial infrastructure, provided 
investment incentives for selected industries through 
special rapid depreciation schemes, and reduced costs by the 
provision of low interest loans to specific industries. Also, 
direct subsidies and heavy protection were afforded to these 
selected industries. 
By far the largest beneficiaries of direct government subsidy 
4.13) Material for this discussion is drawn from Ogura, S. 
and N. Yoshino, "The Tax System and the Fiscal and Loan 
Program" in Komiya R., M. Okuno, K. Suzumura, (eds.) 
"Industrial Policy of Japan" Academic Press Tokyo 
(1988), Chapter 5, p.121-152. 
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in Japan have been the agriculture, forestry and fishery 
industries which have collectively received 72% or more of 
total direct subsidies each fiscal year from 1955 to 1982. In 
1955 and 1956, ocean transport was the next largest recipient 
at 5% and 4.9% in those two years. Direct subsidy payments to 
the domestic coal industry began in 1960, and from 1960 to 
1970 the ocean transportation and domestic coal industries 
were collectively the largest subsidy recipients after 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, at an average annual 
rate of 12% of total payments. The remaining categories of 
direct subsidy payments were made to high technology, small 
business, textiles, etc., and the average annual rate to 
these industries was 8.1% from 1960 to 1970. Between 1960 and 
1970, ocean transport and coal mining collectively received 
$US 1.2 billion in direct government subsidy payments. 
Prior to 1961, the main beneficiaries from special rapid 
depreciation schemes had been the iron and steel industry and 
automobile manufacturing. From 1962 to 1973, the ratio of 
special depreciation allowances to total depreciation became 
greatest for shipbuilding at 15%, compared to an average of 
8% for all manufacturing. 
In the early fifties the Japanese government formed the 
Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ) to supply long-term funds 
for ecjuipment exports, and the Japan Development Bank (JDB) 
to supply long-term investment funds to industry. The JDB 
focussed on lending to the electric power and ocean transport 
industries, followed by domestic coal mining, iron and steel. 
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fertilizers, and machinery, in order of priority. The EIBJ 
loans were mainly for shipbuilding during the period from 
1950 to 1970. Funds from these banks were made available 
at lower interest rates than could be obtained commercially, 
and it is estimated that interest costs to the sea transport 
industry were reduced by 2 0% on average for the period 1962-
1975 relative to commercial lending rates. The provision of 
such subsidized capital to shipbuilders encouraged the 
reconstruction of the Japanese merchant fleet employing the 
latest technology and scale economies. From 1965 to 1985, the 
total capacity of the Japanese ore and bulk carrier fleet 
increased from 1,243,721 tonnes gross to 13,899,762 tonnes 
gross, and the average vessel size increased 2.7 times'* *•'•'*. 
Robinson'* * -^^ provides estimates of reductions in the costs 
of ocean transportation of bulk minerals in a 58,000 ton 
deadweight vessel from 1958 to 1973 due to technology and 
other efficiency improvements of about 50%, and cost 
reductions due to economies of scale of about 45% in 
increasing average vessel size a factor of 2.6 times. As a 
major bulk minerals importer in the Japanese economy, the JSI 
received considerable benefit from ocean transportation 
industrial policies. 
4.14) Lloyd's Register of Shipping - Statistical Tables 
(1965 to 1985) 
4.15) Robinson, T.J.C. "The Costs of Ocean Transport of Bulk 
Materials" International Journal of Transport Economics 
Vol.IV No.4 (December 1977) p.320-324. 
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The F.T.C. report analysis did not consider the direct 
subsidies, rapid depreciation, and low interest government 
loans to the sea transport and domestic coal mining subsidies 
industries, when assessing the impact of government subsidies 
on changes of international competitiveness of the JSI. 
There is little doubt that a portion of the reduction of 
resource input factor costs enjoyed by Japanese steel makers 
in the period from 1956 to 1976 can be attributed to 
government assistance to ocean shipping and domestic coal. 
Other factors also contributed to the loss of US comparative 
advantage in resource factor costs, most particularly the 
depletion of locally sourced high grade iron ore resources 
which occurred in the early f if ties'* * •'•^. 
Japan's industrial policy programme promoting ocean shipping 
also has had an important influence on the division of 
producer and consumer surplus in world steel resource input 
markets. Ocean transportation is a significant proportion of 
the total accjuisition costs for iron ore and coking coal for 
both north Asian and EEC steelmakers. In creating a dominant 
position in the international bulk shipping trade, Japanese 
buyers were in the position to dictate to the steel commodity 
suppliers in Australia, Canada and Brazil, that coking coal 
and iron ore contracts would be written on an fob basis. 
This ensured that the division of surplus arising from the 
4.16) Crandall, R.W. "The US Steel Industry in Recurrent 
Crisis: Policy Options in a Competitive World" 
Brookings Institution Washington D.C.(1981) p.19-21 
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locational rents associated with ocean shipping would be 
controlled by Japanese interests, and established a monopoly 
position in a key link of the supply chain. It will be shown 
in Chapter 6 that dominance of the ocean shipping is but one 
manifestation of market power enjoyed by the JSI, which has 
resulted in the creation of market tiers arising from 
oligopsony purchasing stategies, at the expense of Australian 
and some Canadian coking coal exporters. 
The direct subsidy of Japanese coking coal producers 
resulting from elements of industrial policy encouraging 
domestic coal production has also been significant. However 
market distortion in North Asian coking coal markets 
resulting from such policies in Japan are dwarfed by the 
effect on EEC markets of domestic production subsidies 
afforded many European coal producers, which shall now be 
considered. 
4.3) EEC Coal Production Subsidy Policies 
A study by the OECD's International Energy Agency (lEA) 
entitled "Coal Prospects and Policies in lEA Countries:1987 
Review (1988), presents details of such subsidies. Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 which follow have been prepared from this and other 
referenced data sources. 
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TABLE 4.2 
WEST GERMAN COKING COAL SUBSIDIES 
(1987 US Dollars) 
Years 1984 1985 1986 1987 1990 
Total Subsidy 524.9 415.3 1282.8 1836.1 2043.0 
($millions) 
Subsidy/Tonne* 17.36 13.64 49.89 72.0 81.72 
* Source : International Coal Report #268 (March 1991) p.4. 
To consider the impact of the German subsidy policy on a 
typical importer of coking coal in Europe, take the example 
of the situation for France. The average cif cost of 
Australian coking coal imported by France in 1987 was 
$US56.53/tonne, for imports of 2.327 million tonnes. France 
also imported 2.804 million tonnes of American coking coal at 
an average cif cost of $US56.49/tonne. The effect of the 
German subsidy was to make the 1.572 million tonnes of German 
coking coal imported by France competitive on a cif basis (at 
$US56.43/tonne) with coking coals imported from Australia and 
the US at the expense of more efficient US and Australian 
producers, which otherwise might have serviced this demand. 
As the example indicates, the market distorting effects of 
European coal subsidies are significant not only in Germany 
but for other EEC importers of coal. German coking coal 
subsidies will cease to apply to export sales after 1995, but 
Germany's domestic markets will continue to suffer distortion 
from subsidy policies for the foreseeable future. 
Significant coal production subsidy programmes exist 
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elsewhere, and Table 4.3 summarizes the larger government 
supported programmes amongst the OECD member nations. 
TABLE 4.3 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN OECD COAL PRODUCTION 
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total Support ($'87US millions) 
W.Germany 1999.2 2261.8 2258.5 2087.2 3566.9 5815.0 
Belgium 200.7 161.7 184.3 183.9 313.1 425.0 
Japan 346.3 614.1 659.8 851.8 1159.8 1330.0 
Spain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 367.0 
UK 1203.3 2258.5 3482.3 616.1 1683.0 n/a 
Support/Tonne Produced ($'87US/Tonne) 
W.Germany 22.30 27.14 32.72 25.36 44.29 71.0 
Belgium 30.52 26.01 29.45 29.59 55.62 n/a 
Japan 19.96 37.32 39.46 51.78 76.22 93.0 
Spain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 19.0 
UK 10.57 21.49 81.80* 6.34 16.48 n/a 
Source : Coal Prospects & Policies in lEA Countries 
1987 Review - lEA, Table V-3. 
* Year of the UK coal strike. 
Although the West German programme is largest of those 
reported for the OECD, trade distortions due to the subsidies 
of the UK, Belgium, and Spain, are also significant. The 
Japanese government subsidy of local production is additive 
to coal trade distortions caused by the JSI's purchasing 
policies, and in actual magnitude per tonne, the highest 
within the OECD. 
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4.4) US Industry Response to Changing Comparative Advantage 
Table 4.1 has shown that Japanese steelmakers overcame the 
comparative disadvantage relative to the US from a lack of 
low cost coking coal resources, by achieving higher process 
energy efficiencies, and by obtaining access to lower cost 
foreign resources. Such actions, together with the 
maintenance of a labour factor cost advantage, and the US 
loss of low cost iron ore due to depletion, enabled the JSI 
to commence to penetrate US domestic steel markets in the 
sixties. The US industry response was to seek protection 
against Japanese steel imports by convincing their government 
to adopt its own industrial policy measures to counteract the 
deterioration of international competitiveness occurring as 
the result of dynamic comparative advantage just described. 
Okuno and Suzumura^ •-^ ,^ divide the various types of 
industrial policy into three categories; the development of 
new industries (Tl); intervention in specific aspects of 
industrial activities in general (T2); and adjustment 
assistance for ailing or failing industries (T3). Of the 
three specific examples of Japanese industrial policy already 
discussed, the policies adopted in the various steel industry 
rationalization plans fell into the Tl and T2 categories of 
4.17) Okuno, M. and K. Suzumura "The Economic Analysis of 
Industrial Policy:A Conceptual Framework through the 
Japanese Experience" in Mutoh H., S. Sekiguchi, K. 
Suzumura, and I. Yamazawa (eds) "Industrial Policies 
for Pacific Economic Growth", (1986) Allen & Unwin -
Sydney. 
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industrial policy, as did the ocean transportation policies. 
Japan's domestic coal mining policies have been more in the 
nature of protective (T3) categories. 
Unlike Japan and newer industrially developing countries 
(South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil), both the US and EEC steel 
industries have sought the protection of defensive (T3) types 
of industrial policy in attempting to deal with the increased 
international competitiveness of Japanese and other low cost 
steel manufacturers. In the case of the US, this policy has 
mainly taken the form of establishing import cjuotas through 
the mechanism of voluntary restraint agreements (VRA's). For 
the EEC, the so called "Davignon" plan was introduced in 1977 
with the aim of reducing internal competition, and helping to 
ease the burden of structural adjustment for the European 
steel industry. The main policy instruments of this plan were 
mandatory minimum prices for trade within the EEC, and basic 
prices for imports into the region together with bilateral 
price and volume agreements with the principal steel 
exporters. 
The JSI response to VRA limitations to US steel markets has 
been one of exporting higher value added steel products and 
forming joint venture agreements with ailing US steel 
producers to produce steel in the US. This latter action may 
limit further growth in demand for Australia's steel 
commodity exports to service Japanese steel exports to US 
markets or the demands of Japanese manufacturers with plants 
now located in the US. In future the cjuantities of Australian 
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sourced coal and iron ore which are processed by the Japanese 
steel industry, and further enhanced by Japanese car 
manufacturers and others into elaborately transformed 
manufactures, may well decline if the trends of overseas 
relocation of Japanese manufacturing continues. 
Australia has adopted its own version of industrial policy 
for the local steel industry in the four year industry plan 
recently completed^*^^. Like the forms of T3 industrial 
policy adopted in the US and the EEC, this plan was defensive 
in nature, intended as a rescue package for an ailing 
domestic industry. Considering Australia's resource factor 
endowment situation in both iron ore and coking coal, it is a 
serious reflection on the micro-economic efficiency of 
transportation services and other elements in the domestic 
steel manufacturing chain, that a T3 type industrial policy 
has been required. The situation just described does however 
highlight the difference between the offensive nature of the 
Japanese and other North Asian governments' use of industrial 
policy for their steel industries, and the reactive use of 
steel industry industrial policies in Australia, the US and 
the EEC. 
4.5) Strategic Focus of Japanese Steel Industry Policies 
The formulators of postwar industrial policy within MITI 
4.18) Bureau of Industry Economics Occasional Paper #5 
"Australian Steel and the Steel Industry Plan" 
AGPS Canberra (1988). 
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have frequently used the term "modernizing the industrial 
structure of Japan"^*-^^. The meaning of this expression 
refers to the policy goal of shifting the industrial 
structure of the economy as much as possible towards groups 
of industries in which productivity improvement was easy 
(i.e. having strong learning or economy of scale gains), for 
which expansion of demands were anticipated, and which were 
based on high technology processes. 
A limitation of Ricardian and H-0 theories of comparative 
advantage and factor endowment explanations of international 
trade is that such theories do not consider the effects of 
dynamic changes of industrial structure within various 
trading nations, or the division of the gains from trade 
resulting from such changes. Changes in industrial structure 
over time and the direction of such changes can be influenced 
by industrial policy inteirventions, chance historical events, 
and culture and institutions. Even technological advance is 
not solely determined exogenously but is greatly influenced 
by learning experience within individual firms. 
In any exchange economy, the gains from exchange depend on 
the initial endowment of the participants. In international 
trade, such gains are greatly influenced by the industrial 
structure and resource endowment of the trading nations which 
determines which goods are exported and which goods are 
4.19) Material used in this discussion is drawn from 
Itoh M., M. Okuno, K. Kiyono and K. Suzumura "Industry 
Promotion and Trade" in Komiya R., M. Okuno, K. 
Suzumura, (eds.) "Industrial Policy of Japan" Academic 
Press Tokyo (1988) Chapter 10, p.257-276. 
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imported. If a particular nation's industrial structure is 
such that international demands for its exports are strong, 
and foreign countries can supply that nation's imports 
cheaply, the economic welfare of that nation will be 
differentially advanced through trade relative to those 
nations not able to export such sought after goods. 
Furthermore, if a nation is able to stimulate competing 
resource development projects among foreign suppliers to 
further cheapen essential imports which are resource inputs 
to its exports, gains from trade are further enhanced. One 
issue which must be addressed is whether market forces alone 
will cause the formation of the desired industrial structure 
or whether some forms of Tl and T2 type industrial policy 
guidance are necessary. 
Another issue of importance concerns the use of Tl and T2 
industrial policies by some trading nations in the absence of 
the adoption of such policies by others, and the resulting 
division of the gains from trade. 
Itoh et al^*^^, provide theoretical models to support a need 
for Tl and T2 type industrial policy intervention for 
industries having significant learning and economies of scale 
effects, such as steel and automobile manufacture. The 
success of Japan in these industries would seem to validate 
the theoretical basis of the models proposed by these 
4.20) Itoh M. , M. Okuno, K. Kiyono and K. Suzumura 
"Industrial Policy as a Corrective to Market Failures" 
in Komiya R., M. Okuno, K. Suzumura, (eds.) 
"Industrial Policy of Japan" Academic Press Tokyo 
(1988), Ch.9 p.233-253, and Ibid. Ch.lO p.260-268. 
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authors. However this success might also be in part a result 
of the adoption of strategic and aggressive forms of 
industrial policy (Tl and T2 types) by Japan, whereas the US 
and Australia have been reluctant to adopt other than 
reactive or protective (T3) types of industrial policies, and 
tend to rely instead on market forces for the development of 
the appropriate industrial structure. 
For high technology industries having significant economies 
of scale and therefore suffering market failure, reliance on 
market forces for structural adjustment may be theoretically 
and practically inappropriate. This is particularly the case 
in an era when export oriented countries like Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan employ T2 type industrial policies for those 
same industries. 
4.6) Summary of Findings 
The quite remarkable growth of the JSI in the fifties and 
sixties was at least partially due to the sucessful 
application of industrial policy within Japan. The 
authoritative F.T.C. study"* •^•'- of this phenomenon neglected 
consideration of the beneficial effects of Japanese 
industrial policy on ocean transportation and domestic coal 
production on resource input costs for the JSI. This omission 
casts doubt on the validity of the study's conclusion that 
4.21) US Federal Trade Commission - "The United States Steel 
Industry and Its International Rivals : Trends and 
Factors Determining International Competitiveness" US 
Government Printing Office (1978) 
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industrial policy was a negligable factor in explaining the 
differential performance of the Japanese and US steel 
industries. Additional research is required to quantify the 
influence such policies had on coal and iron ore acquisition 
cost trends for the JSI. 
The creation of a dominant position in bulk shipping also 
provided Japanese interests with effective control of the 
ocean transportation component of the steel resource input 
delivery chain, and the ability to influence the division of 
locational rents. 
It has been shown that as supplier of a critical input 
material in industrial manufacturing processes important for 
economic growth and wellbeing, the steel industry has 
historically been a favoured candidate for industrial policy 
interventions of one type or another. Such a history has 
impeded the formation of ideal competitive markets in traded 
input commodities. 
Steel manufacture is an energy intensive and technologically 
complex process. The premium end use for Queensland's coal 
exports is in the ironmaking stage of steel manufacture, 
which shall be investigated in the context of process 
technology evolution in the next chapter. 
157 
Chapter 5, 
TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION IN IRONMAKING 
Chapters 3 and 4 have addressed the changing relationships 
between economic growth and steel demands, and the 
restructuring of world steel manufacture which has altered 
patterns of demand for steel input commodities. Having also 
examined the relationships between crude steel demands, crude 
steel production and pig iron production in Chapter 3, focus 
is now directed on the various ironmaking processes. The 
evolution of blast furnace manufacturing technology will be 
considered, particularly with regard to those process changes 
which may impact future tjualitative as well as cjuantitative 
retjuirements for coking coals. 
Other coal based technologies which do not recjuire the 
special caking characteristics of coking coals will also be 
examined, as well as those iron reduction processes which 
employ natural gas rather than coal as the primary energy 
input. 
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5.1) The Blast Furnace Process for Ironmaking 
Some eighty percent of the world's demand for coke is a 
derived demand arising from the operation of the blast 
furnace as the principal ironmaking process used for crude 
steel manufacture. In order to appreciate the present role of 
coke in an integrated steel plant, and evaluate alternative 
ironmaking technologies, it is necessary to obtain some 
familiarity with the blast furnace process. The description 
provided in Appendix "A" affords the necessary basic 
technical information which is recjuired in the discussion of 
coke characteristics, and the demand and price differentials 
associated with various properties of coking coal which 
follow. 
Modern blast furnace technology has evolved over many years 
from primitive charcoal smelting processes which were used in 
the earliest production of iron from naturally occurring 
ores. Most of the ores used in modern steel manufacture exist 
as oxides of iron, either hematite (Fe203) or magnetite 
(Fe304), and sometimes in small deposits as hydroxides and 
carbonates. When chemically pure, hematite may contain 7 0% 
iron, and magnetite up to 72% iron. However, iron content of 
naturally occurring ores ranges between 50 to 66% for rich 
ores (Australian and Brazilian hematites), and 30 to 50% for 
lean ores such as American taconite ore. The remaining 
material (or gangue) which is mixed with iron ores consists 
mainly of silica, alumina, and small amounts of moisture and 
chemically combined water. The blast furnace production of 
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iron from such ores involves the chemical separation of iron 
from its oxide compounds by reduction processes, followed by 
the physical separation of molten iron from the gangue 
impurities of silica and alumina. 
The modern blast furnace is a technically mature apparatus 
which has evolved continuously over the last hundred years to 
perform these tasks, possessing overall thermal efficiencies 
of 85 to 90%. Such levels of thermal efficiency are not often 
achieved in energy intensive industrial processes. For 
example, overall thermal efficiencies rarely exceed 3 5% in 
the coal or oil fired central power stations used for 
electricity generation, and nuclear power generation 
facilities of the light water reactor technology type, have 
thermal efficiencies of less than 30%. 
Coke is the principal source of energy in the blast furnace 
process. It is burnt in the lower section of the furnace to 
provide the large amounts of heat recjuired for the chemical 
and physical separation of iron. Coke also provides both the 
structural support and permeable matrix material necessary 
for the physical separation of licjuid iron from gangue 
impurities which also takes place in the lower portion of the 
blast furnace as is described in Appendix A. 
As is clear from the process description, good coke 
characteristics are critical to successful blast furnace 
operations, and it is the structural and abrasion properties 
of the coke at the high temperatures occurring in the lower 
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zone of the blast furnace which are of greatest importance. 
Blast furnace demands account for most of the world demand 
for coke (and coking coals), but the blast furnace demand for 
coke is itself a derived demand, which depends on the 
proportions of pig iron required in crude steel manufacture. 
It has already been demonstrated in Chapter 3, that this 
proportion has changed over time due to changes in the 
technologies used for steel production. Future advances in 
blast furnace and coke manufacturing technology, and other 
emerging iron producing processes which may influence 
tjualitative and cjuantitative demands for Queensland's coking 
coals are now examined. 
5.1.1) Blast Furnace Scale Changes 
At the end of the Second World War the US steel industry was 
the world's technological leader in all aspects of steel 
manufacture, including iron smelting. By the mid 1950's, 
America's steel industry technical experts considered that 
blast furnaces had reached their maximum efficient size as 
evaluated by engineering and economic criteria, then having 
a size of about 1500 cubic metres internal volume, and 
averaging one half a million tonnes of hot metal output per 
year. The Japanese steel industry expanded rapidly in the 
fifties and sixties using American blast furnace technology 
which at the time was considered state of the art. However 
towards the end of the sixties, the JSI committed to 
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significant increases in the scale of new blast furnace unit 
capacities which were double the size of the units being 
constructed in North America or Western Europe. 
In 1966, Japan was producing six times its 1955 output with 
about 50 blast furnaces averaging .6 million tonnes annually, 
some 10% more than the US average output per furnace at that 
time. However, only four years later Japan had more than 
doubled pig iron output while adding only ten additional 
blast furnaces. The average annual output per furnace in 
Japan had then increased to 1.1 million tonnes. 
The furnaces constructed in Japan over this short intervening 
period were very much larger than the 1500 cu.metres 
previously considered economic within the US steel industry, 
with working volumes in excess of 4 000 cu.metres producing 
3.5 to 4.5 million tonnes of hot metal per year. Gold's^ *-'-
research indicates that it was recognized in Japan at the 
time that scale cost economies were modest (<5%) beyond 3000 
cu.metres, and incremental economies beyond 4 000 cu.metres 
were slight and declined rapidly. In short, the major 
increases in scale of Japanese blast furnaces were not 
attributable to substantial technological advances. It was 
managerial aspirations, with engineers responding to those 
attitudes, which was the driving force behind the selection 
of much larger unit sizes. There was also the influence of 
5.1) The reasons behind the JSI's decision to significantly 
increase unit sizes have been investigated by Gold, B. 
"Evaluating Scale Economies:The Case of Japanese Blast 
Furnaces" Journal of Industrial Economics (September 
1974) p.1-18. 
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an industrial policy^'^ intending to minimize adjustments in 
the market shares of major Japanese manufacturers by 
licencing the authority to construct new furnaces 
secjuentially for each company. This policy limited the total 
number of blast furnaces through the sequential rationing of 
permission to build new furnaces. In a steel demand 
environment which was experiencing such rapid growth, it 
could be anticipated that each company would make the most of 
limited capacity addition opportunities, by adding the 
largest sized units considered technically feasible. 
In addition, the strong steel demand environment encouraged 
manufacturers to maximize pig iron yield per cubic metre of 
blast furnace volume per day. Japanese steel makers employed 
significantly higher driving rates in their furnaces than was 
US practice at the time, yielding 50% more output per cubic 
metre of volume^'-^ through higher top pressures, oxygen 
enrichment, higher operating temperatures, stronger blast, 
and increased use of sintered and pelletized ores. 
Also, the JSI's earlier commitment to the basic oxygen 
furnace (BOF) for steel manufacture than the US or European 
industries, recjuired a higher ratio of hot metal to crude 
steel output compared to the open hearth process (which uses 
a greater proportion of scrap in the charge), and was an 
5.2) Ibid. p.10-11. 
5.3) Gold, B. "Productivity, Technology, and Capital" 
Lexington MA: D.C. Heath-Lexington Books (1979) p.119. 
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additional incentive to focus on the development of large 
blast furnaces in Japan. 
The very large capacity furnaces being built by the JSI in 
the late sixties placed much higher operating stresses on 
coke due to the increased height and weight of burden in 
these vessels. This, together with the higher driving rates 
adopted, necessitated greater material strengths at higher 
temperatures for coke to fulfil its role as a structural 
material in the high temperature operating areas of the 
raceway and dead man zones of the blast furnace. Such 
developments placed a premium on those low volatile coking 
coals which could be used to produce high strength furnace 
coke. Initially these prime coals were available only from 
the Appalachian coal fields of the United States. 
Consetjuently, large cjuantities of this "hard coal" was 
imported by the JSI, and was the reason for the dominance of 
the US as the principal supplier of coking coals in the 
fifties and sixties. 
As coke strength and abrasion resistance at high temperatures 
became critical with the increasing scale and production 
rates of blast furnaces, the unicjue coking properties of its 
hard coking coals increased the pricing premium commanded by 
US coking coals. Such price increases in the late sixties 
became of concern to the JSI, which at that time initiated 
the development of alternative sources of hard coking coal 
from both Queensland and western Canada through the various 
Japanese trading companies. 
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Before discussing the special properties of coking coal 
needed to manufacture coke of superior strength for large 
furnaces at high rates of hot metal production, it is 
necessary to consider the differing compositions of the 
various types of bituminous coal used for coke manufacture. 
5.2) Coking Coal Composition^•^ 
Bituminous coal consists of organic and inorganic 
constituents. The organic constituents, called macerals, are 
further identified in the three major categories of exinite, 
vitrinite and inertinite. The inorganic materials are 
principally the oxides of silicon and aluminium so prevalent 
in the earth's crust, which form an uncombustable residue 
when coal is burnt, and are referred to as ash. 
The vitrinite maceral is thought to be derived mainly from 
the woody tissue of trees in peat swamps. Exinite is derived 
from ancient pollens, spores and leaf epidermis, and is 
technically important in coking process as it enhances the 
fluidity of the coal (the caking property) which is valued in 
coke making. Inertinite is derived from fungal remains, 
charcoal and partly charred wood, and has the highest carbon 
content of the three maceral categories. 
5.4) Material for this discussion is drawn from Pearson, D.E. 
"The Quality of Western Canadian Coking Coal" Canadian 
Institute of Minerals Bulletin (January 1980) p.70-84. 
and Zimmerman, R.E. "Evaluating and Testing the Coking 
Properties of Coal" Miller Freeman Publications Inc. 
San Francisco (1979) Chapters 5 and 6. 
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The Carboniferous-aged coals of Appalachia and western Europe 
may contain 60 to 80% vitrinite and from 5 to 20% exinite. 
The Permian-aged central Queensland and Cretaceous-aged 
western Canadian coking coals often contain 60 to 80% 
inertinite, with correspondingly lower proportions of the 
other two maceral constituents. 
In coke making, inertinite provides much of the carbon matrix 
important for strength, and the exinite and vitrinite 
macerals melt and break down during coking to form the porous 
structure of coke. Coals very high in vitrinite and exinite 
lack the carbon content necessary for coke strength, and are 
thus considered to be "soft" coking coals. Coals high in 
inertinite concentration are considered "hard" coking coals, 
but if sufficient exinite and vitrinite macerals are not also 
naturally present, such hard coals by themselves will not 
make satisfactory coke without the addition of soft coking 
coals to the coke blend. The ideal naturally occurring coals 
for coke making are the low and medium volatile coals of 
Appalachia, which can be used with minimal blending to 
produce high strength cokes. 
The commercially accepted methods to measure the coking 
properties of various types of coking coals are the tests for 
fixed carbon content, free swelling index (or crucible 
swelling number), and fluidity. Ash, sulphur and moisture 
content properties must also be defined to properly assess 
the value of a particular coal in the coke blend and as the 
principal energy input to the blast furnace in the form of 
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coke. These measurements generally form the basis of expected 
coal cjuality specifications and may define rejection limits 
for a coal in the event that particular levels are not met. 
Fixed carbon is the amount of carbon remaining after the coal 
has been coked. As carbon is the material consumed in the 
blast furnace, a high fixed carbon property of a coal gives a 
high coke yield per tonne of input to the coke ovens, which 
increases the value of such a coal in the blend. 
The caking properties of a coal refers to its melting and 
fluidity characteristics during melting at the high 
temperatures of the coke ovens. It is these characteristics 
which act to bind the fixed carbon particles together in a 
porous matrix which is both uniform and strong at high 
temperatures. Good caking properties are associated with a 
higher content of volatiles, and are contributed by exinite 
and vitrinite macerals which break down at high temperatures 
to release the coal litjuids and hydrocarbon gases generated 
as byproducts in the coking process. 
Ash and sulphur are coal impurities which become retained in 
the coke and reduce the carbon content. Ash and sulphur also 
react chemically in the blast furnace with other impurities 
introduced with the iron ore feed and form additional slag. 
Additional slag retjuires additional coke combustion and 
limestone or other flux material for its separation from the 
hot metal, thereby reducing hot metal yields and adding to 
the energy costs by increasing the rate of coke consumption. 
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Moisture is present in all coals and is of no value in the 
coking process, but a certain amount is retjuired to prevent 
excessive dust formation during handling and transportation. 
Coals requiring higher levels of moisture for satisfactory 
handling would normally incurr an economic penalty in 
economic evaluation relative to lower moisture coals because 
of the cost of transporting the additional moisture, and the 
costs of coal drying prior to coking. 
The properties of a coking coal most likely to increase its 
value to the ironmaker are therefore the fixed carbon content 
and caking characteristics, measured by free swelling index 
and fluidity. Higher ash, sulphur, and moisture contents in a 
coal will reduce its economic value to the ironmaker. 
The function of coke in the blast furnace process has been 
described, and the constituents of bituminous coal important 
for coke manufacture identified. It is now necessary to 
briefly describe the coke manufacturing process itself. 
5.2.1) Metallurgical Coke Manufacture 
Coke is manufactured from a blend of bituminous coals of 
suitable properties by a process of carbonization which 
involves heating the blend to a temperature range of 900 to 
1200°C in the absence of air. The coking process is generally 
performed in by-product coke ovens which together with the 
iron ore sinter plant are adjuncts to the blast furnace 
facilities in most integrated steel plants. 
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Coke ovens consist of a series of narrow vertical retort 
chambers, each not greater than one half a metre in width, 
having a length of about 15 metres and a height of up to 7 
metres. As many as a hundred ovens may be constructed side by 
side to form a coking battery. Carbonization proceeds from 
the walls of the oven inwards and can take from 12 to 2 0 
hours to complete. The gases and coal licjuids given off 
during the process are collected in a series of flues 
separating the ovens, and are processed to give valuable fuel 
and chemical byproducts. 
When the carbonization of the coking coal blend is considered 
complete, the oven is discharged by inserting a ram in one 
end of the oven and collecting the hot coke at the other. 
The hot coke is then quenched, either with water sprays or by 
inert gas dry cjuenching which enables recovery of much of the 
heat energy from the discharged coke. 
Coke batteries are subjected to severe operating conditions 
with high temperatures and accompanying thermal stresses. The 
silica brick wall linings retjuired due to such high process 
temperatures are sometimes also subjected to severe 
mechanical loads during carbonization and the coke discharge 
cycle. Under such service conditions the walls of the ovens 
require regular replacement, and the oven doors and seal 
components need continual maintenance to meet air pollution 
control retjuirements. Increasingly stringent air emission 
regulations in the US have created problems in maintaining 
existing coke batteries in operation to such an extent that 
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the US industry may have to rely on imported coke in future 
to maintain operation of a significant proportion of existing 
blast furnace facilities'*^. 
A similar pattern of decline in coke oven capacity is 
forecast by MITI for the JSI. By 2005, Japan is expected to 
become a significant importer of coke, and by 2015 all 
existing Japanese coke manufacturing capacity is expected to 
be retired, despite a prediction that blast furnace 
consumption of coke will remain in the range of 30 to 33 
million tonnes per year. In order for these forecasts to be 
realized, considerable growth in the international trade of 
coke will be recjuired. International merchant trade in coke 
is presently only about 12 million tonnes annually. 
Due to the problem of aging coke ovens and more stringent 
emission controls on their operations within the OECD, blast 
furnace ironmaking processes are now reaching an important 
threshold. Existing facilities are approaching the end of 
their normal economic lives, and many installations have 
already extended operations beyond the original design 
expectations. 
5.5) Numerous studies have been performed, and articles 
published in industry literature, addressing the 
problems of aging coke ovens, e.g. Paine Webber Mitchell 
Hutchins Inc. "The Western World Age-of-Coke-Plant Time 
Bomb" (November 1983), and International Coal Report "US 
Coke Imports" ICR #220 (April 1989) p.12-20. 
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Advances in the design of new coke batteries are possible. In 
Western Germany, feasibility studies of a much larger battery 
concept is reported by Nashan'*^, which involves coke ovens 
of.8 5 metres wide, 12.5 metres high, and 25 metres in length. 
It is estimated that the productivity of such a design would 
be raised from the 32 tonnes of coke per oven for Ohgishima 
(Japan's largest) to 160 tonnes per oven. The length of 
sealing surfaces to be maintained would be reduced about 70%, 
and the costs associated with meeting more stringent 
environmental controls reduced by 40 to 60%. It is estimated 
that overall coke production costs might fall by 2 0% should 
such new technology be adopted. 
It seems likely that future steel industry demands for coke 
will decline in the industrialized countries, and existing 
world patterns of the coking coal trade change substantially. 
Growth in crude steel demand is modest at best, making it 
unlikely that new fully integrated plants of optimum economic 
scale (3 to 5 million tonnes crude steel per annum) will be 
built in OECD countries. Future demand patterns will depend 
on further developments in the blast furnace technology and 
some emerging processes for ironmaking which shall now be 
discussed. 
5.6) Nashan, G. "On the Way to a New Coking System" 
Proceedings of the 1st International Cokemaking Congress 
Essen (1987) 13th to 18th September, Paper A2. 
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5.3) Blast Furnace Technological Developments 
Blast furnace processes have been in continuous technological 
evolution over the last century. The rapid increase in the 
size of new furnaces of the sixties was accompanied by oxygen 
enrichment of the blast, increased blast temperatures, higher 
top pressures, and additional fuel injection through the 
tuyeres. These developments have resulted in higher furnace 
productivities, and lower consumption of coke per tonne of 
hot metal (pig iron) produced. 
Coke combustion remains the major source of energy in the 
blast furnace reduction process, but consumption can be 
reduced as a result of improvements in the overall process 
energy efficiency, and with the injection of alternative fuel 
inputs such as oil or non caking coal into the furnace. 
Coke consumption reductions achieved in the sixties were due 
to improvements in overall energy efficiency arising from the 
pretreatment of the iron ore feed, higher operating 
temperatures and pressures, and the partial replacement of 
coke as the energy source in the combustion zone of the 
furnace by oil injection at the tuyere level. 
As oil prices increased in the seventies, methods were 
developed to inject thermal (non caking) coals in a finely 
pulverized form instead of oil as an economically attractive 
alternative method for reducing coke consumption. This 
technology is known as pulverized coal injection (PCI), and 
has been widely adopted by the JSI and European ironmakers. 
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Table 5.1 shows the trends for coke and tuyere injected fuel 
consumption for the five largest Japanese steel producers as 
reported in annual Tex coal manuals since 1955. 
The lowest average rate of coke consumption achieved by the 
JSI was 42 6 kg. per tonne in 1978, the same year as the 
Iracj/Iran war induced oil shock. Rapid increases in oil price 
then led to reductions in the oil injection rates in 
following years, and consetjuently increases in coke rates. 
PCI was introduced by the JSI in 1981, and the declining coke 
consumption trend was re-established in 1983. 
A considerable economic incentive exists to reduce coke rates 
in the blast furnace process. Approximately 1.5 tonnes of 
coking coal is recjuired to produce a tonne of coke, and 
coking coals command premium prices over PCI and thermal 
coals. Also, the manufacture of coke recjuires large coke 
battery investments, which are likely to become even greater 
in future due to more stringent environmental controls. 
Reduction of coke demand alleviates the retjuirement to 
maintain coking capacity, as well as saving coking coal. 
Coke consumption per tonne of pig iron produced could 
theoretically be lowered to as little as 200 Kg/tonne by an 
increased rate of addition of energy to the blast furnace 
through the tuyeres, together with the use of plasma 
technology in the combustion zone. Injection of coal at rates 
as high as 150 Kg/tonne of hot metal are being achieved at 
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TABLE 5.1 
JAPANESE FUEL CONSUMPTION TRENDS IN BLAST FURNACES 
(Per tonne of Pig Iron produced) 
Japanese 
Fiscal Year 
1955 
1958 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Coke 
(kg.) 
711 
727 
715 
664 
632 
615 
592 
541 
516 
509 
505 
504 
502 
503 
493 
469 
447 
441 
440 
443 
440 
430 
435 
426 
429 
458 
478 
482 
492 
485 
486 
486 
478 
476 
Residual Oil 
(Litres) 
nil 
5 
23 
38 
38 
37 
31 
26 
26 
27 
49 
61 
57 
58 
55 
49 
49 
38 
37 
31 
13 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Pulverized Coal 
(kg.) 
nil 
• *«• 
« fc 
.8 
1.1 
5.0 
9.0 
13.2 
22.4 
28.4 
25.7 
Source: Tex coal manuals 1960 to 1990. 
the Scunthorpe facility of British Steel''^ and are showing 
that each unit of PCI replaces a unit of coke consumed even 
at such high rates of injection. Future joint research by 
5.7) Fitzgerald, F."Energy, High Technology and Economics in 
Modern Steelmaking" Energy World Vol.158 (May 1988) 
p. 3-13. 
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British Steel and Hoogovens will test higher PCI rates up to 
300 Kg/tonne of hot metal. If proven successful, such high 
rates of PCI energy input could reduce blast furnace coke 
consumption to levels of 2 00 Kg/tonne of hot metal'*^. This 
is not a happy prospect for the future demand growth of 
Australia's coking coal exports. 
However, technology developments such as these place more 
severe structural demands on blast furnace coke. Better 
cjuality coking coals will be needed to manufacture the 
smaller tjuantities of higher strength coke recjuired. With 
such developments, greater price differentials between 
premium coking coals and PCI or thermal coals are possible, 
although overall demands for coke will fall. Whether such a 
premium priced market segment for coking coals develops, will 
depend on the business strategies of existing suppliers, and 
their response to declining volume demands for coke. This 
topic will be addressed in Chapter 8. 
Another technological development which was pioneered by the 
JSI involves the bricjuetting of low or non caking coals for 
use as a low cost additive in the coking coal blend. This 
technicjue has created a new category of coking coal called 
"semi soft" coal which can constitute up to 3 0% of the coal 
blend charged to the coke battery, and uses coals priced well 
below premium hard or soft coking coals. Use of bricjuetted 
5.8) Peters, K.H. "The Iron and Steel Industry Depends on the 
supply of Blast Furnace Coke in the long term, too" 
Proceedings of the 1st International Cokemaking Congress 
Essen, September 13th to 18th 1987, Paper Al. 
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coal has enabled the JSI to replace some of the costly 
premium coking coals with cheaper material. Another coke 
making process also under investigation in Japan is that of 
"formed coke", which recjuires no caking properties in the 
coals used as feed material. 
The economic incentive to pursue technologies discussed above 
is driven by cost differentials between traded coking and 
thermal coals, oil, natural gas or other fossil fuels which 
can be used in the blast furnace as tuyere injected material, 
or incorporated into coke manufacture to replace premium 
priced coking coals. 
New smelting technologies are in the trial stages of 
development which may replace the blast furnace as the 
world's major ironmaking process. Some such developments 
create a significant technological threat to Queensland's 
continued role as a coal supplier for iron ore reduction, and 
could lead to a loss of the pricing premium traditionally 
associated with this end use. 
5.4) Alternative Iron and Steelmaking Technologies 
Economies of scale in fully integrated steel manufacture 
producing flat products and involving the blast furnace 
(B.F.) and basic oxygen furnace (BOF) route, retjuires a 
optimum plant size'*^ of 3 to 5 million tonnes annual crude 
5.9) Aylen, J. "Privatisation of the British Steel 
Corporation" (1988) Fiscal Studies 9 (3) 
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steel capacity to be internationally competitive. This 
situation, together with the difficulty associated with 
accurately forecasting steel demands within the OECD, and 
persistent overcapacity in the industry since the early 
seventies, has precluded greenfield construction of such 
fully integrated plants in OECD countries in recent years. 
Recent growth in such facilities has been taking place in 
LDCs such as Brazil, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, 
where economic growth remains more closely linked to steel 
demand than is the case within the industrialized economies. 
5.4.1) Market Penetration by Minimills 
The three major centres of OECD steel production of North 
America, Japan, and the EEC have been reducing integrated 
steel manufacturing capacity since the late 1970's, with the 
most spectacular reductions taking place in the US. However 
not all segments of the steel manufacturing industry have 
been contracting. Table 5.2 shows the capacity additions and 
production growth which have taken place in the electric arc 
furnace (EAF) and minimill segments in the US. 
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Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
TABLE 5.2 
CRUDE STEEL PRODUCTION/CAPACITY U.S.A. VARIOUS YEARS 
(millions of short tons/year) 
Integrated Firms 
Capacity Output 
9 7 . 3 
1 2 7 . 8 
1 2 4 . 5 
1 0 8 . 8 
9 8 . 3 
5 8 . 2 
5 1 . 2 
5 5 . 2 
3 6 . 2 ( 3 6 . 5 % ) . . 6 3 . 1 
Minimills 
Capacity 
2.8 
4.5 
7.5 
10.2 
15.5 
21.8 
n/a 
• • 
Output 
2.0 
3.7 
7.0 
7.8 
13.5 
17.6 
30.4 
34.0 
140. 
143. 
146. 
142, 
138. 
111. 
,0 
,7 
,3 
,9 
,2 
,8 
n/a 
* Total is for EAF production from 1986 on. 
Sources: Barnett D.F.Se R.W. Crandall "Up from the Ashes" 
The Brookings Institution (1986) 
IISI World Steel in Figures 1987, 1988 
The growth of the minimill and the use of EAF technology for 
crude steel production at the expense of B.F./BOF integrated 
production process has also been significant elsewhere. In 
1988, 29.7% of crude steel was produced by EAF in Japan and a 
comparable proportion of 29.2% of crude steel was produced by 
EAF processes in the EEC. This trend is indicative of 
increased crude steel production by EAF at the expense of the 
B.F./BOF process in all three major centres of steel 
manufacture within the OECD. In order to assess the 
likelihood of the continued future penetration of EAF and 
other steel making technologies at the expense of the fully 
integrated B.F./BOF processes, the underlying reasons for the 
recent success of the EAF approach to steel production must 
understood. Barnett and Crandall'*-'-*-' have investigated such 
changes in the US steel industry. 
5.10) Material used in this discussion draws on Barnett D.F. 
and R.W. Crandall "Up from the Ashes:The Rise of the 
Steel Minimill in the United States" - The Brookings 
Institution (1986) Washington D.C. 
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Mention has already been made of the scale problems 
associated with the construction of greenfields fully 
integrated plants in an industry having excess capacity. This 
situation favours small scale EAF technology for new steel 
manufacturing facilities, because of the lower capital costs 
of entry. However some steel products have not led themselves 
to EAF or minimill manufacture. These are the thin sheet and 
higher cjuality rolled steel plate or flat products used for 
consumer durable goods such as automobile and white goods 
production. Existing technology for plate and particularly 
the hot rolled strip mill production process, presently 
requires integrated plant steel making capacities of two to 
five million tonnes annual capacity for production cost 
efficiency. As well as the scale factor, the steel cjualities 
required for flat products have been difficult to achieve for 
EAF processes using steel scrap as the principal input. 
Primarily for these reasons, the initial EAF penetration of 
steel product markets in the 1960's was concentrated in the 
so called "long product" areas such as concrete reinforcing 
bars, light shapes used in construction, and merchant bars 
for use in manufacturing, where steel cjuality requirements 
are not as critical. Minimills pursued regional market entry 
strategies, locating near their target markets and away from 
integrated plant competitors. High transportation costs to 
deliver long product materials over significant distances 
limited the aJaility of the larger integrated suppliers to 
defend these local markets, as long as sufficient low cost 
scrap of suitable quality was available for EAF feed. 
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Because of efficiency at a small scale of operation, initial 
construction cost does not create a barrier to entry for the 
minimill. As EAF technology has improved, together with such 
downstream process improvements as continuous casting, it has 
become possible to widen minimill product lines to include 
more sophisticated items such as wire rods, higher cjuality 
bars and medium sized structural shapes, to further penetrate 
steel product markets which were formerly the preserve of 
integrated plant producers. To demonstrate the cost 
advantages which permitted such market penetration, 
comparative wire rod production costs between US and Japanese 
integrated producers and US minimills are shown in Table 5.3. 
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TABLE 5.3 
COST OF PRODUCING WIRE ROD IN REPRESENTATIVE U.S. MINIMILLS 
AND U.S. AND JAPANESE INTEGRATED PLANTS IN 1981 AND 1985 
Item 
Labour 
Iron Ore 
Scrap 
Coal and Coke 
Other energy 
Miscellaneous 
Operating costs 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Taxes 
Total Cost 
US 
Minimill 
1981 
$US 
59 
»: • 
90 
• • 
45 
68 
262 
10 
8 
2 
1985 
per 
42 
• • 
95 
. . 
44 
63 
244 
9 
12 
2 
US 
Integrated 
1981 
short ton ( 
127 
61 
14 
51 
22 
88 
363 
10 
4 
4 
1985 
of fini 
112 
61 
14 
42 
20 
90 
339 
11 
8 
4 
Japanese 
Integrated 
1981 1985 
shed product 
51 
48 
3 
59 
10 
94 
265 
16 
18 
4 
47 
44 
2 
59 
11 
94 
257 
17 
17 
4 
282 
Addendum - Input prices 
Labour($/man hr.) 16.9 
Iron Ore ($/ton) 
Scrap ($/ton) 80 
Coal ($/ton) 
Electricity 
(Cents/Kwhr.) 4.2 
Yen/$US 
Efficiency measures 
Man-hrs/ton 3.5 
Yield to finished 
product (%) 93 
267 381 362 303 295 
17.5 
85 
• » 
4.5 
2.4 
94 
19.5 
45 
80 
55 
4.2 
6.5 
80 
22.5 
40 
80 
55 
4.5 
5.0 
88 
11.5 
27 
90 
70 
6 
240 
4.5 
90 
11.7 
24 
87.5 
59.5 
7 
240 
4.0 
93 
Source : World Steel Dynamics:The Steel Strategist #11 
New York - Paine Webber (1985) 
The indicative economic data provided in Table 5.3 deserves 
additional analysis and comment. Consider first the relative 
labour inputs, consisting of the productivity component in 
nan hours per ton of finished wire rod product. For this 
input in 1985, the US minimill data indicates more than 
double the productivity of the US integrated mill producer. 
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and 1.67 times that of the typical Japanese integrated plant. 
When these productivities are reflected in input labour costs 
in monetary terms, the US minimill labour cost advantage is 
further increased relative to the US integrated mill, due to 
lower wage rates associated with non union operations. It is 
also of interest to note that in 1985 with a 240 Yen to $US 
exchange rate, US minimills had an apparent labour cost 
advantage of some 10% over the typical Japanese integrated 
producer of this product. The significant depreciation of the 
dollar against the yen which has occurred since 1985 
(approximately 4 0%), has further changed relative Japanese 
and American production costs in favour of the US minimill. 
Table 5.3 is also useful in that it shows the importance of 
scrap and electricity costs for EAF operating economics, and 
the relative importance of raw material and energy input 
costs for minimill and integrated plant production of the 
same product (wire rod). 
In the US, the typical minimill EAF operates with 100% scrap 
feed material, versus the 10 to 3 0% scrap feed charged to the 
BOF in an integrated mill operation. For the integrated mill, 
the remainder of the charge for the BOF is hot metal from the 
B.F., for which the energy intensive process of reducing the 
oxides of iron in naturally occurring ores to elemental iron 
has already been performed. So the operating economics of the 
minimill are far more sensitive to the costs of scrap feed 
than is the case for the integrated facility. 
182 
Coking coal is the principal energy input for the integrated 
steel mill, so the cost of coal should be added to the other 
energy costs in comparing relative energy cost inputs for 
the competing processes of Table 5.3. In the US energy costs 
per ton of wire rod from integrated plants in 1985 amounted 
to $62/ton. Comparable energy costs from the minimill were 
$45/ton, reflecting the energy savings resulting from the 
recycling of steel scrap in the EAF process, rather than the 
energy intensive operation needed to reduce iron oxides in 
the B.F.. 
Are the minimill cost advantages shown in Table 5.3 
indicative of the eventual demise of integrated plant steel 
production in the industrialized world, and the eventual 
passing of blast furnace technology as the major method for 
iron making? The answer to this cjuestion will depend on 
the extent to which steel recycling is economically 
justified, and future progress in alternative iron making 
technologies which lend themselves to smaller scale 
operations. However, as an unusually efficient industrial 
apparatus which has a history of continued improvement to 
retain competitiveness with emerging technologies, the blast 
furnace has enjoyed a long process lifecycle. 
Progress in the technology of thin slab casting has opened 
the last remaining steel product preserves of integrated 
producers to the minimill sector. Minimills are now capable 
of producing the high grade thin sheet and strip products and 
be able to compete across all product lines. However this 
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technological success in the downstream process area will 
bring new challenges to the minimill sector relating to the 
cjuality of EAF scrap feed necessary to produce the higher 
quality steels necessary for thin sheet product manufacture. 
This scrap cjuality problem will be worsened by the emphasis 
on special alloy and new specialty coated sheet and tubular 
products which is presently occurring in the integrated steel 
manufacturing sector. Higher concentrations of tramp and 
other impurities which follow from these developments will in 
future recjuire added expense in the separation and processing 
of obsolete steel scrap, which must eventually be reflected 
in higher scrap prices or tjuality deterioration. 
Also, as there is approximately fifteen years lag between 
crude steel manufacture and the recycling of the resulting 
products as obsolete scrap, future scrap availability will be 
diminished by the slowing of growth in steel consumption in 
the industrialized economies. The minimill sector has far 
greater vulnerability to this and the tjuality related 
industry trends just described than do integrated producers. 
The differing scale economies of fully integrated mills vis a 
vis the minimill, and the changes in technology and 
production economics which have permitted the growth of the 
EAF/minimill sector at the expense of the B.F./BOF process 
for crude steel manufacture have been described. The 
importance of scrap costs and the increasing demands for 
purity in scrap material may prevent penetration of the 
EAF steelmaking process beyond about 4 0% of crude steel 
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manufacture on a sustained basis, unless a substantial 
merchant trade in some enriched iron intermediate product or 
material develops. Direct reduced iron (DRI) is a process 
that could produce such a material to enable further 
penetration of steel markets by the minimill segment. 
5.4.2) Direct Reduced Iron Processes 
Direct reduction processes are those in which metallic iron 
is produced from oxide ores below the melting point of any of 
the materials involved. The chemical reduction processes 
are very similar to those which take place in the middle (or 
isothermal) zone of the blast furnace, where temperatures do 
not reach the melting point of burden materials. 
As many as a hundred of such processes have been invented 
and operated in demonstration or pilot plant scale since 
192o'*^-^. They fall into three major categories: (1) those 
using solid fuels in granular iron beds, (2) those using 
gaseous fuels in granular beds, and (3) those using gaseous 
fuels in fluidized beds. The world commercial DRI industry is 
dominated by category (2), and the Midrex process accounts 
for 85% of the 17 million tonne per year of the natural gas 
based category (2) capacity installed since 1975. The Midrex 
system will then be used as the representative process for a 
5.11) This discussion draws on Cunningham, B.C. and J.G. 
Stephenson "Direct Reduction Processes", in Stephenson 
R.L. (ed.)"Direct Reduced Iron:Technology and Economics 
of Production and Use" The Iron and Steel Society of 
A.I.M.E. (1980). 
commercial approach to direct reduction iron making, and 
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process and economic comparisons will be made with blast 
furnace technology. 
5.4.3) Midrex Direct Reduction Process 
In the Midrex process, the reduction of iron ore pellets, 
briquetted ore fines, or lump ore, takes place at 
temperatures of 800 to 900°C using hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide as reducing gases. The reducing gas is produced from 
the catalytic reforming of natural gas (principally methane 
CH4),is 57% hydrogen and 38% carbon monoxide. The chemical 
reactions involving carbon monoxide and ore are the same as 
equations (l),(2),and (3) for blast furnace reduction (see 
Appendix A) in the isothermal zone. Temperatures in direct 
reduction processes do not rise to the 1000°C necessary for 
the chemical reactions of the Boudouard or carbon 
gasification reaction (ecjuation (4)), and the direct carbon 
reduction of wustite (ecjuation (5)), which are so important 
in the blast furnace. The absence of these reduction 
reactions due to lower operating temperatures are important 
differences between the direct reduction and blast furnace 
approaches to ironmaking. 
Like the blast furnace, the Midrex process is based on the 
principle of counter-current flow in which the feed material 
descends through a shaft furnace, to be heated and reduced by 
rising hot reduction gases. 
The charge takes about six hours to pass through the 
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reduction zone, depending on the characteristics of the iron 
material. For efficient operation the feed should be uniform, 
with lumps or pellets of a highly porous structure which do 
not swell crumble or stick together during reduction. These 
recjuirements limit the availability of naturally occurring 
ores which are suitable as DRI feed. 
The process output can be highly reactive and has been known 
to ignite spontaneously. For merchant trade in the material 
it seems necessary to bricjuette or pelletize the furnace 
output, and this is generally done by hot briquetting as the 
last stage of the DRI process. 
The Midrex process of iron reduction can be related to 
that of the blast furnace if one thinks in terms of 
segmenting the blast furnace at the interface between the 
lower and middle zones, and considers the use of natural gas 
as an alternative fuel to produce the reduction gases which 
are formed by the combustion of coke in the lower zone of the 
blast furnace. 
The major process difference relates to the high 
concentration of hydrogen as an effective gaseous reductant 
in addition to carbon monoxide in Midrex, whereas the blast 
furnace has the advantage of attaining iron melting 
temperatures in its lower zone which permits physical 
separation of gangue. Because DRI processes do not attain 
iron melting temperatures, gangue separation is a problem 
which recjuires low gangue ores as DRI feed. However, like the 
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blast furnace, the Midrex process has an unusually high 
thermal efficiency. 
For Midrex or any other natural gas fuelled ironmaking 
process to replace the blast furnace, the overall economics 
must be comparable. The economics of direct reduced 
ironmaking and a comparison of DRI and EAF steelmaking with 
B.F./BOF will now be compared. 
5.4.4) Economics of Direct Reduced Iron 
Natural gas and uniformly sized lump ore or pellets (6 to 10 
mm up to 25 or 30 mm) are the major input materials for a 
natural gas based shaft furnace processes. Average costs for 
DRI produced by such systems are estimated in Table 5.4. 
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TABLE 5.4 
AVERAGE COSTS FOR MIDREX DRI 
('85 $US/tonne of DRI produced) 
$US/tonne 
Iron Ore 37.6 
(Around .94 tonnes Fe/tonne DRI at $40/tonne Fe) 
Natural Gas 27.5 
(10.3 Gigajoules (GJ) @ $2.67/GJ.) 
Electricity 4 
(100 kilowatt hours (kWh)/tonne @ $.04/kWh) 
Other Materials 5.9 
(Catalysts, maintenance materials etc.) 
Labour 5 
(.2 man hours/tonne @ $25/ man hour) 
Total Operating Costs 8 0 
Amortization and Financial Costs 20 
Total Cost 100 
Source: Astier, J."Economic Prospects for Direct Reduction" 
Steel Times International (October 1987) p.39-41. 
Astier is careful to point out that production costs vary 
significantly depending on location and size of plant, and 
indicates a cost range from $60 to $150/tonne. The finance 
cost shown in Table 5.4 is for a 450,000 tonne/year capacity 
plant. A plant of twice that size might have finance costs of 
$16, and labour costs of $l/tonne. However it is clear from 
this estimate that the costs of iron ore and the value placed 
on natural gas are the most critical inputs when considering 
the economics of DRI. 
Comparisons of net energy consumption in the production of 
DRI and that needed for hot metal from the blast furnace are 
also of interest. The Japanese steel industry's average B.F. 
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energy consumption in 1985 was 12.2 GJ/ tonne'•-'-2, with some 
2.0 GJ/tonne recjuired for iron ore feed preparation. The net 
gas energy recjuired for DRI is 10.3 c;j/tonne in the reduction 
furnace, and if a similar 2.0 (^/tonne is assumed for DRI 
feed preparation, total net energy requirements appear very 
similar. Of course in an integrated B.F./BOF facility, use is 
made of the energy of hot metal from the blast furnace, thus 
improving the overall thermal efficiency of steelmaking. The 
EAF charges cold feed, and consumes electricity in heating 
the charge. However this disadvantage in energy efficiency is 
offset by using scrap as the charge material, resulting in 
average energy recjuirements of about 8.5 GJ/tonne'* •'-•^  of 
crude steel output for the minimill. 
An overall thermal energy consumption comparison probably 
still favours the B.F./BOF approach for crude steel 
manufacture depending of the method of electricity 
generation. If the 8.5 GJ of electric heat used in the 
minimill is produced from thermal power stations at say 3 5% 
thermal efficiency, some 24.3 GJ of thermal energy would have 
been retjuired. This total recjuirement then compares with the 
industry net energy consumption of 22.3 c;j/tonne in the US 
(17.7 GJ /tonne in Japan), in 1985 for steel from hot metal 
5.12) Statistics on Energy in the Steel Industry 1980 - 1985 
IISI Brussels (1987) 
5.13) Anderson, D.F. "Scrap as a Commodity" Ironmaking and 
Steelmaking Vol.14. No.3 (1987) p.130. 
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production in the B.F./BOF integrated process. According to 
Acevedo'*-'-'*, crude steel production using an iron feed of 70% 
DRI and 30% scrap recjuires 16% more primary energy than that 
recjuired for the B.F./BOF route, confirming the rough energy 
consumption estimates made above. 
Earlier comparisons of the energy efficiency of producing 
cold rolled sheet by the minimill, the DRI/EAF and the 
integrated B.F./BOF methods have been made by Leckie et 
al'*-^', and are shown in Table 5.5. 
TABLE 5.5 
PRIMARY ENERGY REQUIRED FOR MANUFACTURE OF COLD ROLLED SHEET 
(GJ per Tonne of Liquid Metal Tapped) 
EAF 
(100% scrap) 
Production of licjuid steel 
Coal for Coking 
Coal for Sinter 
Oil or P.C.I. 
Gas to Reformer 
and for Pelletizing 
Electricity to EAF 
Ancillary services 
Rolling, finishing, 
general works services 
Primary Energy Recjuired 
B.F. byproduct credits 
Nett Primary Energy 
Recjuirement 
n/a 
• • 
• • 
• • 
6.167 
.515 
7.089 
13.771 
n/a 
13.771 
DRI/EAF 
(30% scrap) 
n/a 
« • 
9.450 
7.400 
2.575 
6.633 
26.058 
n/a 
26.058 
B 
(30= 
.F./BOF 
k scrap) 
14.600 
1.765 
2.757 
n/a 
• #> 
2.574 
7.136 
28.832 
4.469 
24.363 
5.14) Acevedo, A.T. "Direct Reduction - Electric Arc Furnace: 
A Techno - Economic Overview of Performance" 
Proceedings of the 20th IISI World Steel Conference 
Rio de Janeiro (1986) 
5.15) Leckie A., Millar A.,& Medley J., "Short and Long Term 
Prospects for Energy Economy in Steelmaking" 
Ironmaking and Steelmaking (1982) Vol.9 No.5. 
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Comparisons of Table 5.5 confirm that the overall energy 
efficiency of the DRI/EAF approach to steelmaking is 
competitive with the integrated B.F./BOF process for 
those countries having access to low cost natural gas. 
The combustion of gas rather than coal to produce high 
temperature heat results in about 50% less CO2 released per 
unit of primary energy produced. If an assumption is also 
made that natural gas is used to generate electricity for the 
EAF process as well as providing the fuel for DRI, steel 
sheet production by the DRI/EAF route would reduce C02 
emissions by about half relative to the coke fuelled 
B.F./BOF approach. A total scrap/EAF production approach 
would yield only a cjuarter of the CO2 emissions per unit of 
finished product output. Significantly lower CO2 emission 
levels of EAF processes may favour further penetration of 
iron and steelmaking by these technologies if greenhouse gas 
externality penalties are adopted, in recognition of economic 
costs resulting from climatic change. 
Should a trade in enriched iron feed material for the 
EAF/minimill sector develop, the lower barriers to entry and 
superior product performance in niche markets that these 
steelmakers serve could cause further declines in the 
integrated B.F./BOF share of steel manufacturing in developed 
countries. Such a trade could use natural gas based 
technologies for iron ore reduction in order to reduce 
greenhouse emissions and convert natural gas reserves distant 
from alternative direct use market demands, to a readily 
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transportable form. 
The minimill and the DRI/EAF technologies are now commercial, 
and have already influenced demands for pig iron and the 
blast furnace's contribution to crude steel manufacture. 
Other coal fuelled technologies for iron reduction are in the 
advanced research or early demonstration stages of 
development. Several of the more promising of these 
technologies will be described. 
5.5) New Coal Based Ironmaking Technologies 
The incentive to develop new technology arises from the large 
capacities necessary to achieve economies of scale with the 
blast furnace approach to ironmaking (>3 million tonnes per 
year), and the capital cost and environmental problems 
associated with coke and sinter plants needed to prepare the 
coal and iron resource inputs. Uniformly sized iron feed is 
recjuired for the blast furnace, so iron fines must be 
sintered or pelletized for the furnace to function 
efficiently. Alternatively, lump ores can be used, but a 
premium is paid for such material as opposed to the costs of 
iron ore fines which are in excess supply world wide and thus 
command lower prices. Small scale ironmaking processes, which 
do not recjuire coke or lump or sintered iron ore feed, would 
have considerable economic attraction. A large proportion of 
existing ironmaking capacity in integrated steel plants in 
the OECD has now aged to the point of recjuiring major 
refurbishment or complete replacement. In the next decade 
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major investment decisions must be made, and it is likely 
that some new form of reduction smelting will emerge. Smith 
and Corbett'*^^ have surveyed various new ironmaking 
processes which aim to achieve the following objectives: 
1) Reduce capital costs by eliminating the need for coke 
ovens. 
2) Attain economic operations at small scale (<.5 million 
tonnes per year). 
3) Use non coking coals as the primary fuel source. 
4) Have the ability to integrate within existing works. 
5) Minimize the environmental problems associated with coking 
and sintering operations. 
To achieve these objectives, the most promising technologies 
physically separate the direct reduction and melting 
processes which take place in the blast furnace. Typically, 
the combustion of coal takes place in a fluidized bed melter/ 
gasifier, and the combustion gases from this melting reactor 
are then piped to a separate vessel in which direct reduction 
occurs. Direct reduction may take place in a countercurrent 
reactor vessel of similar design to a Midrex reactor, or in a 
fluidized bed reactor which uses ore fines rather than lump 
ore, pellets, or sinter. 
5.16) Smith R.B. and M.J. Corbett "Coal-Based Ironmaking" 
Ironmaking and Steelmaking(1987) Vol.14 No.2 p.49-74 
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5.5.1) The COREX Process 
The COREX process is an example of the former approach, which 
has a demonstration plant of 3 00,000 tonne annual capacity 
operating in South Africa since December 1987. Smith and 
Corbett also provide the estimates of US hot metal production 
costs for COREX shown in Table 5.6. 
TABLE 5.6 
US OPERATING COSTS FOR COREX PROCESS 
Item Unit Cost Unit Consumption Cost $'87 US 
per tonne hot metal per tonne hot metal 
Iron ore $40/tonne 
(pellets,lump or sinter) 
Coal $50/tonne 
Limestone $15/tonne 
Dolomite $15/tonne 
Oxygen $28/tonne 
Electricity 4*-^ /kwhr. 
Raw Water 2 0^ /m~-^  
Operating labour 
Maintenance labour 
Gross operating cost 
Gas credit $2/Gj. 
Nett operating cost 
1.5 tonnes 
0.795 tonnes 
0.16 
0.15 
0.75 
37.5 kwhrs. 
1.5 cu. metres 
10.4 Gj. 
60.0 
39.75 
2.40 
2.25 
21.0 
1.50 
.30 
6.67 
3.30 
137.17 
(20.80) 
$116.37 
These costs do not include an investment component which 
might amount to $23 per tonne of hot metal produced, for an 
installation of this capacity in the US costing $45 million. 
The total hot metal cost is then close to $140/tonne. 
Estimated costs for hot metal of about $14 0/tonne exceed the 
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average US #1 heavy melt scrap prices of $84.42/tonne for 
1987, but are well below the average US pig iron values of 
$209.21 in 1987, and $206.75 in 1986 (as estimated by the US 
Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook for 1987). On the basis of 
this estimate, the COREX process appears to be competitive 
with the blast furnace as an iron making process in America. 
The direct reduction reactor used in COREX reduction smelting 
recjuires lump or pretreated iron ore feed, as uniformity of 
the feed material is critical in all such counterflow 
reduction processes. Other approaches which use fluidized bed 
direct reduction to avoid pretreament of iron ore fines are 
at earlier stages of development than the COREX system. 
5.5.2) Kawasaki's XR Smelting Reduction 
One such approach is Kawasaki's XR smelting reduction 
technology. This process has been under development since 
1979 by the Kawasaki steel company, and research has been 
supported by the Japanese government through grants from 
MITI. In 1983, a pilot scale (10 tonnes per day) facility 
commenced operations, and in 1989 a larger scale 100 tonne 
per day demonstration plant was announced. Separate fluidized 
bed direct reduction and smelting reduction reactors are 
used, with the off gases from the smelting process being 
piped directly to a direct reduction reactor. Hot reduced 
iron feed from the direct reduction vessel is injected into 
to the smelting reduction vessel through an upper ring of 
tuyeres in that vessel. The process does not recjuire coke 
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manufacture or sintering, and reduces the capital cost of 
ironmaking facilities by about one half, while using non-
caking coals and iron ore fines as the principal resource 
inputs. Another potential advantage of the approach is that 
existing blast furnaces might be modified to serve as 
smelting reduction furnace by addition of another ring of 
tuyeres. Detailed cost estimates are not yet available, 
although a critical factor in the economics of these 
processes will be the rates of productivity achieved. 
Callcott'*-^^ compares the more promising newer ironmaking 
technologies with a "reference" compact blast furnace design 
incorporating the blast furnace technology advances discussed 
above. Reference blast furnaces would be smaller (1000 to 
1500 cubic metres internal volume) than the latest generation 
of very large furnaces (>4000 cu metre volume) built by the 
JSI. Higher productivities of 3 tonnes of hot metal per cubic 
metre per day (tHM/cu.metre/day) would be obtained, as 
opposed to the 2 to 2.5 tHM/cu.metre/day achieved with 
present large furnace designs. Tuyere coal injection rates of 
200 kg/tHM would be used together with plasma heating, to 
reduce coke rates to 2 50 kg/tHM. New smelting processes must 
be competitive with improved blast furnace technology which 
itself is not static. 
5.17) Callcott Consulting Pty.Ltd. and Carbon Consulting 
International Pty.Ltd."Use of Australian Coals in New 
and Emerging Metallurgical Processes" Consultancy Study 
Report #2 5 Dept.of Primary Industry and Energy 
Canberra (September 1988) 
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5.5.3) The MITI Smelting Reduction Programme 
A seven year research and development programme was 
initiated in Japan in 1988 coordinated by MITI, which has 
been dubbed the "Direct Iron Ore Smelting Reduction Process" 
(DIOS). Results of tests by Nippon Steel of an in-bath 
smelting process being developed under DIOS using a 170 tonne 
capacity top and bottom blowing BOF, have reported 
productivities of 5.4 tHM/cu.metre/day'* •'-^. These results are 
promising, being better than twice the productivity levels 
attained with present blast furnaces, and significantly 
higher than Callcott's reference blast furnace projection of 
3 tHM/cu.metre/day. 
It is too early yet to judge the commercial viability of such 
developments. However the level of research commitment by 
MITI and the JSI under DIOS is impressive at 13 billion yen 
($US 92 million). It is a further example of the use of 
cooperative industrial policy to influence the international 
competitiveness of Japan's steel industry. 
Smith and Corbett'* •'•^  have examined the economics of new 
ironmaking processes vis-a-vis refurbishment and improvements 
to existing blast furnace facilities. Their conclusion is 
5.18) Ibaraki T., Kanemoto M., Ogata S., Katayama H., and H. 
Ishikawa "Development of Smelting Reduction of Iron 
Ore-An Approach to Commercial Ironmaking" Ironmaking 
Conference Proceedings Detroit Michigan 25th to 28th 
March (1990) Vol.49 p.645-650. 
5.19) Smith R., and M. Corbett "Coal - Based Ironmaking" 
Ironmaking and Steelmaking (1987) Vol.14 No.2 p.68-73. 
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that if existing coke ovens and furnaces can be refurbished 
and do not require replacement, economics favour retention of 
B.F. technology. However, if facility replacement is recjuired 
due to plant deterioration or for environmental reasons, or 
if new ironmaking capacity is needed, direct smelting 
processes show superior economics for unit sizes of .5 to 3 
million tonnes of annual capacity. 
In an era of increasing environmental concern over the global 
impact of greenhouse gases emitted by all industrial 
processes, fuel type and energy efficiency considerations 
will influence the rate of introduction of new iron smelting 
technologies. This discussion will conclude by examining the 
potential impact of regulatory or economic penalties 
associated with carbon dioxide emissions, on the various 
technologies for ironmaking which have been discussed. 
5.6) Combustion Emission Considerations in Technolocry Choice 
Irrespective of the outcome of the present debate over 
whether a global warming trend due to greenhouse gas 
emissions has commenced already, there is undoubtedly a limit 
to the absorptive capacity of natural systems. The human 
population is doubling every thirty five years, with most of 
that increase occuring in less developed nations. Should 
those nations aspire to achieve even modest levels of 
economic welfare compared to that enjoyed by industrialized 
countries, the increase in greenhouse emissions resulting 
from the associated energy demands will be extremely large. 
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assuming fossil fuel combustion remains the primary energy 
source. 
All fossil fuel combustion generates greenhouse gas emissions 
consisting principally of CO2, oxides of nitrogen, unburnt 
hydrocarbons and sulphur dioxide. These emissions can be 
reduced by improved combustion, flue gas scrxibbing and other 
technologies. Because of the volumes of gas involved, flue 
gas scrubbing does not seem a practical solution to limit 
the C02 greenhouse gas emission problem. 
The actual tjuantity of CO2 emitted for each industrial 
process depends on the type of fossil fuel used and the 
thermal efficiency of that process. Table 5.7 shows the 
proportions of CO2 produced for various types of fossil fuels 
burnt to energize industrial technologies typically in use in 
Australia. 
TABLE 5.7 
NET CO2 EMISSIONS FROM PRIMARY ENERGY USE (AUSTRALIA) 
(Kilotonnes of CO2 per petajoule) 
Coal (Bituminous/Black) 105 
Coal (Lignite/Brown) 115 
Oil 75 
Gas 55 
Wood/Bagasse 8 0 
As the table indicates, natural gas has a considerable 
advantage over coal as a low CO2 emission fossil fuel. 
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If the global ecosystem's absorbtive capacity reaches the 
point that CO2 should be considered an externality to be 
recognised in the economics of fossil fuel energy generation, 
the externality penalty applied to coal based technologies 
should be about twice that applied for gas. Depending on the 
magnitude of the CO2 penalty, some industrial processes will 
be advantaged, and others significantly disadvantaged. 
As far as metals smelting and refining is concerned, 
aluminium produced with electricity generated by fossil fuels 
retjuires some ten times the primary thermal energy input of 
steel per tonne of finished metal produced. Should coal 
combustion provide the required thermal energy input (as is 
the situation for Queensland), and be assessed an appropriate 
greenhouse externality charges, the externality costs for 
producing aluminium would be significantly greater than that 
of steel. A possible outcome could be declining demands for 
aluminium due to higher costs, and increased substitution of 
steel in place of aluminium for applications where the weight 
of the material is not an important consideration. 
A CO2 externality penalty could also influence future 
patterns of technological evolution in steelmaking. It is 
clear from the energy comparisons of Table 5.5, that EAF and 
DRI/EAF processes would be advantaged relative to the 
B.F./BOF in the manufacture of cold rolled sheet. Should 
nuclear generated electricity be available for the electric 
furnaces, such a technological approach would lessen the CO2 
emission impact of the DRI/EAF approach to cold rolled sheet 
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manufacture to only about one cjuarter that of the traditional 
B.F./BOF approach. This estimate results from the recognition 
that CO2 emissions from gas heat generation are about half 
those from coal (or coke), and from using the indicated 
primary energy input recjuirements of Table 5.5 for the two 
processes. If an objective is to minimize CO2 emissions, the 
most attractive technological approach for steelmaking would 
employ the minimill using nuclear generated electricity and 
100% steel scrap as the iron input. 
Carbon dioxide emission concerns will favour the use of 
natural gas as the preferred fossil fuel and favour those 
technological approaches which employ gas. For ironmaking, 
this is direct reduction, so it might be expected that a 
merchant trade in DRI is more likely to develop under such a 
scenario. For steelmaking, those processes which use primary 
thermal energy most efficiently will be favoured, so further 
penetration of steel markets by the minimill sector would 
result. Where coal continues to be used in industrial 
applications, those technologies having the highest overall 
thermal efficiency will be favoured. On this basis the blast 
furnace ranks well, having overall thermal efficiencies of 85 
to 90% compared with electricy generation efficiencies in the 
range of 35 to 40%. However if direct smelting processes 
using coal are more energy efficient than the blast furnace, 
such technologies will be favoured and greenhouse concerns 
will hasten its obsolescence. Primary energy consumption 
comparisons of Smith and Corbett'*^^ indicate that three 
5.20) Ibid. Table 7 p.67. 
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stage direct smelting processes are in fact more energy 
efficient than the blast furnace. 
To summarize, greenhouse emission concerns could slow and 
perhaps reverse the penetration of steel's end use markets by 
energy intensive metals such as aluminium. All low energy 
efficiency uses of coal as fuel will be penalized. Low 
thermal efficiency coal use will be replaced by other energy 
forms in such applications as electricity generation. 
Greenhouse concerns may then attenuate the lifecycle of B.F. 
technology and pose a threat to thermal coal demand growth. 
5.7) Summary of Findings 
Future demands for coking coals depend primarily on the 
longevity of the blast furnace as the favoured process for 
ironmaking. 
Significant penetration of steel markets, previously the 
domain of large scale integrated plant producers, has already 
been made by small scale minimill producers. 
The early adoption of very large blast furnaces by the JSI 
favoured the rapid growth of Queensland's hard coking coal 
exports. 
The properties of coking coals which are of greatest value 
and should command a price premium from ironmakers are fixed 
carbon content, free swelling index, and fluidity. Higher 
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concentrations of ash, sulphur, and moisture, detract from an 
individual coal's value in the coke blend. 
Economic and environmental concerns make it unlikely that new 
coke batteries will be built to replace aging coke plants in 
OECD countries. The aging of integrated plant ironmaking 
facilities within OECD countries is likely to result in the 
commercial development of smaller scale direct smelting 
processes to replace the blast furnace as the favoured 
ironmaking approach. 
Global warming concerns reinforce the probability of blast 
furnace technological obsolescence, and favour gas based 
reduction processes and scrap recycling. 
In summary, steel industry demands for coke and coking coals 
are at best in the mature phase of the product lifecycle. The 
buoyant growth phase of Queensland's coking coal industry is 
now most likely ended. This is a dramatic change from the era 
of very high (17.38%) annual growth rates described in 
Chapter 1. 
In such an environment, perhaps greater attention should be 
devoted to upgrading the cjuality of Queensland's coking coal 
exports to obtain pricing premiums deserving of the high coke 
strengths which can be obtained from these coals. Such a 
product differentiation strategies would represent a 
significant change from the cost leadership high volume 
export approach which has been the hallmark of the industry 
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to date. 
The state of the major coking coal markets served by 
Queensland's exporters will now be examined in the light of 
the cost leadership rapid volume growth strategy followed 
since the early sixties, to investigate market power 
distortions. This is a critical issue for any future high 
cjuality market segmentation strategy which would be 
appropriate in an era of declining coking coal demands, and 
relevant in any consideration of ways to improve the nation's 
export performance. 
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Chapter 6 
COKING COAL MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
The rapid expansion of the Japanese steel industry (JSI), 
which took place in the fifties, sixties and early seventies 
was described in Chapter 3. The resulting impact on blast 
furnace size and mode of operations in Japan was then 
discussed in Chapter 5. The importance of these events as far 
as Queensland was concerned, was the initiation of a number 
of large scale export coking coal mines in the Bowen Basin, 
involving long term supply agreements between foreign 
controlled mine development joint ventures and the JSI. 
This chapter focuses on these developments and the 
characteristics of the principal market which is served by 
Queensland's coking coal producers. Regression modelling is 
used to relate actual coking coal prices to the coal 
properties already described in Chapter 5, which are deemed 
to be important for coke and ironmaking. Evidence of the use 
of market power by the JSI is also investigated. 
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6.1) International Coking Coal Market Literature 
The patterns of development of the world coking coal trade, 
and the major exporting nations were outlined in Chapter 1. 
In 1989, some 184 million tonnes of coking coal was traded 
internationally, with North Asian regional trade (Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) accounting for 49% of this total. 
The JSI was the largest single importer with demands of 67 
million tonnes. Australian and Queensland's fortunes in the 
coking coal trade have been closely linked to the evolution 
of North Asia's steel industry, which has been dominated by 
the JSI, so this discussion focuses on an examination of 
Japanese coking coal markets. 
6.1.1) Canadian Studies of Pacific Coking Coal Markets 
Several studies have already examined aspects of JSI resource 
procurement, the most notable being those of the Canadian 
researchers Anderson^*^ and D'Cruz^*^. Surprisingly, 
considering the importance of coking coal exports to 
Australia's balance of trade, little published research by 
Australian authors specific to this topic can be found. 
6.1) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987). 
6.2) D'Cruz, J.R. "Quasi Integration in Raw Material Markets; 
The Overseas Procurement of Coking Coal by the Japanese 
Steel Industry" Ph.D. Dissertation Harvard Univ.(1979). 
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The more general works of Smith and others^'-^ associated with 
economic research into trade and market behaviour, address 
broader issues of bilateral monopoly in resource trade, 
without specifically focussing on coal market characteristics 
and behaviour. 
D'Cruz examined the impact of quasi integration resulting 
from the JSI's establishment of long term purchasing 
agreements for coking coal supplies on the price and offtake 
quantity experience of producers over the years 1970 to 1977. 
His research hypothesis was that quasi integration would 
attenuate the use of market power during cyclical phases of 
supply and demand imbalance. It was expected that Canadian 
and Australian coking coal producers linked with the JSI 
through long term contracts would experience higher export 
shipments and prices during periods of steel production 
decline, thereby benefiting from quasi integration. A finding 
of the D'Cruz research was that the beneficial effects of 
quasi integration on price, for producers having long term 
contracts, were minor relative to the detrimental effects of 
price discrimination practiced by the JSI in Pacific markets 
over the period of study. 
Anderson examined the impact of the JSI coking coal 
6.3) Smith, B."Bilateral Monopoly and Export Price Bargaining 
in the Resource Goods Trade" Economic Record, Vol 53 
(1977) p.30-50. 
Harris, S. and T. Ikuta eds. "Australia, Japan and the 
Energy Coal Trade" Australia-Japan Research Centre 
(1982) p.9-12. 
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procurement system on Canadian and Australian suppliers, 
including those not linked through long term contractual 
arrangements. His study discussed both the historic and 
possible future policy responses available for Australian and 
Canadian interests to combat an oligopsonistic procurement 
system. In his view also, there is evidence that the market 
power created as a result of JSI purchasing arrangements has 
resulted in price discrimination amongst the major suppliers, 
to the detriment of some Canadian and all Australian 
producers. 
Anderson cites regression modelling studies of Japanese 
coking coal markets by Kittredge and Sivertson^*"*, which 
concluded that no statistically significant evidence of price 
discrimination existed in 1977, in contradiction to the 
findings of D'Cruz which were also based on regression 
modelling of price and limited quality specification data 
over eight years from 1970 to 1978. 
Anderson's study offered no statistical analysis confirming 
that JSI purchasing policies were resulting in price 
discrimination. Furthermore, he identified shortcomings^*' in 
the analysis used by D'Cruz in support of that study's 
finding in the matter. 
6.4) Kittredge, P. and L. Sivertson "Competition and Canadian 
Coal Prices in the Japanese Coking Coal Market" Canadian 
Institute of Minerals Bulletin September 1980 p.100-109. 
6.5) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Cokinc^ Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987). p.165. 
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6.1.2) Australian Perceptions of Pacific Coal Markets 
A submission of Utah Development (now BHP/Utah) to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce enquiry into 
Australia's export coal industry of July 1982 disputes 
assertions of price discrimination. The company states the 
following with respect to prices obtained in Japanese 
markets: "Utah's prices have at times been compared 
unfavorably with other producers' prices by uninformed 
commentators. Such comparisons either ignore the facts or 
fail to comprehend the significance of major quality 
differences between coals from different sources. Utah's 
coking coal prices have been in line with market values." 
A recent paper by Porter and Gooday^ * ^  examined the 
relationship of average coking coal prices paid by the JSI in 
the years from 1985 to 1988, with a number of coal cjuality 
parameters thought to be important in the economics of coke 
making and blast furnace operation. A finding of this 
analysis is that the new Canadian mines of north east British 
Columbia command substantially higher average prices in the 
Japanese market than would be expected on the basis of coal 
quality characteristics, compared with coking coals from 
other sources. 
6.6) Porter, D. and P. Gooday "The Effects of Coal Quality on 
Japanese Coking Coal Contract Prices" presented at 
Conference of Economists (1990), University of New South 
Wales Sydney, 24th to 27th September. 
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In its study of Australia's minerals and mineral processing 
industries, the Industry Commission examined the issue of 
international market distortions due to coordinated 
purchasing arrangements, such as that ascribed by Anderson 
and D'Cruz to the JSI. The conclusion of the Commission^'^ in 
this matter is as follows: "In the Commission's view, 
distorted purchasing arrangements do not exist or are 
insufficient to justify use of export controls". 
From these citations, it is apparent that differences of 
opinion exist regarding the presence and/or significance of 
price discrimination in Japanese coking coal markets. Clearly 
the cjuestion requires resolution before policy and strategy 
implications can be addressed. A possible methodology for 
investigating the issue involves the development of a 
theoretical model relating price to coal properties in the 
Japanese coking coal market. Cross-sectional testing of the 
model can then be performed at such times when sufficient 
price and quality data are available to allow statistical 
analysis. 
6.2) Modelling of Coking Coal Value in Japanese Markets 
It is clear from the discussions of blast furnace ironmaking, 
coking coal composition and cokemaking of Chapter 5, that the 
6.7) Industry Commission Report - "Mining and Minerals 
Processing in Australia" AGPS Canberra (September 1990) 
Volume 1:Report p.8-5. 
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value of individual coking coals may vary depending on a 
number of factors. For example, during the period of rapidly 
increasing levels of pig iron production, which took place in 
Japan in the fifties, sixties and early seventies, coke 
strength was a prime consideration when selecting coals for 
the coke blend. It might be expected that a price premium 
would be paid for "hard" coking coals at such times. Hard 
coals, having the maceral characteristics described in 
Chapter 5, are defined as those which individually exhibit 
high coke strength as measured by a value of 90 or greater in 
the JSI standard drum test. Later, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
pig iron production declined with declining demands for steel 
in Japan and most industrially developed countries. High 
levels of blast furnace productivity were no longer retjuired 
and coke strength became of less concern. In such 
circumstances, lower quality coals could be used in the coke 
blend, premium priced hard coal imports were reduced, and 
cjuality related price differentials might be expected to 
decline due to increased supplier competition. 
6.2.1) Japanese Pig Iron Production History 
Pig iron production in Japan from 1960 to 1989 is charted in 
Figure 6.1. The highest recorded annual level of pig iron 
produced by the JSI was 90.9 million tonnes in Japanese 
fiscal year 1973. The year chosen for investigation by 
Kittredge and Silvertson was 1977, which was the second of 
three years of declining pig iron production which occurred 
from 1976 to 1978. That study provided all the cost and coal 
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quality data necessary for detailed cross-sectional 
regression modelling, so the 1977 year data will be 
reanalysed. Sufficient data are available to analyse 1983, 
a recessional year for pig iron manufacture in Japan and 
elsewhere within the OECD. More current data are available 
for 1988, which is the third year of a recent recovery in pig 
iron production in Japan. A model of the price quality 
relationship for 1988 when compared with a model for 1973, 
for which coal quality and price data are also available, 
might provide some indication of the changes in coking coal 
quality valuations which could be associated with the changes 
of cokemaking and blast furnace technologies over the 
intervening period, and perhaps indicate any changes of 
market power over that duration. 
6.2.2) JSI Coking Coal Accjuisition Cost History 
Economic theory suggests that the general levels of coking 
coal price at any time in international markets are related 
to the economics of production of the major world suppliers 
and the short term supply/demand balance in world trade. The 
behaviour of coking coal prices in US markets was discussed 
in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 2.3 series "D". A similar 
pattern of price behaviour occurred for hard coking coals 
imported by the JSI as is evidenced in Figure 6.2 on the 
following page. 
FIGURE 6 . 2 
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The data presented in Figure 6.2 merit comment and further 
analysis. The landed costs of hard coals from all three 
sources have exhibited a significant increase followed by 
ecjually significant decrease in real $US terms over the 
period from 1969 to 1989. Costs first increased sharply for 
imported US coals in 1974. Landed costs for Canadian and 
Australian coals also increased in real terms, but more 
gradually. US coal costs in 1989 are once again below the 
real levels of 1969. Average Canadian hard coal landed costs 
in 1989 remain significantly higher than Australian costs, 
and above the levels of 1973. Australian landed costs in 1989 
were below the real levels of 1973. 
The data presented in Figure 6.2 demonstrate a fluctuating 
pattern of hard coking coal acquisition costs over the twenty 
six year duration. It is also obvious that significant real 
differences have existed between the landed costs for US, 
Australian, and Canadian sourced hard coking coals. Such 
patterns suggest the existence of a multiple tiered market. 
The exercise of market power by the JSI in the bilateral 
bargaining process could explain persistently lower 
acquisition costs for Australian sourced coals, unless it can 
be shown that coal quality differences which influence the 
value of individual coals in the coke blend can justify the 
higher cif costs generally incurred by the JSI for American 
sourced hard coking coals, and for Canadian coking coals in 
recent years. 
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The other major category of coking coal referenced in 
Japanese trade literature is soft coking coal, which exhibits 
lower coke strength but provides fluidity in the coke blend. 
In the fifties and sixties, according to Matsuoka^*^, 
Japanese domestic production was the major source of soft 
coking coal (and fluidity) for the JSI. As Japan has never 
possessed significant economic reserves of hard coking coals, 
practically all the hard coking coals used by the JSI have 
been imported. 
During the seventies increased quantities of soft coking coal 
were imported from Australia (New South Wales), South Africa 
and the US, as domestic production steadily declined. Early 
in the eighties, a decision was made to phase out Japanese 
coking coal production completely, due to its excessive cif 
cost relative to imported coals. By 1988 domestic production 
had fallen to less than 800,000 tonnes from a level of ten 
million tonnes produced and consumed in the early seventies. 
Differential cif cost behaviour can be noted between Japanese 
soft coking coals and Australian imported coking coals in 
Figure 6.3. Comparative data are available only from 1960. 
Australian coking coal shipments to Japan were less than 
500,000 tonnes per year prior to that time, and only 
commenced in 1956, so the historic duration shown in the 
figure is representative. Throughout the entire period 
Japanese domestic coal maintained a higher real cif cost than 
6.8) Matsuoka, H. "Requirements for Coals in Japanese Coking 
Blends" Symposium Paper 20 (1975) Australian Institute 
of Mining and Metallurgy Illawarra Branch. 
FIGURE 6 . 3 
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either soft or hard coals from Australia. The magnitude of 
the differential widened considerably in 1977, but is 
significant throughout the twenty nine years charted. This 
fact, together with its high subsidy cost (see Table 4.3), 
was no doubt a factor in the MITI decision to phase out 
domestic coking coal production. 
In the early eighties there also appeared a new category of 
imported coking coal termed "briquetting or semi-soft" coal. 
Such coals have lower swelling characteristics (as measured 
by the free swelling index) , and frecjuently have higher ash 
contents than premium coking coals. The coals are generally 
produced as a lower quality byproduct from coal washing 
processes, and command considerably lower prices than premium 
hard or soft coking varieties. The Queensland mines producing 
such coals are frequently joint venture operations having 
minority Japanese trading company equity interests. There is 
the potential for these trading companies to cause knowledge 
asymmetry in the bilateral bargaining process, for byproducts 
such as semi-soft coking coal, by providing marginal 
production cost information to the JSI oligopsony involved in 
purchasing this product. 
During periods of low pig iron demand, when high blast 
furnace productivity and coke strength is not recjuired, the 
JSI has used as much as 30% of such coals in the coke blend 
to replace more costly premium hard or soft coking coals. 
Semi-soft coals are also frecjuently used for pulverized coal 
injection, further reducing the demands for furnace coke. 
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Unless coal quality differences provide a satisfactory 
explanation, the trends of Figures 6.2 and 6.3 suggest a 
pattern of differential costs which may be the result of the 
use of market power by Japan, as the largest buyer of coking 
coal in the Pacific region, in a situation of bilateral 
monopoly. To pursue this question from the Queensland 
perspective, it is necessary to focus on the hard coking coal 
statistics provided in annual Japanese coal manuals. 
All low volatile coals and most mid volatile coals imported 
from the US are considered hard coking coals. All Australian 
low volatile coals from the Bowen Basin and the Illawarra 
(South Coast) producing region of New South Wales are also 
considered hard coking coals. Low volatile Canadian coking 
coals from Alberta and British Columbia also fit into this 
category. The analysis will consider these sources of coal. 
It is clear from the discussion so far that coking coal 
valuation in the Japanese steel market is a complex issue. 
Blending requirements are dynamic both from the aspects of 
technological evolution and business cycle demands for pig 
iron. These have become of greater significance since overall 
levels of JSI crude steel production reached a plateau at 
about the 100 million tonne annual level since the early 
seventies. 
A hypothesis that price discrimination according to coal 
source has been exercised by the JSI can be tested by 
developing cross-sectional regression models which relate 
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coking coal cif cost and quality characteristics for the 
Japanese market by country source. These models can be tested 
for structural consistency using the Chow test^*^. If 
significant differences do occur according to country source, 
the models can be respecified by including dummy variables 
related to country source in the regression analysis^*^°. 
Such cross-sectional regression models will be developed for 
the major brands of US, Australian and Canadian hard coals 
imported by the JSI for Japanese fiscal years 1973, 1977, 
1983, and 1988, to investigate this issue. However, before 
proceeding it is necessary to develop a theoretical model to 
identify the quality characteristics most likely to influence 
prices from a technical viewpoint, and review published 
literature on the topic. 
6.3) Price/Quality Relationships for Hard Coking Coal 
In the descriptions of byproduct cokemaking and blast furnace 
operation of Chapter 5, it was suggested that fixed carbon 
(or mean maximum reflectance of vitrinite as a measure of 
coal rank) would be an important factor in determining a hard 
coal's economic worth. High Gieseler fluidity and free 
swelling index (FSI) characteristics are beneficial for coke 
manufacture, and might be significant in a regression 
6.9) Chow, G.C."Tests of Equality between Sets of 
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions" Econometrica 
(1960) 28(3) p.591-605. 
6.10) Gujarati, D. "Use of Dummy Variables in Testing for 
Ecjuality between sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions" The American Statistician (Feb.1970) p.50. 
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equation. However Gieseler fluidity and FSI are both physical 
testing techniques to determine the caking characteristics of 
a particular coal. Inclusion of both variables in the 
regression ecjuation is unnecessary, particularly for hard 
coking coals whose principal contribution to the coke blend 
is carbon. Increased ash and sulphur content would be 
expected to result in lower acquisition costs, as these 
impurities contaminate the coke and add costs in the blast 
furnace operation. Such parameters should have negative 
regression coefficients. 
Moisture content adds to the costs of transportation and must 
be considered when modelling fob price/quality relationships. 
However, as this modelling exercise examines landed costs 
(cif) rather than fob prices, and as moisture is a minor 
impurity removed in preheating the coke blend before the 
coking process, it is not a quality parameter which needs be 
considered in this modelling study. For the same reasons 
ocean transportation costs should not be included. Variables 
associated with mine productivity should not be considered if 
Japanese markets are assumed to be competitive, as is the 
conventional wisdom, which will be further investigated in 
this study. 
For the above technical reasons, the expected parameters, and 
influence of changes in such coal quality parameters on cif 
value to the ironmaker relative to other hard coking coals, 
can be summarized in Table 6.1 as follows: 
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TABLE 6.1 
HARD COKING COAL CHARACTERISTIC'S INFLUENCE ON CIF COST 
Property Value Regression Sign 
Higher Fixed Carbon Content Increase + 
Higher Fluidity (or FSI) Increase + 
Higher Ash Decrease -
Higher Sulphur Decrease 
It seems unlikely for the same technical reasons that coking 
coal quality related valuations at the point of end use would 
differ significantly depending on the source of coal. That 
would imply that Australian ash or sulphur impurities were 
somehow different to US or Canadian ash or sulphur in their 
economic impact on coking and blast furnace operations. 
6.3.1) Price/Quality Modelling Literature 
Prior to the recent modelling work of Porter and Gooday, four 
regression modelling studies of the Japanese coking coal 
market had been performed attempting to relate fob prices to 
coal quality characteristics. 
Callcott, Kittredge and Sivertson, Pearson, and Miyazu, 
Takekawa and Fukuyama, developed fob pricing models using 
cross-sectional regression analysis techniques involving 
detailed coal quality characteristics for a number of 
individual coal brands, as is indicated in Table 6.2 
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TABLE 6.2 
REGRESSION MODELLING OF COKING COAL PRICES IN JAPAN 
Author Callcott^'^^ Kittredge Pearson^*^^^iyazu^*^^ 
Sivertson et al 
Year of Data 
Coal Sources 
Number of Coals 
1966 
Australia 
USA 
57 
1977 1978 1979 
USA USA All coals 
Australia Australia except 
Canada domestic 
27 33 51 
Statistically 
Significant 
Parameters 
(at at least 
10% level of 
significance) 
FC 
ash% 
volatile 
matter% 
FC (or RQ) 
FSI 
i FLDTY 
ash% 
sulphur% 
moisture% 
transport 
RQ max 
FSI 
ash% 
labour productivity 
contract term 
RQ max 
Reactives% 
Organic 
Inerts% 
Log(FLDTY) 
ash% 
sulphur% 
where: FC is fixed carbon. 
Kg max is the mean maximum reflectance of vitrinite. 
FLDTY is Gieseler fluidity. 
FSI is free swelling index. 
All models developed in the studies listed, related fob 
prices and coal cjuality for both hard and soft imported 
coking coal brands. Japanese domestic soft coking coals were 
6.11) Callcott, T.G. "Conjoint Papers on Coal, Coke, and 
Size Reduction" Dissertation for doctorate in Applied 
Science, University of Melbourne (1970) papers 52 & 53. 
6.12) Pearson, D.E."The Quality of Western Canadian Coking 
Coal" Canadian Institute of Minerals Bulletin (January 
1980) p.70-84. 
6.13) Miyazu T., T. Takekawa and Y. Funabiki, "The Selection 
of Coal and Additives for the Reduction of Coke Cost" 
Proceedings of McMaster Symposium #8 "Blast Furnace 
Coke Quality, Cause and Effect" May 1980. McMaster 
University, Hamilton Ontario Canada p.6-1 to 6-12. 
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not considered in the regression relationships. This omission 
is a serious shortcoming if modelling seeks to examine 
evidence of price discrimination practices in the coking coal 
purchasing policies of the JSI, which is the principal 
objective of this study. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that support of the domestic 
coal industry was a specific element of Japanese industrial 
policy during the reconstruction era from 1945 to 1960, and 
average cif prices for Japanese soft coking coals have 
exceeded the average price of all imported coals in all but 
two years since 1960. These facts alone lend support to a 
view that price discrimination has favoured domestic 
suppliers over foreign sourced coals throughout the period. 
Indeed, the stated reason for the decision to phase out 
Japanese coking coal production was its high acquisition cost 
relative to imported coals. 
All Queensland premium coking coals are hard, and the focus 
of this study is the examination of the Japanese market for 
these coals. Problems associated with the inclusion of 
imported soft coals without considering Japanese sourced soft 
coals, which occurs in all the studies cited, can be avoided 
by eliminating soft coals from the US and Australian brands 
of coal considered when modelling, and using only hard coking 
cif cost and quality data. The approach differs from that of 
all other authors in developing their respective regression 
models, and deliberately excludes consideration of price 
discrimination for soft coking coals in Japanese markets. 
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That topic is worthy of study in its own right, but is not 
pursued here because Queensland does not export soft coking 
coals. 
The work of the Kittredge and Sivertson is a major 
contribution in the research on the characteristics of the 
Japanese coking coal market, which concluded that assertions 
price discrimination are not justified. It is worthwhile to 
review the methodology used in that study, and reexamine the 
Japanese coking coal market for 1977 using the coal prices 
and quality data only for hard coking coals, for the reasons 
explained above. 
6.3.2) Remodelling of Japanese Fiscal Year 1977 Data 
A listing of the coal quality and cost data used by Kittredge 
and Sivertson in their investigation of competition in 
Pacific markets in 1977, appears in Table 4 of that paper. 
The methodology used by these authors in the regression 
analysis, was to pool coking coal price and cjuality data for 
thirty six brands of hard and soft coking coal imported by 
the JSI to generate the following relationship: 
P = 56.398 + .488FC + 1.839FSI + .00034FLDY - 1.255A 
(4.40) (3.00) (2.57) (-2.45) 
- 13.729S - 1.38TM - .278T - 1.214TRANS - .372PR 
(-2.16)* (-2.56)* (-1.84)* (-1.47) (-1.71)* 
F/g 26) ~ 27.0*, R-square = .90, R-square = .87 
where: P is fob price paid by the JSI in $US per long ton 
The figures in parenthesis are "t" values, * indicates 
significant at at least the 5% level of significance. 
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FC is fixed carbon content 
FSI is free swelling index 
FLDY is fluidity 
A is % ash 
S is % sulphur 
TM is % total moisture (as shipped) 
T is the contractural term in years 
TRANS is the ocean shipping cost 
PR is the mine labour productivity 
A similar regression model using only the brand data for US 
and Australian coals was then used by the authors to predict 
fob prices for Canadian coals purchased by the JSI in 1977. 
These predicted prices were close to the actual prices paid 
for the three brands of Canadian coal making up the bulk of 
exports. The authors therefore concluded that a competitive 
market situation existed, and tjuality differences could 
account for price differentials between US, Australian, and 
Canadian coking coals sold into Japanese markets in 1977. 
There are several difficulties with this analytical approach 
and the findings. The authors included both hard and soft 
coking coal brands from the US and Australia when developing 
the regression equations. Inclusion of soft coal data does 
not recognize the different roles paid by hard and soft 
coking coals in coke manufacture. It also ignores the fact 
that high priced Japanese domestic coking coals (see Figure 
6.3) made up some 35% of the soft coking coal used by the JSI 
in 1977, compared with 37.5% of much lower priced soft coal 
from Australia, which was the largest foreign supplier in 
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that year. The inclusion of Australian and US soft coking 
coals in the price model should then also have required the 
consideration of Japanese domestic soft coals when developing 
a comprehensive price regression model designed to cover the 
full spectrum of coal quality. 
The difficulty of Japanese domestic coals exclusion (perhaps 
because of a lack of cif cost information by brand) can be 
overcome if a respecified cif model considers only the 
principal sources of hard coking coals which are in fact 
fully imported. For such a respecified model, landed cost and 
coal quality data for the twenty one hard coking coals brands 
imported from the US, Australia, and Canada in 1977 are 
available. 
A modelling relationship with cif cost as dependent variable 
should not include all the independent variables considered 
in the Kittredge and Sivertson study which analysed fob 
prices. For cif cost modelling, coal moisture and ocean 
transport cost parameters are not required. The mine 
productivity term is of no relevance to the landed value of 
coal to the ironmaker in a competitive market environment. As 
free swelling index (FSI) and Geiseler plasticity are 
different physical measurements of the caking characteristic, 
inclusion of both parameters is not warranted, particularly 
in an analysis of the hard coking coal market. Miyazu et al. 
indicate that log Geiseler plasticity is the caking related 
parameter used in brand evaluations by the JSI, so this 
caking related parameter shall be used in this study. D'Cruz 
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determined that quasi integration is a statistically 
significant factor in determining fob coal price, so a 
contractual term "T" should also be included as an 
independent variable in the regression ecjuation. From a 
priori reasoning then, a model relating cif cost to cjuality 
should be of the form of cif cost as a function of fixed 
carbon, ash, sulphur, log fluidity, and contractual term. 
Also, from a priori reasoning, regression coefficients should 
have the signs indicated in Table 6.1 in the regression 
relationship. 
The definite cif cost tiers appearing in Figure 6.2 suggest 
the possibility that differences might exist between the 
regression models for Australian and Canadian coals vis-a-vis 
the US coals imported by the JSI in 1977. This possibility 
can be investigated by performing Chow^*^^ tests to determine 
if pooling of the Australian and Canadian coal data can be 
justified. The test results, which are given in Appendix C, 
suggest that all nine Australian coal brands can be pooled 
with four of the five Canadian hard coals, but the Smoky 
River Canadian brand should be treated separately. Chow tests 
also suggest that the eight US coal brands should be treated 
separately from the pool of nine Australian and four Canadian 
brands. Finally, a Chow test also demonstrates that the Smoky 
River brand is not significantly different to the US brands 
in these regression relationships. 
6.14) Chow, G.C. "Tests of Ecjuality between Sets of 
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions" Econometrica 
(1960) 28(3) p.591-605. 
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The regression model result obtained when Australian coals 
are pooled with four Canadian coals and is as follows: 
C = 47.21 - .0454 FC + 1.367 A - 7.02 S + .143 FY + .300 T 
(-.199) (1.427) (-1.158) (.411) (1.390) 
F/5 2.2) ~ 2.133, R-square = .6038, R-square = .3207 
where: C is the cif value of each coal in $US per long ton 
FC is % fixed carbon on a dry, ash free, basis 
A is % ash 
S is % sulphur 
FY is log Geiseler plasticity 
T is contractual term in years 
Figures in parenthesis are "t" values, and none are 
significant at at least the 5% level of significance. 
The model is notable for the lack of statistical significance 
of the overall regression equation (as evidenced by the "F" 
statistic), considering that the independent variables used 
for modelling were selected on a priori technical grounds. 
The regression model obtained for the US coals and the Smoky 
River brand from Canada, which Chow tests also suggest can be 
pooled is as follows: 
C = -7.691 + .827 FC + .394 A + 16.217 S + .768 FY + .514 T 
(1.710) (.497) (1.339) (.909) (1.492) 
F/5 Q\ = 1.415, R-scjuare = .7022, K-square = .2058 
A similar comment can be made regarding the absence of 
statistical significance, as was the case for the pooled 
Australian and Canadian brands, considering that independent 
variables used in regression modelling were selected on a 
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priori technical grounds. 
Chow tests can be used to determine whether differences 
between linear regression equations are due to differing 
independent variable (or slope) coefficients, or different 
intercept values. Such tests allow the determination of the 
source of difference between regression equations. The 
results, given in Appendix C, show that the cause of the 
model difference between the pooled Australian and four lower 
tier Canadian brands, and the US brands with Smoky River, is 
the result of different intercept values in each regression 
equation. A regression equation for cif cost "C", in which a 
dummy variable is introduced to permit intercept shift to 
take place, is as follows: 
C=62.084 +.214 FC +.028 A -3.95 S -.108 FY +.078 T -19.703 CI 
(1.714) (.067) (-.667) (-.379) (.532) (-9.249) 
F/g ]^5s = 55.47 , R-square = .9569, R-square = .93 96 
where: CI an intercept shift dummy variable is zero for the 
US and Smoky River coal brands, and one for the nine 
Australian and four lower tier Canadian brands. 
FC is % fixed carbon on a dry ash free basis 
A is % ash 
S is % sulphur 
FY is log Geiseler plasticity 
T is contractual term in years 
* denotes significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
The error sum of squares (E.S.S.) for the model is 78.3, and 
the standard error of the estimate is 3.57 6. However, the 
significance of the coefficients of quality parameters raises 
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a question as to the significance, at at least the 5% level 
of significance, of any the independent variables apart from 
the intercept shift dummy variable CI in this model. "F" 
testing of the combined impact of the quality variables 
removed shows that these variables have not made a 
significant contribution to the regression at at least the 5% 
level of significance. Compared with the other results this 
suggests that the low "t" values for the quality variable 
coefficients are not due to multicollinearity. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable CI ($19.70 per long 
ton), provides a measure of the magnitude of producer surplus 
sacrificed by Australian and Canadian producers in their 
bilateral negotiations with the JSI vis-a-vis the acquisition 
cost of US hard coking coals. The fact that Smoky River, a 
Canadian underground mine, achieved a price in 1977 
comparable with US coals, provides an example of the use of 
differential pricing as a buyer strategy to encourage 
additional production capacity, which has been an effective 
element of JSI acquisition strategy. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Kittredge 
and Sivertson only in that Australian and most Canadian hard 
coals are shown to have consistent fob prices and cif costs 
(as ocean freight to Japan is practically identical from each 
source). The finding that Canadian coals were receiving fob 
prices consistent with a competitive market is not supported 
by the analysis because of the tiered nature of the Japanese 
market. All Australian, and four of the Canadian hard coal 
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brands were in fact $19.70 per long ton lower in acquisition 
cost than would be expected relative to US brands, and 
quality related characteristics are not significant as 
explanatory factors, at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
However, it is possible that 1977 was an unusual year. 
Analysis of coal quality and cif cost data for other years 
might better support a position that the persistent cif cost 
differentials illustrated in Figure 6.2, can be 
satisfactorily explained by differing quality related 
valuations of individual coal brands, as has been the 
position of Utah Development Company and other Australian 
coking coal exporters. Cross-sectional analysis of coal 
quality and cif cost data for other years might in fact 
demonstrate that the persistent cif price differentials, 
illustrated in Figure 6.2, can be satisfactorily explained by 
quality related differences between the individual coal 
brands. 
Pearson examined fob price and quality relationships for 
1978. But, as was the case in the Kittredge and Sivertson 
study, both hard and soft coals were pooled in Pearson's 
regression model. The modelling studies of the Japanese 
authors Miyazu et. al. again only considered both the hard 
and soft coking coals imported in 1979. Although the use of 
domestic soft coking coals was declining in 1979, the volume 
used (6.8 million tonnes) was very nearly as great as that of 
Australian soft coking coal (7.6 million tonnes). For reasons 
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relating to differential pricing for Japanese soft coking 
coals outlined when reviewing the Kittredge and Sivertson 
study, the Miyazu study could not address issues of market 
distortion. Unlike the Canadian papers, no details of prices 
or the coal brands which were used to create the regression 
model is provided by these Japanese authors. This makes 
reanalysis of their data difficult. Also, as the years of the 
Pearson study (1978) and the Miyazu study (1979) are so close 
to the year already reexamined (1977), there seems little 
point in attempting to repeat the analysis of hard coking 
coal markets for 1978 and 1979. 
Cost and quality data for nineteen hard coking coals imported 
by the JSI are available for fiscal year 1973 from Tex coal 
manuals of 1974 and 1975. In 1973, the JSI's highest level of 
pig iron production was recorded. It is also the last year of 
reasonable world energy price stability prior to the first 
oil shock, and a year when demand for hard coking coal 
exceeded supply. Well defined cif price differentials were 
already established between US hard coals and Australian and 
Canadian hard coals by that time (see Figure 6.2), so 1973 is 
a worthy year for an analysis of hard coking coal cif cost/ 
(juality relationships. 
6.3.3) Regression Modelling for Japanese Fiscal Year 1973 
The individual brand data available for 1973 consists of 
seven US hard coals, eight Australian, and four Canadian 
hard coal brands. The Australian and Canadian brand 
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information encompasses all the hard coals shipped at that 
time, and the available data are listed in Appendix B. In 
1973, JSI domestic soft coking coal purchases of 9.6 million 
tonnes was 61% of all soft coking coal purchased in that 
year. NSW soft coking coal producers were by far the largest 
foreign suppliers of the remaining soft coking coal purchased 
in 1973. As Figure 6.3 shows, both hard and soft coking coals 
from Australia were acquired at a substantially lower average 
cif costs than were Japanese domestic coking coals in 1973. 
No detailed information on cif acquisition costs for Japanese 
domestic coals, by brand, is available for that year. 
The regression analysis methodology used is the same as has 
been described in detail for 1977. Chow tests support the 
pooling of eight Australian with four Canadian hard coal 
brands. Again, Chow and "F" tests suggest that US coals are 
structurally different due only to intercept shift. Based on 
priori expectations, the regression equation for cif cost "C" 
is: 
C=29.798+.064 FC +.641 A -8.199 S -.234 FY +.221 T -15.063 CI 
(.682) (1.549) (-1.717) (-.951) (1.761) (-8.164) 
F/g -^2) ^ 35.27*, R-square = .9463, R-square = .9195 
where: CI, an intercept shift dummy variable, is zero for US 
coals, and one for Australian and Canadian coals. 
Other symbols as previously defined 
* denotes significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
The standard error for the model is 5.842, and E.S.S. = 30.4. 
As for 1977, the "t" values suggest that at the 5% level. 
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intercept shift (CI) is the only significant variable. This 
finding was also confirmed by an additional "F" test on the 
combined effects of all quality related variables. 
Again, the result suggests significant influence of buyer 
power in establishing the cif cost of imported coking coals. 
Australian and Canadian exporters appear to have given up 
$15.06 per tonne in producer surplus relative to US coking 
coals in the various bilateral bargaining processes which 
established actual cif costs in 1973. 
Steel manufacturing is a basic industry, which by necessity 
had to be internationally competitive in order for Japan to 
achieve its industrial policy objectives relating to export 
growth of high value added manufactures. Therefore, if a 
premium is paid for a substantial volume of a key input from 
one country source, this must be offset by lower cost inputs 
from other suppliers for the industry to remain competitive. 
It is not surprising then that quality factors do not appear 
to account for cif cost differences for hard coking coals 
from the US vis-a-vis Australia and Canada in 1973. 
A review of publications of the Joint Coal Board (JCB) of the 
time supports this statistical confirmation of two tier 
pricing for imports into Japan which cannot be explained by 
(juality differences. In 1971 the JCB stated "The Board has 
been and continues to be critical of the unduely low prices 
at which our export coals continue to be sold"^'^^. In the 
6.15) JCB Annual Report 1970/71, paragraph 2.23, p.18. 
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marketing section of the JCB annual report of the following 
year it was stated categorically " — t h e differences in price 
(cif prices in Japan for low ash hard coking coals from the 
US, Australia and Canada) do not correspond with the quality 
variations. Indeed the major variations in cif prices are 
between countries and not between coal qualities"^'^^. 
In 1973 the JCB compared the fob prices for two US hard coals 
with two North Bowen Basin hard coals and two South Coast 
New South Wales (NSW) coals as of 1st September of that year. 
All six were low volatile hard coking coals reasonably 
comparable in quality, supplied under long term contractual 
terms. The price of both NSW coals was $21.07, the Queensland 
coals were priced at $16.86 and $16.89 respectively, and the 
US coals at $23.88 and $25.03 per long ton^*^^. Ocean freight 
from the US to Japan had risen to $15 per long ton versus $5 
from Australia at that time. The cif costs of US coals were 
then $38.88 and $40.03 compared with $26.07 for the NSW coals 
and $21.86 and $21.89 for the Queensland coals. Quality 
differences alone cannot explain such variations, as the 
regression modelling exercise has shown. 
Investigation of more current data is also necessary. 
Examination of cif cost and coal quality data for 1983 
affords the opportunity to examine quality and cif cost 
behaviour during the recessional cycle of 1982/83 when 
6.16) JCB Annual Report 1971/72, paragraph 5.150 p.140. 
6.17) JCB Annual Report 1972/73, paragraph 3.115 p.110. 
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Japanese pig iron production fell to 74.5 and 75.2 million 
tonnes, the lowest annual levels between 1971 and that time. 
6.3.4) Regression Modelling for Japanese Fiscal Year 1983 
Quality and cif cost data are available from the Tex coal 
manuals of 1984 and 1985 for thirty different brands of hard 
coking coal imported by the JSI from the US, Australia and 
Canada in 1983. Data for seven US brands, fifteen Australian 
brands, and nine Canadian brands were obtained from these 
sources and are listed in Appendix B. The regression analysis 
methodology used is the same as has been described in detail 
for 1977 and 1973. Chow tests support the pooling of the 
fifteen Australian with the four Canadian hard coal brands 
having the lowest cif costs. Again, Chow tests show that US 
coals are structurally different due to intercept shift from 
the nineteen low cif cost brands from Australia and Canada. 
Chow testing also shows that the remaining five higher cif 
cost brands from Canada are structurally different from lower 
cif cost Canadian and Australian brands, but not different 
from the seven US brands. 
Based on a priori expectations, and the results of Chow 
tests, the regression equation for cif cost "C" is: 
C=93.118 -.294FC +.710 A +3.764 S -.688 FY +.133 T -14.821 CI 
(-1.817) (1.251) (0.760) (-1.694) (1.255) (-9.238)* 
F/g 24) = 23.95*, R-square = .8569, R-square = .8211 
* denotes significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
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where: CI, an intercept shift dummy variable, is zero for US 
coal brands and the five higher cif cost Canadian 
brands, and one for Australian and the four lower cif 
cost Canadian coal brands. 
Other symbols as previously defined 
The standard error for the model is 4.603, and E.S.S. = 
236.14. Again, "F" testing on the combined effects of 
the (juality variables shows the only independent variable of 
significance to be CI. The result suggests the significant 
influence of buyer power in establishing the cif cost of 
imported coking coals in 1983. Australian and Canadian 
exporters appear to have given up $14.82 per tonne in 
producer surplus relative to US exporters in the various 
bilateral bargaining processes which established actual cif 
costs in 1983. 
Japanese crude steel production rebounded quickly in 1984, 
and by 1988 had again reached levels not seen since 1980. Pig 
iron production also rebounded to 80.9 and 79.3 million tonne 
levels in fiscal years 1984 and 1985, only to decline for two 
years and then return to 79.3 million tonnes in 1988. Recent 
coal (juality and cif cost data is available from Tex coal 
manual sources for Japanese fiscal year 1988, and cif cost 
modelling for that year can be performed. 
6.3.5) Regression Modelling for Japanese Fiscal Year 1988 
Data by individual brand for twenty nine hard coking coals 
from US, Australian and Canadian sources were obtained from 
the Tex coal manuals of 1989 and 1990. Data for six US 
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brands, fourteen Australian brands, and nine Canadian brands 
from these sources are listed in Appendix B. The regression 
analysis methodology used is the same as has been described 
in detail in the reanalysis of price quality relationships 
for 1977. 
Chow tests support the pooling of the fourteen Australian 
with the five Canadian hard coal brands having the lowest cif 
costs. It is notable that in 1988, coals from Smoky River and 
Greenhills were being acquired by the JSI at the same low cif 
cost as the Australian and lower tier Canadian coals such as 
Balmer, Luscar and Fording River. In earlier years (1977 and 
1983), these coals obtained a price premium from the JSI, and 
their accjuisition costs were not significantly different from 
US coals on a quality adjusted basis. 
Again, Chow tests show that US coals are structurally 
different due to intercept shift from the nineteen low cif 
cost brands from Australia and Canada. Chow testing also 
shows that the remaining four higher cif cost brands from 
Canada are structurally different from lower cif cost 
Canadian and Australian brands. Chow tests suggest that the 
Canadian brands of Line Creek and Gregg River are not 
different from the six US brands, but the Bullmoose and 
Quintette brands are structurally different. Based on a 
priori expectations, the regression ecjuation for cif cost "C" 
for 1988 is then: 
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C = 55.36 +.154 FC -.076 A -7.399 S +.109 T +.576 FY 
(1.190) (-.183) (-2.83) (1.253) (2.352) 
-10.738 CI +27.391 C2 
(-9.981) (15.341) 
F/-7 21) = 111.3*, R-square = .9738, R-square = .965 
* denotes significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
where: CI is zero for US brands and upper tier Canadian 
brands, and one for Australian brands and lower tier 
Canadian brands. 
C2 is one for Quintette and Bullmoose, and zero for 
all other brands. 
All other symbols are as previously defined. 
The standard error for the model is 3.2 36, and the E.S.S.= 
79.1. It is only in 1988 that there appears to be some 
support for the position that some quality related 
independent variables (S and FY) are statistically 
significant in influencing cif values in the Japanese coking 
coal market. 
The fact that the coefficient of the fluidity variable has 
become significant in 1988, is probably a result of the 
phasing out of Japanese domestic production. Japanese 
domestic soft coking coals have particularly good fluidity 
properties, and their absence from the coke blend is now 
being reflected by increased recognition of the value of 
fluidity in hard coking coals. However, even in 1988, it is 
clear that quality effects are small compared with the 
intercept shift terms which are the outcome of the price 
discrimination practices implicit in the JSI's resource 
acquisition policies. 
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6.4) Evidence Supporting The Hypothesis of Market Distortion 
The above results support a hypothesis that quality 
differences have been relatively insignificant in determining 
cif values of hard coking coals to Japanese ironmakers in the 
past, and that market power in the bilateral bargaining 
process is the principal determining factor. It seems likely 
that for a span of twenty six years (1963 to 1989), 
Australia's hard coking coals have had lower cif costs 
relative to US hard coals and some Canadian hard coals than 
would be expected, due to JSI acquisition policies which have 
biased the outcome of the bilateral bargaining process. These 
findings support the positions of Anderson and D'Cruz, and 
the many public comments of the Joint Coal Board (JCB). 
6.4.1) JCB Comments Regarding Exports to JSI 
The reason for the prevailing pattern of lower Australian cif 
costs, shown in Figure 6.2, stems from early hard coking coal 
contracts signed with New South Wales producers in the late 
fifties. Certainly a differential trend was well established 
by then. The problem was noted as early as 1968 in the Joint 
Coal Board's Annual Report of 1967/68 which stated^'^^ " — 
prices at which Australian coals were being sold to Japan 
were unduely low compared with prices paid to United States, 
Canada and other suppliers, even when quality allowances were 
made." 
6.18) JCB Annual Report 1967/68 paragraph 2.20 p. 14. 
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Such concerns were voiced with increasing urgency by the 
Board in subsequent years, but as the JCB lacked authority to 
influence the coal marketing activities of Queensland's hard 
coal producers, no coordinated marketing effort ensued. The 
JSI, acting as an oligopsony contracting for all Australian 
coking coals, was able to maintain an environment of 
destructive competition between competing suppliers within 
New South Wales and Queensland, and between the export 
industries of each state. 
A similar acquisition strategy was adopted for Canada, where 
interfirm competition and interstate competition between 
Alberta and British Columbia assured the same outcome in the 
sixties and seventies. It surely is no coincidence that the 
research of Kittredge and Sivertson was performed for the 
British Columbian Ministry of Industry to investigate state 
government concerns over the apparent discrepancy in cif cost 
between Canadian and American coals sold into the Japanese 
market. It is unfortunate, in hindsight, that these authors 
apparently were not familiar with, or chose to ignore, 
concerns expressed by the JCB in the late sixties and early 
seventies. Had there been greater recognition of that 
viewpoint, it is doubtful whether an assumption that prices 
received by Australian coking coal exporters were determined 
in a competitive market environment, would have been made in 
the Kittredge and Sivertson study of Canadian prices in 1977. 
Success in eliciting low cost hard coal supplies from both 
Australia and Canada, enabled the JSI to achieve another key 
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element of Japanese industrial policy with respect to steel 
production. That objective was to diversify supplies of steel 
commodity inputs, and reduce reliance on the US for coking 
coal supplies. 
6.5) JSI Supply Diversification Strategies 
The degree of success in achieving an objective of supply 
diversification as far as hard coking coal supplies are 
concerned is well illustrated in Figure 6.4 (following page). 
The import trends of Figure 6.4 are worthy of further 
analysis and discussion. When viewed in conjunction with 
Japanese pig iron production trends of Figure 6.1, and 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 showing imported coking coal cif costs, 
the trends in import volume from the three major world 
suppliers of coking coals reveal the success of JSI's 
supplier diversification policy^•^^, and further market 
distortion resulting from that policy. 
In the decade from 1963 to 1973, annual pig iron production 
grew from 20.7 million tonnes to 90.9 million tonnes at an 
average growth rate of nearly 16% per annum. As realization 
of future high growth rates became accepted by the JSI in the 
6.19) JSI policies with respect to supply diversification are 
spelled out in Horie, H. (ed.) Coal Manual (1969), The 
Tex Report Ltd. pp.1-4. As is further stated on p.41 of 
the 1969 Coal Manual, it was anticipated that imports 
from the US, Australia, and Canada would eventually 
rise to levels of approximately 20 million tonnes 
annually from each of these key suppliers. 
FIGURE 6 . 4 
244 
o 
CO 
o 
o 
OX) 
• I -H 
o 
o 
PS ^ 
C / ^ CO 
OH 
O 
c« 
fl 
2 ^ 
<1 ;fl 
CQ 
(U 
d 
d 
o 
E-
O 
ID 
CM 
O tD ID 
<T> 
(30 
00 
f-
«> 
I D 
:** 
CO 
C\2 
T H 
O 
05 
00 
t^ 
" 
p 
I D 
•* 
::*' 
CO 
C\2 
t - H 
O 
05 
00 
r-
^ 
I D 
:** 
CO 
CD 
CX) 
CD 
r—\ 
o ' 
-p 
:j> 
CO 
C (P 
Z5 
CO ^^  
CD 
CD 
( 
Ui 
^H 
CO 
^ ' 
,—i 
CO -
o 
c« 
• I-H 
& H 
(D 
(D 
CO 
^ , 
CO 
• - 5 
I ^ 
00 
0> 
c (P 
y3 
< 
e
n
e
s 
/ } 
H 
• 
VD 
,^  & v*^ 1 fa 
CJ *^ 
:d P 
A
-U
S,
 
B
-A
us
tr
 
So
ur
ce
: 
A
s 
245 
sixties, a strenuous effort was made to reduce reliance on 
the US as its sole supplier of hard coking coals. Prior to 
1960, only small quantities (< 100,000 tonnes per year) of 
NSW south coast hard coals had been imported, beginning in 
the mid fifties. Rapid growth of Australian imports between 
1963 and 1965 then came from an expansion of NSW supplies 
from existing mines, which increased from 535,000 long tons 
in 1959/60 (Australian financial year) to 2,874,000 long tons 
in 1964/65. But also, and more importantly, the commissioning 
of the Moura mine in central Queensland took place. 
6.5.1) The JSI's Supply Stratetyy in Queensland 
Moura was a large development (approximately 3 million tonnes 
annual (capacity) whose total output was committed to the 
Japanese market. The original contract was signed in 1961 for 
2.9 million tonnes, and that Moura contract was instrumental 
in establishing the low price regime for Australian hard 
coking coals in the Japanese market which exists to this day. 
This view is supported by comments contained in the Tex coal 
manual^'^^ for 1969, which states * — high appreciation of 
the following merits of the coal (from Moura) that 
contributed greatly to the Japanese steel industry's coking 
coal supply at least until 1967. 
6.20) Horie, H. (ed.) Coal Manual (1969), The Tex Report Ltd. 
Tokyo, p.63. 
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1) The initially contracted low price of the coal served as a 
restraining factor to the price hike tendency of other 
imported coals. 
2) Having the highest fluidity of all the imported coals, 
Moura coal was used as a basic component of coal mix. 
3) Its annual volume of import was larger than that of any 
other overseas coal at that time." 
The fob price precedent established by the Moura contract has 
haunted the Australian coking coal industry ever since. 
Rapid growth in Australian hard coal imports by the JSI, 
which then occurred from 1967 to 1976, was due to the 
commissioning of five new mines in Central Queensland. Like 
Moura, these new mines were committed on the basis of long 
term supply contracts, and with prices based on the Moura 
precedent. Apart from the South Blackwater mine, which was 
owned and operated by a Queensland company (Thiess), all the 
mines were large scale open cut operations owned and operated 
by Utah International, a US multinational company. A list of 
these capacity additions, and the management groups having 
operational control, is provided in Table 6.3. 
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TABLE 6.3 
EXPORT COKING COAL MINE COMMISSIONINGS - QUEENSLAND 
Year Project Management Capacity 
Million Tonnes 
1961 
1968 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1975 
Moura 
Blackwater 
South Blackwater 
Goonyella 
Peak Downs 
Saraji 
Peabody (US) 
Utah (US) 
Thiess (Qld.) 
Utah (US) 
Utah (US) 
Utah (US) 
3.0 
3.0 
1.0 
4.0 
4.5 
4.5 
Source: Queensland Coal Board Annual Reports 1960 to 1976. 
Total annual capacity additions, in the period from 1968 to 
1975 of 17 million tonnes, far exceeded the JSI's increased 
imports of Queensland's hard coking coals. That increase 
amounted to only 11 million tonnes annually over the same 
period to create an excess of supply capacity relative to JSI 
demands. Failure of the JSI to expand pig iron production and 
demand for hard coking coals, was not the reason that 
Australian capacity expansions exceeded Japanese imports. 
That was due to the JSI's initiation of a large expansion in 
western Canadian hard coking coal export capacity in the same 
time frame as the Queensland expansions. 
6.5.2) The JSI's Supply Stratecyy in Canada 
In 1968, a Canadian contract for fifteen years of supply of 
hard coking coal at an annual rate of 5 million long tons per 
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year was signed. This contract resulted in the expansion of 
the Balmer mine to a large scale open pit operation of 5 
million tonne annual capacity in 1970. Two more contracts 
were concluded soon after, which resulted in the opening of 
the Fording River and Luscar mines. All three Canadian mines 
were large scale open cut operations producing hard coking 
coals having quality characteristics very similar to 
Queensland's coking coals. 
As was the case for the Moura mine in Queensland, the Balmer 
mine was controlled by a foreign company (Kaiser Steel of the 
US). Also, as was the case with Moura for Australian hard 
coals, that price settlement established the precedent of low 
average cif costs for Canadian hard coking coals, which was 
to continue until the early eighties. The setjuence of 
contractual arrangements leading to new mine developments in 
Queensland in the late sixties and Canada in the early 
seventies explains to a great extent the similarity of cif 
cost trends for coals from these sources. Regression 
modelling studies have confirmed the close relationship 
between Queensland's hard coal producers and the lower tier 
Canadian mines of Balmer, Luscar and Fording River. Some of 
the mines which commenced production in Canada in the early 
eighties obtain higher prices in Japanese markets for coals 
of very similar characteristics to those commencing 
operations in the seventies. However, do the import trends of 
Figure 6.4 provide an indication of further market distortion 
due to the purchasing power of the JSI, or reflect a 
legitimate need for supply diversity? 
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6.5.3) The Need for Supply Diversity 
Supply diversity is certainly an important issue for an 
industry having significant economies of scale, situated in a 
country like Japan which lacks most of the resource commodity 
inputs required to support an internationally competitive 
steel industry. Reliability of supply is also an important 
issue for importers of a commodity like coking coal, because 
of the effect of oxidation on caking characteristics. Unlike 
thermal coals, which can be stockpiled for long periods as a 
security against supply disruption, coking coals must be 
converted into coke within about six months after mine 
production. This limits the buyers ability to employ long 
term stockpiling as a strategy against supply disruption in 
coking coal production. For this reason the monopoly power of 
labour unions in Australia's coking coal mines, and in state 
railway operations, has long been of concern to the JSI. 
These issues were certainly of concern to MITI when 
formulating the Japanese industrial policies relating to the 
steel industry. In Chapter 4, the role of Japanese industrial 
policy relating to shipbuilding and ocean transportation was 
discussed. A shipping industry capable of efficiently 
transporting the large quantities of iron ore and coal 
imports over great distances was fundamental to attaining 
internationally competitive resource input costs for Japan's 
steel industry. An important outcome of the ocean shipping 
element of Japanese industrial policy was the ability of the 
JSI to control the ocean transportation component of 
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delivered cost. By contracting on an fob basis rather than 
cif, as was the case for both Australian and Canadian coking 
coal purchases, the JSI was able to influence the 
distribution of locational rents associated with shorter 
ocean haul distances from Australian and Western Canadian 
coal export terminals to Japan (4,400 nautical miles), versus 
the much longer distance from Norfolk Virginia in the US 
(9,400 nautical miles). 
6.5.4) Departures from Competitive Market Behaviour 
Up until 1978, the displacement of the US as principal 
supplier by Australia and Canada as lower cost suppliers, as 
is illustrated in the trends of Figure 6.4, is consistent 
with competitive market behaviour. From 1978 on the pattern 
of imports does not correspond with expectations, recognizing 
that quality differences are not a significant factor, were 
the JSI acting as an input cost minimizing industry. US 
imports rose above 10 million tonnes annually from 1979 to 
1984, despite much lower costs for Australian hard coals. 
This was not a consecjuence of supply scarcity from Australia 
with rising levels of pig iron production. Additional export 
capacity of 5 million tonnes was added in 1981 in Queensland, 
as a result of the commissioning of the Gregory and Norich 
Park mines, and annual rates of Japanese pig iron production 
had continued the declining trend which commenced in 1973. 
Since 1983, imports from Canada have risen while both US and 
Australian imports have declined. These patterns have evolved 
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despite the fact that Australia has continued as the low cost 
supplier throughout the period, and Canada has now displaced 
the US as the highest cost supplier. As it has already been 
demonstrated that cjuality differences are unimportant in 
explaining the persistent trend of lower cif costs for 
Australian hard coals, so this behaviour is not indicative of 
a functioning competitive market situation in the Japanese 
hard coking coal trade. A conclusion which could be drawn 
from these import trends is that the JSI have adopted a 
policy of limiting their reliance on Australian coking coal 
imports to some ceiling quota or share, irrespective of the 
cost competitiveness of Australian sourced coals. The 
patterns provide further evidence of market failure in the 
Japanese coking coal trade. This can be demonstrated by 
longitudinal modelling of changes of market share with cif 
costs for Australian, US and Canadian hard coking coal 
producers over the period from 1973 to 1989. 
6.6) Modelling of Japanese Market Response 
Data are available by Japanese fiscal years from 1963 to 
1989, for hard coking coal cif costs in constant 1987 $US 
(Figure 6.2), and hard coking coal import quantities from 
Australia, Canada, and the US (Figure 6.4). From the import 
volume data of Figure 6.4, each country's market share in 
Japan for each year can be calculated as the volume of 
imports from that major supplier (Australia, Canada or the 
US) , divided by the sum of imports from all three of these 
major suppliers. In a similar fashion, the cif cost data of 
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Figure 6.2 can be used to calculate the percentage change in 
real cif cost by year, by dividing the annual change in real 
1987 US dollar cif costs from one year to the next by the cif 
cost in the initial year, for hard coals from Australia, the 
US, and Canada. 
Pig iron manufacture is the principal end use for coke. 
Figure 6.1 shows quite clearly the declining overall trend in 
pig iron production in Japan which has taken place since 
1973. Although integrated steel manufacturing capacity 
increases in South Korea and Taiwan have compensated to some 
extent for declining Japanese demands for coking coal in the 
Pacific Rim, a similar pattern of decline of pig iron 
production in Europe, the other major importing region, has 
resulted in an excess of supply over demand in the seaborne 
coking coal trade since 1973. In such a situation, if the 
Japanese market was acting in accord with economic theory, 
buyers would seek to minimize their cost of coking coal 
inputs, and one would expect a relationship to exist between 
changes of market share for each of the three major suppliers 
of hard coking coal, with changes of cif cost from each of 
these sources. 
Evidence has already been presented that normal competitive 
market behaviour was not permitted. Horie's quotation 
relating to the JSI's supply diversification policy 
(footnoted on page 245) states the intent to increase imports 
from the US, Australia, and Canada, to approximately equal 
levels. However, it is the conventional wisdom that 
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competitive market behaviour does exist in Japan's coking 
coal trade, so an attempt will be made to confirm such 
behaviour by market modelling. 
6.6.1) Theoretical Market Share/Acquisition Cost Models 
Economic theory suggests that the level of a buyer's demands 
for a commodity from a particular seller should be a function 
of its acquisition costs, on a quality adjusted basis, 
relative to other sellers. It has already been demonstrated 
that coal quality is not significant in explaining the 
accjuisition costs of hard coking coals imported by the JSI. 
It should follow then, from the cif trends of Figure 6.2, 
that lower cost Australian hard coking coals should gain 
market share at the expense of higher cif cost suppliers if 
Japanese markets were competitive. A model can be 
hypothesized for annual changes in market share Australian 
hard coking coal imports by the JSI as follows: 
MSCH = fn( PEA, REUS, PEC,) 
where: MSCH, the dependent variable, is the annual change of 
market share for Australian coking coal for Japanese 
fiscal years from 1973 to 1989, expressed as a 
percentage. Australia's market share is calcnalated as 
the proportion of hard coking coal imports from 
Australia, as a percentage of the total imports from 
Australia, Canada and the US. 
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PEA is the annual real percentage cif cost change 
by year from 1973 to 1989 for Australian imports. 
REUS is the annual real percentage cif cost change 
by year from 1973 to 1989, for US imports. 
PEC is the annual real percentage cif cost change 
by year from 1973 to 1989, for Canadian imports. 
Market response models for US and Canadian hard coal imports 
can also be hypothesized in a conceptually similar fashion, 
with each model having the same set of independent 
variables^ •^ •^ . 
6.6.2) Australian Market Response Model 
The market response model relating Australia's market share 
changes to own price change, and cross price changes is as 
follows: 
MSCH = .0126 - .0025 REUS + .006 PEA - .003 PEC 
(-2.13) (1.44) (-1.03) 
F/3 12) =1*663, R-square =.2937, R-square =.1171, D-W =2.319 
"t" values are not significant at 5% (two tailed test) 
6.21) As the sum of coal market shares in this market sum to 
one, this is an example of Zellner's "Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions(SUR)" problem. However as the 
independent variables are identical, the OLS estimates 
used are equivalent to the SUR generalized least 
squares estimates. On this see Kmenta, J."Elements of 
Econometrics" McMillan Publishing Co. New York,(1990) 
pp. 635-648. 
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Chow tests for structural change, due to the second oil shock 
of 1979, do not indicate significant change. 
This model is notable both for its low R-square value, 
negligible "F" value, and the lack of statistical 
significance for all coefficients of cost related independent 
variables thought to be important in competitive markets. In 
short, these results fail to demonstrate statistically 
significant model relationships, at at least the 5% level of 
significance. Also, as the previous cross-sectional analyses 
supported the presence of a two tier market situation which 
could not be explained by quality differences, this result 
could further indicate that too great a cif cost advantage 
has historically been given up by Australian exporters in 
their bilateral bargaining with the JSI vis-a-vis US and 
Canadian sellers. 
Having examined the Japanese market share response model for 
Australian hard coal imports, it is informative to generate 
and compare similar models for US and Canadian hard coals. 
6.6.3) US Hard Coking Coal Market Response Model 
The market response model relating annual percentage demand 
changes for US hard coking coal imports by the JSI with cif 
costs is the following: 
MSCH = -.0373 + .0044 REUS - .0064 PEA + .002 PEC 
(1.95) (-.81) (.336) 
F/3 12) =1.512, R-scjuare =.2744, R-square =.0929, D-W =1.121 
"t" values are not significant at 5% (two tailed test) 
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As was the case for the Australian market model, regression 
coefficients of independent variables are of negligible 
significance in this model. Chow tests for structural change 
due to the second oil shock of 1979 again support the view 
that the relationship is stable throughout the period. 
6.6.4) Canadian Hard Coking Coal Market Response Model 
The market response model relating annual percentage change 
of market share for Canadian hard coking coals with 
percentage real cif cost changes from the three major 
suppliers is as follows: 
MSCH = .0330 - .0026 REUS - .0038 PEA + .0066 PEC 
(-1.21) (-.50) (1.18) 
F/3 12) =1.493, R-square =.2718, K-scjuare =.0897, D-W =2.008 
"t" values are not significant at 5% (two tailed test) 
Chow tests for structural change due to the second oil shock 
of 1979, and at the commencement of production of Bullmoose 
and Quintette do not indicate significant change. Again, the 
model is notable both for the negligible "F" value, and the 
lack of statistical significance for all coefficients of cost 
related independent variables thought to be important in 
competitive markets. 
All three major suppliers appear to have experienced 
distortions in the normal relationships between demand with 
acquisition cost competitiveness in Japanese hard coking coal 
markets. However Australia's situation is unique in being the 
only supplier whose cif costs have consistently been lower 
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than other major suppliers. What motives might have caused 
the JSI to abandon cost minimizing behaviour for hard coking 
coal acquisitions, by maintaining higher cost imports from 
the US and increasing imports from Canada, rather than 
increasing lower cif cost shipments from Australia? A number 
of possible reasons can be suggested: 
1) Concern over concentrations of supply side monopoly power 
within Australia's coal export industry. 
2) The need for supply diversification to reduce the risk of 
supply disruption. 
3) Ownership issues, such as the substantial Japanese etjuity 
position in the North East British Columbian coal 
projects. 
4) Bilateral balance of trade pressures, particularly the 
trade surplus with the US relative to the deficit with 
Australia. 
Any one or all of these motives could explain the JSI's 
reluctance to permit coking coal imports from any one country 
source to exceed an apparent maximum purchasing ratio ceiling 
of about 40% as is illustrated in Figure 6.5 (on the 
following page). 
The trends of Figure 6.5 provide strong evidence of the 
reluctance of the JSI to permit excessive exposure to any one 
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country source. Only once, in 1970, were US coking coal 
purchases over 40% of the total annual purchase (at 44.1% in 
1970). Australian coking coal imports have never exceeded 
42.5% of the total in any one year, although exceeding 40% in 
nine of the last eleven years. This has occurred in spite of 
the cif cost competitiveness of Australia's hard and soft 
coals over the period as evidenced in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, 
and an excess of productive capacity both in Queensland and 
NSW. Canadian imports (Figure 6.5 series "B") have recently 
made up about 24% of annual purchases. Other purchases 
(series "C"), have also increased as a percentage of the 
total in recent years (17.4% in 1987), due to increases from 
South Africa (soft coking coal) and the USSR (hard coking 
coals). 
Comparisons between the three country market response models 
can now be performed. 
6.7) Japanese Hard Coking Coal Market Response Comparisons 
The regression model results for the three major suppliers 
are summarized in Table 6.4 
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TABLE 6.4 
REGRESSION MODELLING OF HARD COKING COAL MARKET RESPONSE 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Country Source 
Statistically 
Significant 
Independent 
Variables 
(at at least 
5% level of 
significance) 
Structural Changes 
R-square Value 
Adjusted R-square 
IIF" value 
Australia 
none 
none 
.294 
.117 
1.66 
US 
none 
none 
.274 
.093 
1.51 
Canada 
none 
none 
.272 
.090 
1.49 
This comparison is notable for the similarities of each 
individual country's regression modelling outcome. No 
statistically significant independent variable is found for 
all three country models. In each case the "F" values of the 
models fail to indicate significant relationships between 
percentage changes of market share with cif cost at at least 
the 5% level of significance. 
The failure of any cif cost related coefficient to be 
significant in these regression equations implies that cif 
costs of Australian coals relative to those from Canada and 
the US is not important in establishing year to year changes 
in market share. This result suggests the possibility that 
over the full twenty six years of this study the price 
elasticity of demand for Australian hard coals has been 
inelastic in the Japanese market. 
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The modelling results are not surprising considering the cif 
cost segmentation of the Japanese hard coking coal market, 
which were confirmed in the findings of the cost/quality 
cross-sectional modelling studies performed for individual 
years. 
Findings that Australian hard coking coal own and cross price 
elasticities of demand are zero or insignificant in Japanese 
markets are supported by Ball and Loncar^*^^. Their study of 
Japanese coking coal markets was based on quarterly import 
value and volume data for all imported coals from the first 
cjuarter of 1978 to the third cjuarter of 1989. Ball and Loncar 
concluded that own and cross price elasticities of demand for 
coking coal are not significantly different from zero at the 
10% level of significance. 
6.8) Conclusions Regarding Pacific Market Structure 
Based on the research and analysis described here it is 
difficult to endorse the preliminary findings of the Industry 
Commission that "— distorted purchasing arrangements do not 
exist or are insufficient to justify use of export controls", 
as far as Australia's coking coal exports to Japan are 
concerned. Also it is difficult to agree with Utah's 
statement that: "Australian coal export prices in general. 
6.22) Ball, K. and T. Loncar "European and Japanese Demand 
for Australian Coal: A Systems approach to Import 
Demand" Proceedings of the Conference of Economists 
University of NSW, Sydney (1990) 24-27 September. 
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and Utah's in particular, have at times been compared 
unfavorably with other producers' prices by uninformed 
commentators. Such comparisons either ignore the facts or 
fail to comprehend the significance of major quality 
differences between coals from different sources. Utah's 
coking coal prices have been in line with market values." 
A respecification of the data used in the Kittredge and 
Sivertson study, to include only hard coking coals, supports 
the research hypothesis of price discrimination in Pacific 
markets in 1977, which cannot be explained by coal cjuality 
difference. Similar evidence was present for all other years 
examined. Market response models for Australia, the US and 
Canada, also show no statistically significant relationships 
between changes in market share with changes in cif cost. 
Considerable debate regarding the solution to Australia's 
current account problems has revolved around abstract 
concepts of competitive markets and free trade. To relate 
such market and trade theories to the practical realities for 
Queensland's coal exports it is first necessary to provide 
the definition of a competitive market. 
6.8.1) Competitive Market Definition 
A purely competitive market^'^^ is defined as one in which 
the following conditions apply: 
6.23) Tisdell, C.A. "Microeconomics of Markets" 
John Wiley & Sons (1986). p.42. 
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1) No individual buyer or seller is able to influence the 
conditions of exchange. 
2) No traders are in collusion. 
3) In the opinion of the buyers the commodities are 
homogeneous. 
4) Buyers and sellers act in their anticipated (individual) 
self interest, free of any artificial restriction. 
5) Commodities are perfectly mobile, which occurs if 
transport costs are negligible. 
The attitudes of the Industry Commission and many firms in 
Australia's export coal industry reflect a view that 
competitive markets exist in the Pacific coking coal trade. 
In reality, few if any of the above conditions necessary for 
ideal competitive markets apply in the Japanese coking coal 
market. 
The first two conditions relating to market power are 
violated by the coordinated purchasing strategies of the JSI. 
The contractual and purchasing strategies used to initiate 
new mining developments in Queensland and Western Canada were 
designed to stimulate destructive competition between firms 
state governments and the two nations, as has been described 
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by Anderson6.24 
The discussion of the technical aspects of coke making and 
the function of coke in blast furnace smelting has shown 
that coking coal is not a homogeneous commodity as far as 
coke and ironmaking is concerned. The presence of Japanese 
trading companies as minor ecjuity participants in many 
Australian and Canadian joint venture operations provides 
access to detailed cost information regarding mine production 
operations. No such detailed information regarding the values 
of individual coals in the coke blend is available to 
Australian or Canadian negotiators. This situation creates 
the condition of knowledge asymmetry which, in a bilateral 
bargaining process, is likely to distort the outcome in 
favour of those parties having superior economic and 
technical information. The JSI's purchasing strategy, which 
is designed to prevent excessive reliance on purchases from 
any one country, is a trade restriction in conflict with the 
cost minimization interests of individual firms, and prevents 
the formation of competitive markets on the demand side. 
Finally, it will be shown in the following chapter that 
transportation costs are a substantial proportion (more than 
50% of the cash costs) of the cost of supplying coking coal 
to Japanese buyers. 
6.24) Anderson, D.L."An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies : The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987) pp.54-57. 
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6.9) Summary of Findings 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings of this 
chapter suggest that the persistent differentials in cif cost 
between Australian, US and Canadian hard coking coals cannot 
be adecjuately explained by the quality differences which, 
from a priori technical expectations, should impact each 
coal's value in coke blending and ironmaking. Quality 
differences do not seem to be significant relative to price 
discrimination, which is the major contributing factor. 
Regression modelling of changes of market share with cif 
acquisition costs fails to demonstrate significant 
relationships, further indicating market failure in the 
Japanese hard coking coal trade. 
Ample evidence has been provided to show that the Japanese 
hard coking market has failed to behave as an ideal 
competitive market over the years. Other major buyers in the 
region, such as South Korea and Taiwan, also tend to base 
their prices on precedents set in the annual price 
negotiations with the JSI. In this fashion the market 
distortions caused by the purchasing policies of the largest 
buyer of the region flow into the entire Pacific coking coal 
trade. 
The existence of large subsidy payments made to German and 
other EEC coal producers (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) prevents the 
formation of competitive coking coal markets in Europe, the 
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other major importing centre for internationally traded coal 
Attention is now devoted to examining the structure of 
production and delivery costs from the world's three 
principal suppliers, and the response of the major input 
factor cost elements in Australia and America to the 
commodity price cycle which the international coking coal 
trade has experienced from 1973 to 1989. 
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Chapter 1_ 
COKING COAL PRICE / COST RELATIONSHIPS 
The recent history of international coking coal prices into 
the world's major importing centre was investigated in 
Chapter 6, and the large perturbation in real prices 
described. Chapter 2 examined interrelationships between 
price movements of various energy commodities in the 
investigation of the US Atlantic seaboard market's response 
to the oil price shocks of the nineteen seventies. This 
chapter will compare the micro-economic response of US 
Appalachian and Queensland coal exporters to the substantial 
changes in real price experienced over the last decade in 
international coking coal markets. In particular, the 
response of the labour factor of production for these two 
major suppliers of traded coking coal will be examined. 
7.1) Cost Structures of Major Hard Coking Coal Suppliers 
In order to effectively analyse the response within coal 
exporting industries of Queensland and Appalachia to the 
price perturbation which occurred from 1973 to 1988, one must 
understand the typical components of the cost of coal 
delivery from each source. Such cost comparisons have been 
recently developed by the International Energy Agency (lEA) 
and are presented in Figure 7.1. 
FIGURE 7 . 1 
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This break down of cif costs to Japan highlights those 
elements of coal production and delivery cost which lead to 
the situation of a bilateral monopoly described by Smith^ '-'-. 
The data were developed by lEA Coal Research London, and 
converted to 1987 constant US dollars using the compound 
change in US GDP deflator as the conversion factor ('89$x.93 
= '87$) to permit comparison with the cif cost and price data 
given elsewhere in the dissertation. The lEA is selected as 
the most authoritative source, from many such international 
cost comparison studies which are available. 
Because the transportation cost plays such a large part in 
the total delivery costs for coal, locational rents 
potentially exist for suppliers having the advantage of close 
proximity of the coal resource relative to the end user. Land 
and ocean transportation costs for US suppliers to Japan 
amount to about $3 3 per tonne. Queensland's transportation 
costs are only about $21 per tonne, and as will be discussed 
in Chapter 8, this cost includes a hidden royalty charge of 
about $5. Such large differences in the transportation 
component of delivered costs would normally create an 
opportunity for bargaining over the division of these 
locational rents between the producers and the consumers of 
the traded commodity. The magnitude of these costs, and the 
substantial differences which exist depending on the country 
7.1) Smith, B. "Bilateral Monopoly and Export Price 
Bargaining in the Resource Goods Trade" Economic Record, 
Vol 53 (1977) p.30-50. 
270 
source, is a inevitable impediment to the formation of an 
ideally competitive market in the Pacific coking coal trade. 
7.1.1) Mining Cost Comparisons 
The cash costs of mine production also differ significantly 
between the two major supply sources. It should be 
appreciated that these estimates are made for a 
representative supplier of each country in 1989, and such 
costs vary considerably. The range of estimated open cut mine 
production cash costs for Queensland is $11 to $24 per tonne. 
For central Appalachian underground mines, the range of cash 
costs of production is estimated at $26 to $38 per tonne. 
7.1.2) Typical Open Cut Mining Costs 
Differences exist in the division of production cash costs 
between labour and materials such as explosives, fuel, 
maintenance materials etc., depending on the method of mining 
employed. For a typical large open cut operation of 3 to 5 
million tonnes/year in central Queensland, the mine cash 
operating costs consist of about 35% labour, 25% explosives 
and electricity, and 40% other plant consumables (diesel 
fuel, maintenance and other operating supplies). These cost 
proportions vary with stripping ratio (the ratio between 
overburden removed to raw coal mined), and washery yield 
(sales tonnage as a percentage of raw coal mined), and differ 
for each individual mining operation. However, most central 
Queensland open cut operations are fortunate in having low 
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stripping ratios (typically 8:1), and high washery yields (60 
to 80%), due to the particularly favourable configurations 
and quality of their coal reserves. Such mines are capital 
intensive, having very large earth moving machines which 
yield high labour productivities when the equipment capacity 
is fully utilized. The marginal costs of production up to the 
capacity of this equipment is low, making the operators of 
mines of this type aggressive volume orientated producers 
should the capital facilities in place be less than fully 
utilized. A similar situation exists for the open cut 
operations of western Canada, for the first generation of 
such mines situated in Alberta and southern British Columbia 
which were opened in the early seventies. 
7.1.3) Typical Underground Mining Costs 
Cost structures of underground mines tend to be different. 
Labour is the dominant factor cost at 50 to 60% of the cash 
costs of production. Appalachian underground mines are also 
generally smaller (typically having annual capacity 200,000 
tonnes), and less energy intensive, requiring much less 
materials handling prior to the raw coal extraction stage 
than do open cut mines. Economies of scale and the degree of 
capital intensity per tonne of annual capacity are also much 
less. Provided labour inputs are flexible, underground mines 
often provide swing productive capacity as prices fluctuate. 
In recent years, US coking coal producers have filled this 
role to an increasing extent in Pacific Rim hard coking coal 
markets. The much larger open cut producers of Queensland 
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and western Canada have become base load suppliers to the 
region since the late sixties. 
The evolution of production technology from labour intensive 
underground mines to large scale capital intensive open cut 
mines occurring in Australia and Canada in the late sixties 
and throughout the seventies, has changed the supply side 
economics of the Pacific coking coal trade. Low marginal 
costs of production for such mines, when operating at less 
than full capacity, has greatly increased the market power of 
buyers during periods of industry over-capacity. 
These developments may lead to greater price fluctuations in 
international coking coal markets with future changes in the 
supply/demand balance. In a period of over-supply, which has 
been the situation since the late seventies, prices have 
declined significantly in real terms as low marginal cost 
producers from Australia and Canada have struggled to 
maintain sales volume. Should a period of under-supply 
eventuate, risk averse mine investors may be increasingly 
reluctant to commit to new capital intensive open cut 
facilities. Additional supplies would most likely come from 
higher marginal cost underground mines of Appalachia, which 
are more readily able to increase short run production 
capacity with minimal additional investment. 
An authoritative estimate of production costs has been 
discussed, and it is useful to compare such estimates with 
the cif cost statistics available for JSI imports to gauge 
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some measure of mining industry returns on employed capital. 
7.2) Comparison of lEA Cost Estimates with JSI Costs 
Average cif costs of Australian hard coking coal deliveries 
in 1987 were $49.18 in 1987$US per tonne. For the average 
Queensland hard coal producer, the margin over cash operating 
cost was $6.48 in 1987 using the lEA estimate. The lEA's 
estimate of the capital charge necessary to yield a 15% 
discounted cash flow rate of return after tax (DCFROR) on 
employed capital is $10.60 for such a mine, indicating that 
profitable operations existed on average, but a lower than 
satisfactory rate of return was the norm for the typical 
Queensland open cut mine operator in 1987. 
The typical underground mine producing hard coking coals in 
central Appalachian states of Virginia and West Virginia 
obtained a margin over cash costs of $2.96 for sales to the 
JSI in 1987. This margin is greater than the $1.86 estimated 
by the lEA as the capital recovery charge necessary to yield 
a 15% DCFROR on capital for a typical underground mine in the 
region in 1987. 
The decision to invest or expand to provide additional 
capacity is a function of the price expectations of 
investors, and the division of surplus between the principal 
factors of production of capital and labour amongst other 
things. The above comparison of relative returns to capital 
for Queensland and Appalachian coking coal exporters to the 
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JSI in 1987, indicates an erosion of Queensland's investment 
competitiveness due to the real decline in coking coal price. 
Examination of mine price behaviour and the relative response 
of labour factor costs in Queensland and central Appalachia 
may explain Australia's current low returns to capital 
relative to the US coking coal industry. 
7.3) Coking Coal Price Movements at the Mine Site 
As far as the mine investor is concerned, a critical issue in 
the decision process is the expected price at the mine site. 
For Pacific markets this can be estimated by subtracting from 
future expected port fob prices paid by the customer, the 
components of transportation and port handling costs involved 
in shipping the coal from the mine site to the holds of the 
bulk carrier for ocean shipment. Alternatively, in the case 
of sales to Europe which tend to be contracted on a cif 
rather than fob basis, the mine operator must estimate both 
land and ocean transportation costs in order to forecast 
future mine prices. 
The behaviour of US energy prices resulting from the oil 
shocks of the seventies was discussed in Chapter 2 and is 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. When plotted in constant 1987 $US 
terms, mine site prices received by Queensland's hard coking 
coal producers experienced a similar price fluctuation to 
those of north American exporters as is shown in Figure 7.2. 
As a bulky low value add material, transportation costs 
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greatly influence the competitiveness of any particular coal 
mining operation. A bilateral monopoly situation inevitably 
exists in the coal industry due both to the transportation 
element of delivered cost, and the variable nature of the 
resource deposit itself. Such monopoly characteristics 
distinguish this industry from many others in terms of 
competitive market characteristics. 
It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that although definite pricing 
tiers are apparent, the patterns of price movement are 
similar in all three major producing countries. The reasons 
for the rapid increase in real price in the US in 1974, which 
were discussed in Chapter 2, were related to demand driven 
price increases in thermal coal markets as well as additional 
demands for coking coal which happened to coincide with the 
first oil shock. US coking coal contracts with the JSI were 
generally of one year's duration, with price and cjuantity 
renegotiation being based on market conditions at the time of 
expiration of the annual contract. 
The situation was rather different for the Queensland and 
Canadian exporters at the time. Contracts with the JSI were 
long term with specific provisions relating price increases 
to local cost movements. However the election of a Labour 
Federal Government in 1972 saw a more aggressive government 
stance taken on the prices obtained by Australian coking coal 
producers. As was indicated in Chapter 6, the Joint Coal 
Board had been expressing concerns at that time regarding the 
cif differential in Japan between Australian and US hard 
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coking coals. In 1973 Mr Rex Connor, the responsible minister 
of the new Whitlam government, introduced legislation giving 
the Federal Government^*^ the power of approval over the 
prices of Australian exports. When US coking coal prices 
increased so significantly in 1974, this legislation assured 
that Australia's prices would follow suit irrespective of 
contract escalation provisions, as indeed occurred in 1975. 
Prices at the mine site peaked in real 1987 $US teirms in 1976 
for both Queensland and British Columbian exporters. US 
prices had peaked one year earlier. Mine prices have since 
declined steadily for Queensland and British Columbian 
producers. Except for the years of 1979 and 1980, which saw 
increased levels of pig iron production in Europe and Japan 
resulting in increased demands for Appalachian coking coals, 
prices have also fallen steadily in the US. In 1987 $US 
terms, average mine prices are essentially restored to the 
levels of 1973. 
The amplitude of this price cycle was a factor of some 2.3 
times the 1973 price expressed in 1987 constant dollars for 
US producers and 2.3 6 times for Queensland's exporters. Such 
a large real price increase coming early in the life of large 
open cut mines opened in the late sixties and early seventies 
in Queensland, resulted in windfall profit gains for Utah^*-^. 
7.2) A discussion of the events surrounding the introduction 
of this legislation can be found in McDonnell, J. "The 
Queensland Coal Industry and Trade with Japan" Master 
of Social Science Thesis, University of Queensland 
(1982) p.14-23. 
7.3) A discussion of the profit performance of the Utah 
operations following the price increases of 1974 can be 
found in Galligan, B. "Utah and Queensland Coal" 
University of Queensland Press (1989) Chapter 6. p.146. 
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The promise of high mine profitability associated with the 
peak prices of 1976 then caused a number of new production 
facilities to be developed in British Columbia, Queensland, 
and the Eastern USSR to serve anticipated continued growth in 
demand by the JSI. The Canadian and Russian projects were 
also aided by various forms of Japanese participation such as 
long term contracts, low cost loans, direct ecjuity etc., and 
were encouraged by JSI and MITI industry demand forecasts 
which proved to be well in excess of subsecjuent recjuirements. 
The new capacity also consisted of large capital intensive 
open cut mines which commenced production in the early 
eighties. Such capacity additions, together with the changes 
and improvements in steel making technology described in 
Chapter 5 reducing coking coal input recjuirements per unit of 
output of finished steel product, resulted in a coking coal 
over-supply situation and the inevitable real reductions in 
price from all three hard coking coal exporters due to supply 
competition. Such price reductions can be expected to 
continue until world wide supply/demand ecjuilibrium is re-
established. 
Until the 1991 price settlements with the JSI, there had been 
hopes that this situation may have occurred. Increased levels 
of pig iron production in 1989 and 1990 resulted in modest 
price increases for hard coking coals in those years. The 
acceptance of a one dollar $US price reduction by Utah/BHP 
and the older Canadian producers of Alberta and south east 
British Columbia in the 1991 price settlement again raised 
doubts that real price levels of 1973 can be sustained in 
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international markets. It may well be that mine prices will 
be forced below the real levels which existed prior to the 
impact of the US mine health and safety legislation on 
Appalachian production costs in 1969. Irrespective of the 
final ecjuilibrium price for coking coal at the mine, the 
similarity between the patterns of the price cycle for the 
major suppliers invites comparisons of competitive response 
within in each country's coking coal industry. 
7.4) Competitive Response to Coking Coal Price Cycle 
Porter advances a hypothesis^-^ that international 
competitiveness depends on an industry's ability to innovate 
and upgrade in its home country. He discounts the trade 
theories of Heckscher and Ohlin^*^, which are based on 
concepts of the match between factor endowment and intensity 
of use in each country, in favour of the forces of 
competition within each industry as the prime explicable 
factors. According to Porter, those industries having strong 
domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and 
demanding local customers will also prosper in international 
trade. The key to international competitiveness is a strongly 
competitive domestic market environment. 
7.4) Porter, M. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" 
Harvard Business Review March-April (1990) p.73-93 
7.5) Ohlin, B. "Interregional and International Trade" 
Harvard University Press (1933) Cambridge Mass. 
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Porter's theory was the outcome of cross sectional studies of 
the trade competitiveness of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States in 1971, 1978 and 1985. The 
industry patterns of trade examined were mainly those of 
elaborately transformed manufactures, which are quite 
different from coking coal. Porter, in fact, deliberately 
excluded industries that were highly dependent on natural 
resources from his study, on the basis that factor endowment 
trade theories are satisfactory for such industries. Never-
the-less the Porter model deserves consideration when 
examining the competitive response of the Queensland and 
Appalachian coking coal industry over essentially the same 
time frame, in an environment of falling real export prices. 
7.4.1) Statistical Data Limitations 
One of the more difficult aspects of comparing international 
competitive response to such a major perturbation in coal 
prices is the problem of finding industry statistics 
appropriate for such comparisons. For the international 
coking coal trade, the problem is simplified somewhat by the 
fact that the US, Australia, and Canada are the dominant 
suppliers of this resource commodity, and are OECD member 
nations keeping satisfactory statistical records. However it 
is difficult to find published statistics specific to the 
coking coal mining industry in each of the three countries. 
Most statistics which are readily available relate to overall 
bituminous coal mining activities in each country. To 
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overcome this problem it is necessary to select district, 
state, or provincial data in which mining activities are 
primarily related to coking coal production and sales. 
7.4.2) US Industry Statistics 
For the US coal industry, the most comprehensive published 
statistics were collected by the US Bureau of Mines (USBM) 
until 1976, and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
thereafter. US coal industry data is published annually for 
producing states and districts which are defined by 
individual counties within states^•^. USBM District #7, which 
covers five counties in western Virginia, five counties in 
eastern West Virginia, and portions of two other Virginian 
and West Virginian counties, represents a geographic area in 
which some 80% of production is coking coal. Approximately 
half this production is used domestically and the remainder 
is exported. USBM District #8 which is adjacent to District 
#7, incorporates the portions of Virginia and West Virginia 
not included in District #7. It also includes large areas of 
Kentucky, North Carolina and Tennessee, and is the largest of 
the US bituminous coal producing districts. District #8 
actually produces a greater volume of coking coal than does 
District #7. However, as more than half the production is 
sold as thermal coal the use of District #8 statistics is not 
appropriate when comparing the US coking coal industry 
performance to that of Queensland. USBM District #7 data is 
7.6) Detailed descriptions of each of the USBM coal producing 
geographic districts are published in the EIA's annual 
"Coal Production" 
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available annually for most years between 1960 and 1988, and 
will be used as source for statistics representative of the 
US coking coal industry. 
7.4.3) Queensland Industry Statistics 
Difficulties also exist in obtaining data specific to the 
coking coal industry from published Australian statistics. 
Again, it is necessary to select regional areas where the 
predominant activity is coking coal production. For 
Queensland, additional statistical data problems exist 
because of differing regional boundary definitions between 
the various Federal and State Government agencies collecting 
coal industry data, and the fact that until 1982 some data 
was collected on a calendar year basis whilst other data was 
based on Australian financial year reporting. The Queensland 
Department of Resource Industries collects coal mining 
production and mine price data by mining warden's districts. 
This was reported by calendar year until 1982. The Queensland 
Coal Board (QCB) collects financial year production, 
employment and productivity data by geographic mining 
districts whose boundaries bear little relation to warden's 
district boundaries. Finally, the Federal Government's 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) collects data on coal 
industry employment, wages, expenditures and prices on a 
financial year basis, for geographic statistical districts 
which do not correspond to either of the locational 
definitions used by two Queensland state government agencies. 
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The mine price data used for Queensland in Figure 7.2 (series 
"C") was obtained by combining the statistics for the 
Clermont and Mount Morgan warden's districts. The Clermont 
and Mount Morgan warden's districts encompass most of the 
mines included in the Blackwater, Kianga-Moura, and Mackay 
districts of the QCB, from which over 95% of the state's 
coking coal exports are sourced. Employment, productivity, 
and fob price statistics for the Queensland coking coal 
industry is generated from the data for these three QCB 
districts. Finally, the ABS statistical divisions of Fitzroy 
and Mackay encompass most of the mining establishments of the 
Blackwater and Mackay districts of the QCB, so employment 
earnings statistics are obtained from these ABS divisions. 
7.4.4) Canadian Industry Statistics 
Canadian data sources are more limited. Statistics Canada 
provides production, fob price, employment, and salary data 
for the coal industry for each province. The Canadian 
minerals yearbook provides production and mine price data by 
province. All of Canada's coking coal export production comes 
from British Columbia and Alberta. Alberta also produces 
large volumes of sub-bituminous thermal coals for local 
consumption which cannot be identified separately. Provincial 
statistics of British Columbia are then the only data source 
which could be used in making comparisons of industry 
response to international prices. However British Columbian 
data is strongly influenced by the two north eastern coal 
projects which are not internationally competitive, thus 
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preventing inclusion of a meaningful Canadian industry 
analysis in this study. 
7.5) US Coking Coal Labour Productivity 
A cost driven price increase was caused in all underground 
mining operations in the US in 1970 due to the passage of 
more stringent health and safety regulations. Average labour 
productivity in District #7 commenced a decline in 1965 which 
was to continue until 1978. Productivity in sales tonnes 
produced per manshift fell by 57% over this period. Not all 
of these losses are necessarily associated with the 
operational impact of the new mining regulations. 
In a competitive market driven industry, one would expect an 
interrelationship to exist between price movements and 
production costs. During periods in which production costs 
are increasing due to regulatory change or due to the 
depletion of low cost resources, prices would be expected to 
be demand driven and rise to maintain supply. In periods of 
over-supply, or when a new lower cost technology or lower 
cost resources are supplying the market, one would expect 
prices and labour costs to fall as the market is driven by 
the economics of supply side competitors in which only 
existing producers who are able to lower costs can survive. 
From the discussion of the behaviour of US energy markets of 
Chapter 2 and the OECD steel production history of Chapter 3, 
it appears that markets serviced by Appalachian coal 
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producers were generally demand driven until 1974. After 
1975, increasing shipments of low cost thermal coals from 
open cut mines in Wyoming and other western states, together 
with reduced domestic demands for coking coals and the price 
competition from lower cost open cut Australian producers in 
the remaining growth export markets of North Asia, resulted 
in Appalachian coal prices becoming supply driven. Mine site 
prices for both coking and thermal coals have been declining 
since 1974, as was first indicated in Figure 2.3 of Chapter 2 
and is confirmed in Figure 7.2. 
The trends of annual average real mine price and unit labour 
costs of production can also be developed for West Virginia 
from the statistical data of USBM minerals yearbooks, the 
EIA's annual coal production reports, and the US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics data of bituminous coal mine workers 
average hourly earnings (SIC 121). Figure 7.3 presents the 
trends of average annual mine price and unit labour 
production costs in West Virginia for the years from 1961 to 
1986. These trends suggest the possibility that a 
statistically significant relationship between annual real 
mine price and unit labour cost changes might exist for West 
Virginia's coal mining industry. 
7.5.1) Regression Modelling of US Labour Response 
The possibility of a relationship between price and labour 
factor costs can be tested by the regression analysis of an 
equation of the form: 
FIGURE 7 . 3 
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PCH = fn (LCH) 
where: PCH the dependent variable, is the percentage change 
in real average mine price from one year to the next. 
LCH the independent variable, is the percentage annual 
change in real average unit labour cost of production 
from one year to the next. 
Dl is a slope dummy variable introduced as a result of 
Chow testing which suggests a slope structural change 
in the relationship at the first oil shock (1973/74). 
Dl is one from 1974 to 1988. 
The duration of data spans the two oil price shocks of the 
seventies, and it was necessary to test the stability of the 
regression relationship following the 1973 to 1974 price 
increase, and again following the 1978 to 1979 price 
increase. Chow testing suggests that a structural change in 
the slope relationship between PCH and LCH occurred at the 
time of the first oil shock. No structural change is 
suggested by the Chow test for the second oil shock. 
The results of the time series analysis are then as follows: 
PCH = 1.394 + 1.816 LCH - 1.140 DlxLCH 
(4.621) (-2.283) 
F/2 25) =13.78*, R-square =.5244, R-square =.4864, D-W =1.737 
values in parenthesis are "t" values 
* indicates significant at at least the 5% level of 
significance. 
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The impact of the structural change at the time of the first 
oil shock was to reduce the value of the coefficient of the 
independent variable LCH for the following years. However a 
statistically meaningful relationship between unit labour 
costs and changes of mine price in West Virginia's bituminous 
coal mining industry is shown to exist by virtue of the 
significance of the "F" value for the equation, and "t" 
values for the coefficients of the independent variable 
before and after the structural change. 
The result is indicative of flexible labour response in a 
competitive industry likely to sustain success in 
international trade if Porter's paradigm relating the 
intensity of domestic competition to international trade 
success is applicable. 
7.5.2) Role of West Virginia as a Coking Coal Producer 
West Virginia^'^ is the largest producer of coking coal in 
the US and a major source of US exports to Asian markets. In 
1988, the state produced 130.9 million tonnes of bituminous 
coal from 782 mining operations, of which 99.6 million tonnes 
was from 510 underground mines, making it the second largest 
producing state of the Appalachian coal province. In 1960, a 
total of 107.9 million tonnes was produced from 1708 coal 
7.7) Details of coal production and labour productivity for 
the state of West Virginia can be found in the US Bureau 
of Mines "Minerals Yearbooks" from 1960 to 1975, and in 
the US Energy Information Agency "Coal Production" from 
1976 to 1988. 
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mines within the state, of which 99.1 million tonnes was 
underground production from 1479 mining operations. Labour 
productivity, measured in sales tonnes per man hour (T/mhr.), 
was 1.38 T/mhr. in 1960. Productivity then increased until 
1967, when it reached 1.83 T/mhr. Following the Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1969 and the pricing windfall of the first 
oil shock, labour productivity fell steadily in West Virginia 
to .93 T/mhr. in 1977. A long and bitter miner's strike in 
1978, together with relentless pricing pressure due to lower 
cost supply competition from highly productive open cut mines 
from Western states, has since resulted in an impressive 
recovery of labour productivities in West Virginia which 
reached 2.43 T/mhr. in 1988. This improvement is indicative 
of the flexibility of labour in the Appalachian coal mining 
industry, whose markets have been demonstrated by Soyster 
et.al.''° to be efficient and competitive. 
7.6) Queensland's Coking Coal Labour Productivity 
Queensland's coking coal producers have experienced a similar 
price cycle to that of Appalachia, and the overall trends of 
mine price and average labour cost per tonne are shown in 
Figure 7.4, for the two producing districts which have 
provided the bulk of the state's exports. 
7.8) A detailed comparison between actual market behaviour 
and that predicted by a cost-minimizing model has 
demonstrated competitive market behaviour - Soyster A., 
Gordon R., Enscore E., and Y. We "An Evaluation of the 
US Coal Market" Energy Economics January (1985) pp.3-8. 
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Data presented in Figure 7.4 were developed for this study 
from labour productivity and mine production statistics 
published for the Blackwater and Mackay districts of the 
Queensland Coal Board. Employee numbers and wages were 
obtained annually from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
"Census of Mining Establishments" (ABS 8401.3), and average 
mine prices for the Clermont and Mount Morgan warden's 
districts were used from minerals valuation data contained in 
Queensland Department of Mines annual reports. Yearly 
monetary statistics reported in Australian currency were 
first converted to a US currency equivalent, using the 
average annual exchange rate, and then converted to 1987 
constant dollars using cumulative compound annual changes in 
the US GNP deflator as the conversion factor. These data are 
expressed in real US rather than Australian dollar terms, 
because export coking coal sales are generally conducted in 
US currency and factor cost response in that same currency is 
required to provide indications of change in international 
competitiveness of this industry. 
7.6.1) Regression Modelling of Queensland Labour Productivity 
At first sight, a comparison of the trends of Figure 7.3 with 
those of Figure 7.4 would indicate that West Virginia's 
average labour costs of production have been more responsive 
to price changes than has been the case for the Queensland 
coal industry. This observation can be tested by comparing a 
regression model relating real change in annual mine price in 
'87US dollars to real changes in average unit labour costs 
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for Queensland, with that already derived for West Virginia. 
The strength of the modelling relationship for Queensland's 
industry can be gauged from the results of regression 
analysis of an equation of the form: 
PCH = fn (LCH) 
where: PCH the dependent variable, is the change in real 
average mine price from one year to the next, divided 
by the price in the first year. 
LCH the independent variable, is the annual change in 
real average unit labour cost of production from year 
to year divided by the unit cost in the first year. 
Unlike the situation for West Virginia, Chow testing of this 
regression model does not suggest structural change at either 
of the oil shocks of the seventies. The results of the 
analysis are as follows: 
PCH = 2.57 + .4 62 LCH 
(2.001) 
^(1 18) =4.00, R-square =.1820, R-square =.1365, D-W =.952 
The result differs from that for the West Virginian industry 
which did exhibit structural change at the first oil shock, 
and yielded a regression relationship which was significant 
at the 5% level of significance. "F" and "t" values for this 
model of the Queensland industry are not significant at the 
5% level of significance. 
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7.7) Cause of Dissimilar Labour Factor Cost Response 
Possibly the less robust labour factor cost change response 
to price change for Queensland is due to economic and 
technical differences between large scale open cut mining and 
much smaller scale underground mining which is the norm for 
Appalachian coking coal producers. Resolution of this 
question requires examination of the parameters used to 
determine unit labour costs of production. 
Trends of labour productivity of USBM District #7 are 
compared with those of the combined QCB districts of 
Blackwater, Mackay, and Kianga-Moura in Figure 7.5. Due to 
the very favourable configuration of the Bowen Basin coking 
coal resources, Queensland enjoys a significant comparative 
advantage in mining which is reflected in the higher labour 
productivities of Figure 7.5 (Series "C"), and the much lower 
mining costs illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
In 1969, the average productivity of the three Queensland 
coking coal districts was 3.17 T/mhr. which was a level twice 
the average productivity of USBM District #7 (Series "B"). By 
1974, Queensland's comparative labour productivity advantage 
had widened to 3.15 times that of District #7, despite 
actually falling to 2.87 T/mhr. However by 1988, US 
productivities were significantly higher than in 1969, and 
the gap has narrowed to the extent that Queensland's average 
productivity of 3.63 is only 1.59 times that of District #7. 
FIGURE 7 . 5 
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This indicates a loss of competitiveness for sales into 
markets where Queensland's comparative advantage (due to 
resource configuration) is offset by transportation cost 
differences. 
7.7.1) Mine Scale and Technology Comparisons 
Differences exist between the predominant mining technologies 
used in Queensland and Appalachia. In 1976, the year of 
highest mine price for Queensland's exporters, nearly 24 
million tonnes of coal was produced of which 17.8 million 
tonnes was exported. That year open cut production was nearly 
21 million tonnes. Most export production was coking coal 
from six mines situated in central Queensland. The typical 
operation was a large scale open cut facility having an 
annual capacity of some three million tonnes. 
In 1974, the peak pricing year (in constant 1987 dollar 
terms) for coal sold in West Virginia, a total of 92.9 
million tonnes was produced of which 72.7 million tonnes came 
from 584 underground mines, and 20.2 million tonnes from 307 
open cut mines. The typical producer for the state in that 
year was an underground operation producing some 125,000 
tonnes. 
7.7.2) West Virginia's Productivity and Wage Rate Trends 
By 1977, average productivity of saleable coal per labour 
hour had fallen to a low of .93 tonnes/hour from the 1.22 
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tonnes/hour average productivity for West Virginia in 1974. 
Production in 1977 was 86.6 million tonnes of which 66.7 
million came from 756 underground operations, and the 
remainder from 340 open cut mines. By 1977, the typical 
producer for this US state was an underground mine producing 
only 88,200 tonnes per year. Since 1977 steady improvements 
in labour productivity have occurred, and by 1988 (the most 
recent data available) average labour productivity reached 
2.43 tonnes/hour. Total production for the state was 131 
million tonnes made up of 99.6 million tonnes from 510 
underground mines, and 31.4 million tonnes from 272 open cut 
mines. In 1988 the typical operator was an underground mine 
producing about 200,000 tonnes annually. 
In addition to the productivity improvements, bituminous coal 
mine workers in West Virginia have experienced a 3.9% decline 
in average hourly earnings in real 1987 dollar terms between 
1984 and 1988. The combined effects of labour productivity 
improvements and declining real wages have resulted in the 
labour unit costs of production falling from $16.87 per tonne 
in 1978 (1987$) to $6.66 in 1988. This 60% real cost 
reduction exceeds the 41% reduction in real average mine 
price which has been experienced in West Virginia over the 
same time frame. 
These statistics support the regression modelling results 
which have demonstrated linkages between price and labour 
cost changes for West Virginia's coal producers. Clearly 
labour factor costs are responsive to the commodity price 
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fluctuation in Appalachia's coal industry. 
7.7.3) Queensland's Productivity and Wage Rate Trends 
For the Fitzroy and Mackay statistical districts of central 
Queensland, average mine prices peaked in real terms at 
$55.14 per tonne (in 1987 US dollars) in the 1975/76 
financial year. In that year, labour costs of production were 
$6.11 per tonne. By 1988/89 (the latest data available) 
average mine prices have fallen to $24.06 per tonne, a 
reduction of 56%. Labour costs of production have also 
fallen to an average of $4.51 per tonne, a reduction of 26% 
or about half the real reduction in price. How were the 
reductions in labour costs of production achieved in 
Queensland? 
Labour productivity, measured in saleable tonnes of coal per 
seven hour manshift worked, amounted to 19.33 tonnes per 
manshift in 1975/76 for the combined Queensland Coal Board 
(QCB) districts of Blackwater, Kianga-Moura, and Mackay. 
Labour productivity for these districts measured in tonnes 
per manhour (T/mhr.) was 2.7 6 compared with average labour 
productivities of only 1.07 T/mhr. for West Virginia. This 
significant productivity advantage was primarily resource 
related, with Queensland's mines typically enjoying thick 
seam (2.5 metres+) open cut mining having low overburden 
ratios. In contrast, the typical West Virginian mine 
operation is underground, extracting coal from seams of 60 to 
150 centimetres. By 1988/89, labour productivities in the 
298 
combined QCB districts had risen to 28.02 tonnes per manshift 
or 4.00 T/mhr., an improvement of some 4 5%. Wages and 
salaries for Queensland's coal miners had also increased from 
an annual average of $A13,071 in 1975/76, to $A49,071 in 
1988/89. Expressed in 1987 US dollar terms, this is a 22% 
increase from $0831,053 to $US37,870. Had Australia's 
currency not experienced a depreciation of 3 5% against the US 
dollar over the same period, wages for Queensland's coal 
miners would have increased by 89% in real 1987 US dollar 
terms, which would have more than offset the 4 5% improvement 
achieved in labour productivity. Instead of the 26% reduction 
of labour costs of production from '87$US6.11 to '87$US4.51 
per tonne, Queensland's labour costs of production would have 
blown out to '87$US7.50 per tonne in 1988/89 without the 
currency depreciation. 
The trend of wages and salaries commanded by coal miners in 
Queensland is shown in Figure 7.6, expressed in constant 
1988/89 Australian dollar terms. As Figure 7.6 shows, coal 
miner's earnings are high in real terms relative to the 
average for all adult male Queensland workers, and this 
advantage is widening despite the decline in international 
coal prices in real terms since 1976. In the 1977/78 
financial year, average wages and salaries for bituminous 
coal miner workers in the districts of Fitzroy and Mackay was 
$A 17,785 per annum. In 1988/89 average wages and salaries 
for mine workers in these districts was $A 49,071 per annum, 
an increase of 12% in real 88/89 Australian dollar terms over 
the 77/78 level. Over that same period, average mine prices 
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for coal sold primarily into export markets has gone from $A 
26.81 per tonne in 77/78, to $A 33.49 per tonne in 88/89. 
When restated in inflation adjusted 88/89 Australian dollar 
terms, this represents a 49% price decrease. It would seem 
that the coal miners of central Queensland have become a 
privileged class of workers in the state, and indeed in the 
nation as a whole. 
7.7.4) Comparative Performance West Virginia/Queensland 
It has already been shown that over a similar time frame to 
Queensland, West Virginia's mine operators experienced a 41% 
real price decline, but were able to lower labour unit costs 
of production by 60% in real local currency terms. 
Unlike Australia, the US coal export industry does not 
benefit from currency movements as costs are incurred in US 
dollars, and world coking coal sales and most thermal coal 
contracts are written in US dollar terms. West Virginia's 
producers have reduced average labour costs of production 
from $16.41 per tonne in 1977 to a $6.66 in 1988 (in 1987 
constant dollars). Average labour costs of production in West 
Virginia remain higher than the $4.51 per tonne for 
Queensland in 1988/89. However, whereas currency 
depreciation was the major cause of cost reduction for 
Queensland, West Virginia achieved the result from 
productivity gains and real reductions in salaries paid to 
mine production workers. Indeed, had the Australian dollar 
retained it's 1975/76 exchange rate against the US dollar. 
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West Virginia's estimated average unit labour cost of 
production in 1988 ($6.66) would actually be lower than that 
of Queensland's ($7.50 in 1988/89). 
Despite the fact that labour costs are less significant in 
open cut operations (about 40% of cash operating costs in 
open cut mines versus 60% in underground mines), these 
comparisons highlight an inflexible labour factor cost 
situation in Queensland's coal industry vis-a-vis the US. Can 
differing extraction technologies and scale of individual 
mining operations explain such different industry behaviour, 
or does Porter's theory of industry competition apply? 
Possible reasons for such disparate industry behaviour will 
now be examined. 
7.8) Reasons for Queensland and US Industry Differences 
Mills and Schumann^•^ have investigated the ability of firms 
to deal with fluctuating demand, and their research is 
relevant to the question under consideration. Their economic 
model states that in an environment of fluctuating demand, 
room exists in competitive markets for some firms with higher 
than industry average minimum average costs, provided such 
firms use technologies which afford greater flexibility to 
respond to demand fluctuations. Such firms require low fixed 
and a high variable components in their average minimum 
7.9) Mills D., and L. Schumann "Industry Structure with 
Fluctuating Demand" American Economic Review (1985) 
Volume 75 pp.758-767. 
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production cost to survive. Since the early seventies, 
Japanese coking coal markets have exhibited many of the 
characteristics of fluctuating demand for US coals (see 
Figure 6.4). In the same time frame US steel industry demands 
for coking coal have fallen by half, resulting in the sale of 
many vertically integrated mine operations. In the 
fluctuating demand environment since 1979 (see Figures 1.2 
and 1.3), it might be expected that labour intensive smaller 
scale operations of Appalachia would exhibit a high degree of 
labour factor cost flexibility, and that US coking coal 
industry behaviour would follow patterns suggested by the 
Mills and Schumann model. 
Industry statistics for USBM District #7 lend support to the 
theory. In 1979, 23.915 million tonnes of coal was produced 
from 276 mines employing 18,610 workers in the district. By 
1988, production had fallen to 14.249 million tonnes from 131 
mines employing 4,077 workers. Average mine output has 
increased somewhat from 86,649 tonnes per year to 108,771 
tonnes over the period. Labour, which is largest component of 
production cost (50 to 60% in underground mines), has behaved 
as a variable cost with the result that average labour 
productivity has increased 265% in Appalachia's major coking 
coal producing district from 1979 to 1988. 
Capital also participated in the adjustment process in 
America's coking coal industry. The reduction in the number 
of operating mines is one indicator. Another indicator is the 
reduction of vertical integration of coking coal mines with 
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steel mill operators. In 1979, 30.2% of District #7 coal 
sales was of the "captive market" category. By 1988, captive 
market sales had fallen to 13.2% of total sales in the 
district. 
The response has been quite different in Queensland's coking 
coal industry. Since 1976, the year of the peak coal price 
(in real $US terms) and 1989, the state's coking coal export 
volumes increased 213%. Mine prices have declined 55% between 
1976 and 1988 (in real 1987 $US terms), or 49% in real 
1988/89 Australian dollar terms. The number coking coal 
producing mines in the state has increased from six in 1976, 
having average sales of 2.73 million tonnes, to thirteen in 
1989 having average sales of 2.98 million tonnes. Employment 
has also risen steadily in coking coal producing districts. 
This has been accompanied by rising real average weekly 
earnings both in absolute terms, and relative to other 
workers in the state (see Figure 7.6), despite the steadily 
falling coking coal prices. Labour productivity gains have 
been modest (see Figure 7.5), so the pain of adjustment to 
declining prices has been borne primarily by capital in 
Queensland's coking coal industry. This outcome is in 
contrast to that of the US, where both the capital and labour 
factors of production have participated in structural 
adjustment. 
Porter's theories relating to the degree of competition in 
the home industry offer some rationale for such variations in 
industry response to the coking coal commodity price cycle in 
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the two leading export nations. 
7.8.1) Porter's "Competitive Advantage of Nations" 
According to Porter^--^^ it is the attributes of the domestic 
market which create the international trade competitiveness 
of an industry. Those four broad attributes are: 
1) Factor Conditions. The nation's position in factors of 
production, such as skilled labour, production technology, 
transportation infrastructure, and for a minerals industry 
the natural resource configuration and location. 
2) Demand Conditions. The nature of home-market demand for 
the industry's product or service. 
3) Related and Supporting Industries. The presence or 
otherwise of internationally competitive supplier 
industries. 
4) Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. The conditions 
in the nation governing how companies are created, 
organized, and managed, as well as the nature and 
intensity of domestic rivalry. 
Porter's model can to some extent explain the quite different 
7.10) This discussion draws on Porter M., "The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations" Harvard Business Review 
March-April (1990) pp.77-86. 
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responses of the coking coal industries of Queensland and 
Appalachia, and the significant improvement of the US 
industry's international competitiveness during a period of 
sustained price decline. 
Consider the differences in Porter's four attributes for the 
two industries. Queensland has every advantage in resource 
related factor conditions. In the Bowen Basin, shallow thick 
seams of high quality hard coking coal exist about half the 
distance from ports of export than is the case for USBM 
District #7. However for other than resource related factor 
conditions important for production competitiveness, US 
producers are advantaged. The US labour force is flexible 
without compulsory unionism, and operates with a well 
developed system of enterprise bargaining. For many 
Appalachian coal producers, competition exists in 
transportation between barge and rail operators, and also 
between alternative rail services. 
Although declining significantly in recent years, substantial 
domestic demands (approximately 40 million tonnes per year) 
still exist for US coking coals. Virtually no such demand 
exists for Queensland's coking coal. 
Only limited competition exists among Queensland's industry 
suppliers. For instance only two firms supply explosives, 
which are a major cost in open cut mining. Contract mine 
service industries cannot operate effectively because of 
union restrictions. Public tenders for the provision of 
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equipment and services to mines frequently receive only one 
serious bid proposal. 
Finally, the industry structure in Queensland is dominated by 
large capital intensive open cut mines operated by only five 
separate companies, with one firm in 1989/90 (Utah/BHP) 
controlling 72% of the state's coking coal sales. No one US 
coking coal company controls more than 10% of coking coal 
sales amongst some fifty producers in central Appalachia. 
For industries with such disparate attributes it is not 
surprising that responses would be different, and that the 
Appalachian industry would exhibit superior ability to adjust 
to adversity, as is predicted by Porter's model. 
Queensland's labour rigidity bodes ill for the future of this 
key industry and is an issue which must be addressed together 
with other endemic problems of structural rigidity requiring 
micro-economic reform in the Australian economy. 
7.9) Summary of Findings 
The microeconomic response of the coking coal industries 
of Queensland and the US has been quite different 
throughout the commodity price cycle occurring in 
international markets since 1960. 
Such disparate behaviour can be explained from differences 
in the predominant extraction technologies employed and the 
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quite different competitive environments of the industry in 
each country. 
A new wave of capacity expansions in Queensland's coking coal 
industry is now proceeding as a result of the adoption of 
thick seam long wall mining technology by some existing 
export mines and the commissioning of the Gordonstone and 
North Goonyella projects. The policy implications of such 
expansions in light of the JSI purchasing strategies, 
declining world coke usage, and the demonstrated inability of 
Australian coal exporters to effectively combat diversion of 
producer surplus in Pacific markets will now be examined. 
These issues, together with policy implications resulting 
from Queensland's factor cost rigidities and the qualitative 
and quantitative impacts of technology changes and 
environmental concerns on ironmaking and the demands for 
coking coals, are all relevant in assessing business 
strategies appropriate for the state's most important export 
industry. 
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Chapter 8^  
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
IMPLICATIONS FOR QUEENSLAND 
High growth rates in regional coking coal demands of North 
Asian steel producers have made this industry attractive for 
Queensland's coal producers since the early sixties. The era 
of sustained demand growth from these steel manufacturers is 
now most likely ended. In this chapter, the strategic 
implications of a research conclusion that the future 
regional demand environment for Queensland's hard coking 
coals is at best stagnant and more likely declining, will be 
assessed. The consecjuences for three major industry interest 
groups consisting of mining companies, state and federal 
governments, and mining unions will be discussed. 
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8.1) Research Conclusions 
A research hypothesis examined in this dissertation has been 
the proposition that the trade and business strategies 
practised by Japanese and other regional consumers of 
Australia's steel input commodities has resulted in a 
distortion of the distribution of surplus between producers 
and consumers in Pacific markets. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence of the significant role that 
Japanese industrial policy has played in the evolution of the 
Queensland coking coal industry. The cross sectional and time 
series studies of the Japanese coking coal market of Chapter 
6 provide comprehensive statistical support for the research 
hypothesis. These studies also provide the necessary 
statistical evidence to support findings of D'Cruz^ *-'- and 
Anderson^•^, who have addressed the issue of oligopsony 
distortion in Japanese coking coal markets. 
A further research objective was to investigate a 
proposition that a continued failure to develop 
countervailing strategic responses by Australian coking coal 
interests may result in destructive competition amongst 
existing producers leading to the collapse in the price 
8.1) D'Cruz, J.R. "Quasi Integration in Raw Material Markets: 
The Overseas Procurement of Coking Coal by the Japanese 
Steel Industry" Ph.D. Thesis Harvard University (1979) 
8.2) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987). 
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premium which Queensland's coking coals have historically 
commanded over thermal coals. The final study objective was 
to propose industry strategies designed to correct market 
distortions and attenuate the product lifecycle for coke and 
coking coal. To address these final issues relating to 
options for countervailing strategic response, findings 
which have been identified so far should be reviewed: 
8.2) Research Findings of Strategic Management Significance 
1) Australia, the US and Canada are the dominant suppliers of 
internationally traded coking coal. All three countries are 
industrially advanced and share the commitment to a market 
driven laissez-faire economic system. This makes the 
prediction of supply side response to technology driven 
demand changes more reliable than would be the case were the 
principal world suppliers less developed nations not 
possessing market driven economies. 
2) The transition of the US coking coal industry in the early 
eighties from a vertically integrated supplier for domestic 
steel producers to an export oriented industry, is of 
significance when assessing the degree of competition in the 
coking coal trade. 
3) Findings regarding links between the price movements of 
oil and thermal and coking coals in US markets are important, 
as is the erosion of coking coal price relative to thermal 
coal price, given the role of the US as Australia's principal 
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competitor in European and Latin American coking coal 
markets. All traded energy commodities have experienced a 
substantial price fluctuation in real terms over the past 
quarter century. 
4) A transition has occurred in the patterns of supply growth 
of crude steel from the developed economies of the OECD to 
developing countries. This, together with increased business 
cycle related volatility of integrated plant production of 
crude steel within OECD countries in recent years, has made 
coking coal demand forecasting less predictable. 
5) A long record of trade restriction and protection of the 
steel industries of the US and EEC, and the effects of 
supportive industrial policy in Japan, has influenced 
the changing geographic patterns of steel manufacture. 
6) Aging of integrated plant ironmaking facilities within 
OECD countries will likely result in the replacement of the 
blast furnace as the principal iron ore reduction process 
technology. This transition, together with environmental 
pressures and other short term technology developments 
already adopted, will change future demand growth prospects 
and quality requirements for bituminous coals in ironmaking. 
6) Modelling studies of Japanese coking coal markets confirm 
assertions made by other investigators of a long history of 
market distortion, due to oligopsony practices of Japanese 
steel industry interests. The finding that a defacto import 
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(juota for Australian coking coals exists in Japan is of 
strategic significance. 
7) The supply side micro-economic response of the Queensland 
and US coking coal industries to the recent price fluctuation 
has been markedly different. Dissimilar coal extraction 
technologies and differences in flexibility and the degree of 
competition amongst the factors of production account for 
such disparate behaviour. Labour flexibility is markedly 
greater in US coking coal production operations than is the 
case in Australia. 
These research findings provide a necessary background for 
the discussion of strategy options available to Queensland's 
industry participants. 
8.3) Historic Industry Business Strategies 
Any analysis of historic steel and coking coal industry 
business strategies recjuires the definition of some 
generalized conceptual models which can be used for 
discussion purposes. Porter's^*^ well known definitions of 
three generic strategies which have proven successful in 
business will be used in the discussion of company strategy. 
According to Porter, a successful company can: 
8.3) This discussion of generic competitive business strategy 
development draws on Porter, M.E. "Competitive 
Advantage:Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance" 
The Free Press-London (1985) Chapter 1. 
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1) supply its product or service more cost effectively than 
competitors (overall cost leadership); 
2) add value to its product or service through 
differentiation (product differentiation); or 
3) narrow its focus to a special product/market segment that 
it can monopolize (focus). 
The rapid growth of Queensland's coking coal exports from 
the late sixties to the late seventies was the result of the 
successful application by Utah International of a generic 
competitive strategy based on cost leadership. This strategy 
was possible because of a monopoly of highly favourable Bowen 
Basin coking coal resources enabling the use of large scale 
strip mining technologies. The proximity of these mines to 
deep water ports permitted the use of large scale ocean 
shipping. A rapidly growing regional demand for coking coal, 
and a desire of the JSI to diversify supply sources away from 
Appalachian suppliers (as discussed in Chapter 6), ensured 
success of this strategy. 
The fifties and sixties had been decades of sustained high 
growth in crude steel output by the JSI, recjuiring increasing 
imports of coking coal and iron ore. During that era, the 
steel manufacturing strategy of the JSI was also one of cost 
leadership. Such a strategy was possible because of the 
productive and low cost labour force, and Japanese industrial 
policy favouring rapid growth of steel related industrial 
activity (as discussed in Chapter 4). The JSI's use of 
coordinated purchasing strategies to counter the lack of both 
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hard and low cost domestic coking coals was discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 6. Anderson's^*'* study of this subject 
provides a tjualitative assessment of the impact of such 
strategies on the Australian and Canadian coal export 
industries. Failure of the JSI's resource accjuisition 
strategy might well have prevented the continuation of high 
levels of pig iron and steel production by the JSI in the 
seventies and eighties due to the competitive pressures of 
lower labour cost steelmakers such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Brazil. However, a coordinated resource acquisition 
strategy based on the use of oligopsony power was successful 
in overcoming a lack of domestic mineral resources. 
South Korea and Taiwan have also gone through a period of 
rapid crude steel production expansion based on the cost 
leadership model, adopting purchasing strategies similar to 
the JSI. This has provided relief from declining regional 
hard coking coal demands from the JSI in recent years, and 
has shielded Queensland's coking coal exporters from the need 
to reevaluate production strategies appropriate for an 
industry now in its mature lifecycle phase°'^. 
8.4) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987). 
8.5) The concepts of product lifecycle, and the business 
strategies appropriate at the various lifecycle stages 
are explained in many texts devoted to strategic 
management theory such as Rowe A., Mason R., Dickel K., 
and N. Snyder "Strategic Management : A Methological 
Approach" Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.(1989) Chapters 4 
and 5. 
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The steel industry is considered a "stalemated industry". 
Technology expertise is widely distributed, competitive 
advantage opportunities are limited particularly for large 
scale integrated producers, and competition relies mainly on 
prices. As was discussed in Chapter 5, fully integrated steel 
manufacturers which are the main users of coke in ironmaking, 
have also suffered loss of market share to electric furnace 
steelmakers in all three major OECD markets since the early 
seventies. Future demands for coke by such producers are also 
likely to decline due to the adoption of PCI technology in 
the blast furnace. Most OECD coke oven facilities are aged, 
and increasingly stringent environmental restrictions may 
hinder refurbishing. In the longer term, it seems inevitable 
that a form of direct smelting will displace the blast 
furnace as the favoured technology for ironmaking. How 
Queensland's coking coal producers are responding to such 
deleterious changes in their industry environment will now be 
examined. Comparisons between such behaviour and responses 
considered appropriate according to strategic management 
theory and the literature, can then be made. 
8.4) Strategies for Low Growth or Declining Industries 
Management literature dealing with the problems of transition 
from growth to flat or declining product demand environments 
exists. The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in the late 
seventies, developed a set of contingent business 
strategy recommendations based on four generic types of 
competitive systems: volume, stalemated, fragmented and 
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specialized. The BCG typology^'^ of competitive systems 
utilizes a two dimensional matrix having the potential number 
of sources for differentiating the product on one axis and 
the magnitude of competitive advantage on the other. For 
energy commodity markets such as coal, ways of 
differentiating the product are considered few, so 
Queensland's coking coal industry would be expected to fall 
into either the volume or stalemated business categories 
using the BCG approach. During the sixties and early 
seventies, the appropriate category was clearly that of 
volume, due mainly to buoyant demand growth from the JSI. The 
coal price rises of 1974 and 1975 then occurred which were 
not recognized as transitory by new entrants to the industry. 
The history of sustained demand growth together with the 
price rise caused a rash of new mine developments in 
Australia and Canada adding some 22 million tonnes of annual 
capacity, as described in Chapters 1 and 6. 
Such actions resulted in the coking coal industry becoming 
stalemated due to overcapacity in the mid seventies, in 
Australia, Canada, and the US, as did the major steel 
industries within the OECD. The characteristics^*^ of such 
stalemated industries are the following: 
8.6) Again the BCG "Advantage Matrix" for establishing 
strategic segments and the appropriate business strategy 
is explained in Rowe, A., Mason R., Dickel K., and N. 
Snyder "Strategic Management : A Methological Approach" 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.(1989) Chapter 6. 
8.7) This discussion draws on Calori, R., and J. Ardisson 
"Differentiation Strategies in Stalemate Industries" 
Strategic Management Journal Vol 9 (1988) p.255-269. 
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1) Decreasing production scale economies after an optimal 
size is reached, in a market which is large enough for 
many optimal sized competitors to coexist. 
2) Technology which is available for all competitors in 
the industry. 
3) Cumulated experience does not create barriers to entry. 
4) There are few sources of product differentiation. 
5) Exit barriers which are high due to the capital intensity 
of production facilities in an industry experiencing 
persistent over-supply (applicable in Queensland and 
Canada). 
The situation for Queensland's exporters and the Canadian 
producers of southern British Columbia and Alberta was 
worsened as a result of commitments to thirteen large capital 
intensive open cut mines commencing production in the late 
seventies and early eighties. 
The majority of these mines were initiated as a consecjuence 
of unrealistic long term pricing projections by the various 
project sponsors. The companies involved failed to recognize 
the difference which exists between short and long term price 
elasticities of supply and demand for all energy commodities 
including coking coal. The marginal operating cost 
characteristics for most of these projects is low, but high 
utilization rates are essential to amortize large initial 
capital investments. Rapid growth in Queensland's export 
volumes was inevitable once construction commitments were 
made during the heady pricing years of 197 6 to 1981, for the 
eight new or greatly expanded open cut mines commissioned in 
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the state since 1979/80. A similar pattern of investment 
decisions resulted in five coking coal mines adding a total 
annual capacity of 10.6 million tonnes being commissioned in 
1983 and 1984 in Canada. 
Within this same time frame, America's coking coal producers 
maintained overall export volume levels while losing market 
share to Australia and Canada in the Japanese market. 
However, as was described in Chapter 7, Appalachian producers 
have substantially reduced unit labour costs. The US industry 
has demonstrated greater flexibility than Queensland's 
producers in responding to a declining real $US price 
environment by substantial gains in labour productivity. 
Certainly, the supply side configuration of the American 
market is closer to that of a competitive market environment 
than is the case in Australia or Canada, and greater 
production flexibility exists. According to Porter's^*^ 
findings, this greater degree of competition amongst the 
factors of production affords the US coking coal industry a 
sustainable competitive advantage in international markets. 
The steel industries of the US, EEC and Japan, continue to 
exhibit the characteristics of "stalemate" as do their major 
coking coal suppliers. The strategy recommended by BCG for a 
stalemated industry is first and foremost to anticipate its 
formation and withdraw. 
8.8) Porter, M.E. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" 
Harvard Business Review March/April (1990) p.73-93. 
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Failing early withdrawal, BCG recommends one of the following 
strategic options: 
1) Accjuisition of competitors (creating a monopoly 
or oligopoly situation). 
2) Organization of a cartel (or at least an oligopoly which 
can be dominated by the strategizing firm). 
3) Relocation to where factors of production costs are lower. 
4) Focus on a local market where transportation costs create 
a barrier to entry and dominate that market. 
5) Transformation of the system by technical innovation. 
Legal constraints often prevent the adoption of strategies 
designed to increase the market power of producers within a 
country. Those same constraints may not be present in 
international markets, although US trade practice legislation 
forbids American companies from participation in cartels, 
price fixing or other activities designed to impede the 
fonnation of competitive markets in international trade. In 
contrast, the orchestration of an oligopsony for coking coal 
accjuisition by MITI indicates that Japanese trade practice 
regulations do not prevent actions designed to increase 
bargaining power of buyers in resource commodity markets. 
Each of the business strategy options proposed by BCG can now 
be considered in turn and compared with the actions of the 
various major mine operators in the state. Coking coal 
exports from Queensland's larger mining investors for 1989/90 
are broken down by the various controlling entities and 
ecjuity proportions in Table 8.1 
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TABLE 8.1 
QUEENSLAND COKING COAL EXPORTS 1989/90 
Mining Controlled Volume Percentage of Sales 
Management Group (million tonnes) Control / Etjuity 
Utah/BHP (Utah) 28.903 71.6 36.6 
Mount Isa Mines (MIM) 3.637 9.0 8.2 
Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) 3.431 8.5 7.9 
Shell 3.259 8.1 3.7 
QCT Resources (QCT) 1.062 2.6 19.4 
Mitsubishi 0 0 7.5 
Mitsui 0 0 2.9 
Source: Queensland Coal Board Annual Report 1989/90. 
Table 8.1 highlights the degree of concentration of 
Queensland's coking coal industry, and the dominant control 
position which Utah enjoys. Utah is also by far the world's 
largest coking coal supplier to the seaborne trade, having 
control of some 17.5% of that market in 1990. The second 
largest single supplier is Pittston of the US, with only 3.5% 
of the market. This relative competitive position ratio of 5 
is well in excess of the 1.5 ratio considered high in BCG's 
matrix topology. As the Utah controlled mines tend also to be 
among the world's lowest marginal cost producers, it might be 
expected that Utah would have orchestrated a cartel to combat 
the JSI oligopsony to further its own interests, according to 
the first of BCG's strategy recommendations. This has not 
occurred, perhaps because of US based operations and history 
of the company. Utah has instead followed volume driven 
pricing policies based on its low short run marginal costs, 
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which are apparently designed to increase market share. 
The BCG suggested options of "relocation to where factor of 
production costs are lower" and of "transformation by 
technical innovation", appear to be strategies being followed 
by other industry participants. MIM and Shell are employing 
newly developed thick seam underground longwall mining 
technologies at existing open cut mines to achieve operating 
cost reductions. ARCO and White Industries are developing new 
underground mines using this same advanced coal extraction 
technology. 
The BCG suggested option of "focussing on a local export 
market where transportation costs create a barrier to entry" 
has been preempted by the JSI's coordinated purchasing 
strategy, and its creation of a western Canadian export 
industry in the same time frame as that of Queensland (as 
described in Chapter 6). Australia's fully integrated steel 
industry is a BHP monopoly, with manufacturing plants in the 
southern states. An option of local focus might be available 
to Utah, but domestic volume demands for coking coal are 
insignificant compared to export markets, so local focus is 
not a serious strategic alternative for Queensland's industry 
participants. 
It seems obvious that the state's producers are following 
different strategies. This is to be expected given that the 
attractiveness of the each suggested option varies with the 
competitive position of each firm (as shown in Table 8.1), 
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and the ranking of individually controlled mines on the short 
run marginal cost curve. 
Utah continues to adopt a cost leadership role, despite the 
transition of the coking coal industry from that of volume to 
stalemate. The 1991 price settlement between Utah and the JSI 
is typical of the outcome to be expected from following such 
a strategy. That settlement, which resulted in a price 
reduction of one dollar($US) per tonne for virtually all 
Australia's hard coking coal brands, has been described in 
critical terms in a leading trade journal^*^. 
Competition for market share is normally price driven in a 
volume industry situation, so the 1991 settlement is 
consistent with the strategy of overall cost leadership and 
compatible with Porter's model. However, this study has 
demonstrated that lower prices by Queensland's suppliers will 
not increase sales to the JSI at the expense of the US or 
Canadian market share. The market demand model for Japanese 
hard coking coal imports from Australia derived in Chapter 6, 
fails to show that own price or cross price elasticity terms 
are statistically significant in the regression ecjuation. In 
short, the Japanese price elasticity of demand for Queensland 
hard coking coals is inelastic at present levels of market 
share. 
However, Utah's 1991 settlement is consistent with past 
8.9) International Coal Report #264 "JSM:BHP Settle, Rivals 
Unsettled" Financial Times Press London 14th January 
(1991) p.6-8. 
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behaviour and the company's public statements regarding the 
competitive nature of international coking coal markets. It 
is the reaffirmation of a business philosophy which has 
resulted in the creation of the two tier coking coal market 
in the Pacific. The JSI reward for prompt acceptance of a 6% 
price reduction in real dollar US terms included an increase 
of ash limits for Utah's Goonyella coal from 8% to 8.4%, and 
the carry over of contract tonnage not delivered by the 
company, at the previous year's higher price. 
Utah is not alone in pursuing volume driven business 
strategies which result in undervaluation of Queensland's 
premium hard coking coals in North Asian markets. In return 
for volume offtake commitments by the JSI, MIM and ARCO have 
also accepted low fob prices for their high cjuality hard 
coking coal brands, which have values in ironmaking 
comparable to prime cjuality US mid volatile coals. 
An illustration of the continued pattern of producer surplus 
diversion resulting from adopting such strategies is given in 
Table 8.2. In this table cif costs and cjuality 
characteristics of the US brands of Pittston MV and Blue 
Creek, are compared with the Oaky Creek, Goonyella and 
Gordonstone coking coal brands from central Queensland, based 
on 1990 contract information. 
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TABLE 8.2 
COAL QUALITY / COST COMPARISONS 
Brand cif F.C. FSI Fldy Ash Sulphur T.M. 
cost % # # % % % 
Pittston MV 65.85 66.8 8 3000 6.5 .83 5.5 
Blue Creek 65.23 73.0 8.5 6000 8 .8 6 
Oaky Creek 58.40 68.2 8.5 7000 8.5 .8 8 
Goonyella 58.40 72.0 8 1750 8.5 .55 8 
Gordonstone 58.40 62.9 8 10000 6 .67 9 
Source: Coal Manual (1990) Tex Publishing Co. Tokyo. 
The JSI's use of oligopsony power was cjuite evident in the 
case of the Gordonstone price negotiation. That brand's 
superior fluidity and ash properties relative to other high 
cjuality Queensland coals is unicjue, and clearly comparable 
with the US brands. A price outcome some $US 7 per tonne 
higher than was negotiated could have been expected in a 
competitive market. The reward to Gordonstone for accepting 
the low fob price, was a JSI commitment to purchase 1.5 
million tonnes annually at market prices, on an annual 
rollover basis. This outcome replicates the Moura settlement 
which first established the two tiered nature of Japanese 
coking coal markets in the early sixties, as was described in 
Chapter 6. Again, in return for an offtake commitment, a 
foreign controlled project developer has accepted prices for 
Australian sourced coal, resulting in cif costs to the JSI 
which are substantially lower than would be the case were 
such a coal sourced from the US. To fully compliment this 
sense of deja-vu the same Japanese participant (Mitsui), 
which took an ecjuity position in the original Moura 
325 
development, has recently taken a similar minority interest 
of 15% in the Gordonstone project. 
Similar negotiating strategies were used by the JSI in 
negotiations for Oaky Creek coking coal. In return for an 
annual offtake commitment of 500,000 tonnes, the Oaky Creek 
price was set ecjuivalent to that of Goonyella cjuality coal, 
rather than commanding the fob premium justified by the price 
of US coals having comparable properties to Oaky Creek. 
This study has demonstrated that both of the world's major 
import markets for coking coal suffer significant distortions 
from the ideal competitive configuration. North Asian markets 
are dominated by the JSI oligopsony, and other Pacific Rim 
purchasers base their prices on the JSI settlement benchmark. 
EEC markets suffer distortion from the large subsidies paid 
to domestic producers. Also, Australian producers face 
significantly higher ocean transportation costs for shipments 
to Europe relative to US coal suppliers. 
Are present industry strategies appropriate in these 
circumstances, or can alternative policies or strategies be 
employed to correct situations of significant market 
distortion in the two largest importing regions? To answer 
such cjuestions, possible approaches to correcting the 
distortions in Pacific markets must first be considered. 
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8.5) Anti-Monopsonv/Oligopsonv Strategies^* ^ ^ 
The preferred remedy to this problem from the Australian 
perspective, would be for the JSI to voluntarily abandon its 
coordinated purchasing strategy, and purchase coking coal 
solely on the basis of its cif cost and quality related value 
in ironmaking. Such an outcome is unlikely to occur due to 
the proven success record of the present system as far as the 
JSI is concerned, and legitimate objectives regarding a need 
for supply diversity. However, remedial options do exist 
which could be adopted or used more effectively to alter 
existing divisions of surplus between Queensland's coking 
coal exporters and the JSI consumers, and improve the 
functioning of Pacific markets. These options are: 
1) Cartel Action by Australian Producers 
This strategy is suggested by BCG for a stalemated industry, 
and is the preferred option of coalmining unions, which have 
lobbied extensively for a government coal marketing board to 
handle all overseas sales. The cartel could either be 
government sponsored, or be a private cartel dominated by 
Utah the largest exporting company, as a countervailing 
strategy to match the JSI oligopsony. 
8.10) The following discussion draws on Anderson, D.L. "An 
Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal Procurement Policies: 
The Canadian and Australian Experience" Centre for 
Resource Studies - Queen's University Ontario (1987) 
Chapters 6 and 7, and Smith, B. "Bilateral Monopoly and 
Export Price Bargaining in the Resource Goods Trade" 
Economic Record, Vol 53 (1977) p.30-50. 
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2) Selective Export Duties. 
Such duties are already levied on some of Utah's operations 
and are considered discriminatory by that company. However in 
the present situation, export duties selectively applied to 
individual brands of coal which are being priced below their 
delivered worth to the ironmaker, would capture a portion of 
Queensland's producer surplus presently being lost due to 
market distortion. 
3) Export Control and Contract Approval Regulations. 
Such powers exist under the Customs Act 1901 and the Customs 
(Prohibited Exports) Regulations (Section 9), and have 
already been exercised to a limited extent. For the most part 
these controls have failed to protect the producer surplus of 
Queensland's mine operators. However in the case of a 
proposed sale of Curragh coking coal^ *•'••'• to the Steel 
Authority of India in 1984, the producer's contract 
price was deemed inadecjuate and export approval was withheld. 
Curragh then sought legal redress for commercial damages from 
the Commonwealth government, which was not successful. 
4) Excessive Rail Freight Charges. 
This system is already employed by the Queensland Treasury 
via the freight charges made by Queensland Railways for coal 
8.11) Transcripts of Proceedings Federal Court of Australia, 
"Curragh Coal Sales vs. Wilcox, Bowen and Walsh" 
Brisbane, (1984) 28th and 29th June. 
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haulage, which includes a profit or resource rent component 
that cannot be justified on the basis of the costs of 
providing the service. The scheme has been condemned by mine 
operators, and was found to be economically damaging in a 
study performed at the Monash Centre of Policy Studies. 
The econometric model developed by Freebairn^ * -^^ to support 
that finding, assumed elastic long term price elasticities of 
demand for Queensland coking coals in export markets. The 
regression modelling study of the Japanese hard coking coal 
market which was performed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, 
demonstrates that the price elasticity of demand for 
Queensland coals is inelastic. Such a finding overturns the 
assumed basis of the Monash analysis for the principal 
regional market for Queensland's coking coals. In this 
distorted market, the excess rail freight charge although a 
"second-best"^*-^-^ economic policy response, is an appropriate 
means to combat diversion of Queensland's producer surplus by 
an oligopsony. 
Apart from the direct sponsorship of a producer cartel, 
Australian government agencies have employed all of the above 
methods in their attempts to improve the producer surplus 
8.12) Freebairn, J.W. "Some Effects of Reducing Excess in 
Infrastructure Charges on the Export Coal Industry" 
Economic Record, 191, December 1989 p.345-356, and 
Table 1 p.349. 
8.13) Concepts of "Paratian" and "Kaldor-Hicks" criteria 
relating to economic efficiency and "first-best" and 
"second-best" economic policies are described in many 
economic texts such as Tisdell, C. "Microeconomics of 
Markets" (1986) John Wiley & Sons, Chapter 13. 
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associated with coking coal exports. This study shows that 
the effectiveness of each of these options has been limited. 
The application of export duties has not been sufficiently 
flexible, and its distorting effects are well documented^*^^. 
But despite such shortcomings, export duties have captured 
producer surplus which would otherwise have been competed 
away by Utah in the futile pursuit of additional sales into 
Pacific markets. 
The use of the rail transportation monopoly by the Queensland 
government has also been effective as an anti-oligopsony rent 
capturing strategy. But like the export duty imposition, 
excess rail freights have long been opposed by those mining 
companies most heavily penalized as being economically 
inefficient. Although such arguments are valid in ideally 
competitive markets, the findings of Chapters 4 and 6 clearly 
demonstrate that international steel markets are far from 
being ideally competitive. 
Export controls and the contract approval process seems to 
have been largely ineffectual except in the early stages of 
the regulatory regime. An emphasis on deregulation and 
laissez-faire market philosophies in Australian government 
circles has further emasculated this option as an effective 
anti-oligopsony policy option in recent years. 
The patchwork approach taken by the various Australian state 
8.14) BHP-Utah Coal "The Case for Repeal of the Coal 
Export Duty" company publication January (1991). 
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and federal government agencies having an involvement in this 
industry compares poorly with the coordinated strategies of 
MITI and the JSI in managing the division of surplus between 
producers and consumers in the Pacific coking coal trade. 
Table 8.1 indicates an ecjuity presence of Japanese trading 
companies in the Queensland coking coal industry. Before 
proceeding further, the role of those companies in 
Queensland's coking coal industry will be examined. 
8.6) Japanese Direct Ecjuity Investment Strategies 
Unlike industry practices in the US and EEC, where steel 
companies have integrated vertically into coking coal 
production operations, the JSI has generally avoided taking a 
direct equity position in coking coal mines. Those cases 
involving large proportions of direct ecjuity investment which 
have occurred, seem the result of special circumstances. 
Several such examples have taken place in Canada. The Balmer 
mine of Kaiser Steel of the US was key to the JSI's Canadian 
coking coal diversification policy of the late sixties. The 
project very nearly collapsed in its early years of 
operation. Failure was averted by Mitsubishi and the JSI 
converting emergency loans to a direct equity position of 
3 3.4%. To obtain financing support for some of the recent 
Canadian projects it was necessary for Japanese interests to 
take direct ecjuity positions in the Gregg River (40%) , 
Quintette (38%), and Bullmoose (10%) mines, as well as 
entering into cjuasi integration relationships by undertaking 
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long term supply contracts. 
Japanese direct etjuity in Queensland's coking coal mines has 
been at lower levels than for western Canadian projects, and 
such investments have been made only by trading companies. 
For Moura, the pioneering coking coal development in 
Queensland, Mitsui took 20% direct equity. Mitsubishi then 
obtained 15% ecjuity in the Utah developments which followed. 
Mitsui was later again directly involved with 10% equity in 
the Curragh project, and again most recently with the 
purchase of 15% ecjuity in Gordonstone. The influence of such 
interests, with the exception of Gordonstone which is not yet 
in production, shows in the ecjuity percentages of coking coal 
sales of Table 8.1. 
Is there any significance to this pattern of low level of 
trading company direct ecjuity investment in Queensland's 
coking coal industry, compared with the higher levels in 
Canada? An answer to this cjuestion requires interpretation 
of the strategic role of trading companies in Japan's 
resource accjuisition policies? 
In a competitive market environment, one would expect those 
mine projects seen to be outstanding low cost producers in a 
volume driven business, to attract direct equity investment 
by Japanese steel interests as a form of vertical 
integration. Instead, it has been US mining companies which 
have provided the bulk of venture capital for coking coal 
projects in Queensland. As their ecjuity interests are modest 
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in every case, Japanese trading companies are not unduly 
harmed in the event that returns on employed capital prove to 
be low in this industry. If the primary role of the trading 
company is not that of an investor, but rather to encourage 
development and provide intelligence regarding the cost 
structures of individual mines to the JSI in contract 
negotiations, such patterns of ecjuity investment are logical. 
Recent entry of Mitsui into the Gordonstone project fits the 
role described above cjuite well. 
One of the BCG strategies recommended for participants in 
stalemated industries is that of transforming the system by 
technical innovation. Adoption of thick seam longwall mining 
technology at German Creek, Oaky Creek, Gordonstone, and 
North Goonyella represent attempts to transform by technical 
innovation, and overcome the production cost advantages 
enjoyed by Utah. As no direct Japanese ecjuity exists in the 
German Creek or Oaky Creek projects, it seems possible that 
Mitsui's entry into Gordonstone is based on the desire to 
encourage increased production capacity, and the need for the 
JSI to have access to detailed cost information of this 
technology in future negotiations. An ecjuity investment of 
15% appears a small price to pay to achieve these strategic 
objectives. 
The role of the trading companies in world coal markets has 
been analysed by Szabo^ *-'-^  based on his experience of North 
8.15) Szabo, P.J. "The Role of Japanese Trading Companies in 
Setting World Coal Prices" Mining Engineering January 
(1985) p.31-33. 
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American coal markets. The patterns of behaviour exhibited by 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Queensland's coking coal industry 
support his prognosis. 
Access to timely and accurate marginal production cost data 
for use in contract negotiations appears an important element 
of the JSI's coordinated coking coal purchasing policy. It 
explains to a great extent the JSI's history of success over 
Australian and Canadian negotiators in contract bargaining so 
well demonstrated by the two tier pricing system in Pacific 
markets. Possession of detailed mine production cost 
information by a single Japanese negotiator, together with a 
detailed knowledge of the value of individual coal brands in 
the ironmaking process of each Japanese buyer which is not 
known by Australian or Canadian negotiators, creates a 
situation of bargaining under asymmetric information. 
Samuelson^*-^^ has developed theoretical models addressing the 
situation of two party bargaining under asymmetric 
information in a bilateral monopoly situation. Were a single 
seller appointed to represent Australian producers as a 
remedy to the single buyer approach of the JSI, the annual 
coking coal price negotiation would fit these bargaining 
conditions well. In such situations, an uninformed seller 
achieves the maximal attainable expected profit when a first 
and final offer is made which the buyer can accept or reject. 
This finding suggests a bargaining strategy which could be 
adopted were a single sales representative selected to 
8.16) Samuelson, W."Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information" 
Econometrica, Vol.52 No.4 (July 1984) p.995-1005. 
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represent Australia's coking coal producers in annual 
negotiations with the JSI. 
As Anderson has observed, the JSI's coking coal procurement 
policies have simultaneously achieved supply diversification 
and internationally competitive accjuisition cost objectives 
in apparent defiance of the predictions of economic 
theory^ •-^ .^ This outcome is at least partially due the 
refusal of Australian government policy analysts such as the 
Industry Commission^ * •'•^, and most industry participants to 
admit that distortions exist in Japanese markets. This 
problem now takes on even greater dimensions due to the 
technology changes in ironmaking discussed in Chapter 5, 
which will further segment metallurgical coal demands. 
It is beyond the ability of individual firms (perhaps with 
the exception of Utah) to combat the JSI oligopsony. 
However there are alternative strategies which could be 
followed to capture additional surplus for the industry 
within the Australian sphere of economic interest. 
8.7) Strategy Options for Queensland Industry Participants 
The magnitude of the premium that coking coals have commanded 
8.17) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987) p.185-186. 
8.18) Industry Commission Report "Mining and Minerals 
Processing in Australia", Australian Government 
Publishing Service Canberra, September 1990 - Volume 1 
:Report Page 8-5. 
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over other bituminous coals has varied over the years. Table 
8.3 shows the trends in fob price that Queensland's export 
coals have realized since 1977/78. 
TABLE 8.3 
COMPARISON OF EXPORT FOB PRICES FOR QUEENSLAND COALS 
(Annual average - current $A per Tonne) 
Year Hard Coking Other Coking Thermal Price Ratio 
Hard/Thermal 
4 4 . 4 7 2 1 . 5 8 1 . 9 5 
2 0 . 8 4 2 2 . 2 3 1 . 9 1 
2 9 . 2 4 2 3 . 7 9 1 . 8 6 
5 0 . 2 3 3 1 . 3 6 1 . 4 7 
5 3 . 5 6 4 4 . 0 9 1 . 1 7 
6 4 . 5 3 4 4 . 1 1 1 . 3 9 
5 3 . 0 2 4 3 . 3 3 1 . 3 6 
5 5 . 3 3 4 5 . 1 1 1 . 3 8 
5 1 . 9 1 4 7 . 8 8 1 . 3 9 
4 5 . 3 8 4 5 . 9 6 1 . 4 4 
4 4 . 2 0 4 0 . 1 7 1 . 3 7 
4 4 . 9 6 4 1 . 6 0 1 . 3 1 
5 3 . 3 2 4 7 . 8 9 1 . 3 1 
Sources: Queensland Coal Board, Joint Coal Board. 
It can be seen that fob realizations for hard coking coals 
have experienced erosion relative to thermal coals over the 
period. The category "other coking" consists of higher ash 
weakly coking byproducts of the coal washing operations of 
premium hard coking coal producers and is called semi-soft 
coking coal by the JSI. Such coals are most often produced to 
JSI specification, and generally sold on the basis of 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
42 
42 
44 
46, 
51, 
61, 
58. 
62. 
66. 
66. 
55. 
54. 
62. 
.04 
.43 
.17 
.13 
.59 
.21 
.75 
.47 
,70 
,30 
,09 
50 
60 
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marginal production cost to the JSI. The fob prices obtained 
for semi-soft coking coal are much lower than that of hard 
coking coal, and approach thermal coal price levels in the 
Japanese market. With increasing use of PCI energy inputs to 
the blast furnace recjuiring higher strength cokes, one would 
hope that the cjuality premium for hard coking coals would 
increase relative to other bituminous coals. This is unlikely 
to happen in Pacific markets due to the over-supply of low 
marginal cost hard coking coals from Queensland and western 
Canada. A forecast^*^^ of year 2 000 Japanese coking coal 
demands by the US EIA predicts a decline of 27% from the 
import levels of 1988. Lill^*^^ predicts a steady decline in 
the volume of seaborne traded hard coking coals, from a peak 
in 1989 to the end of the century. 
In such a supply/demand environment, destructive competition 
to maintain sales volume between low marginal cost producers 
having underutilized capacity will likely result in continued 
erosion in the hard coking coal's premium over thermal coal. 
Effective management of an increasing supply/demand imbalance 
recjuires adoption of a degree of coordination on the supply 
side of Pacific coking coal markets to match the JSI 
oligopsony thereby preventing a collapse of the premium which 
8.19) US Department of Energy - Energy Information 
Administration "Annual Prospects for World Coal Trade" 
(1990) 
8.20) Lill, G. "Seaborne Traded Coal for Steelmaking" 
Proceedings of Australian Institute of Energy 
Conference "Imperatives for Coals and Metallurgy" 
Newcastle 23rd May (1991). 
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hard coking coals have historically commanded over other 
bituminous coals. 
This future supply/demand scenario is a significant change 
from the past environment of buoyant demand growth in 
regional markets. Continuation of present laissez-faire 
management effectively vests the JSI with the same level of 
control in determining the future behaviour of price 
relativities between metallurgical and thermal coal markets 
in the Pacific, as has been the case in the past. The likely 
outcome, which would be welcomed by foreign consumers, will 
be a collapse of the pricing premium which hard coals have 
historically received over thermal coals. Such an outcome 
would have serious implications for Queensland's economy, and 
alternative strategies need to be considered. 
8.7.1) Product Differentiation Strategic Options 
Differentiation strategies in stalemated industries have been 
investigated by Calori and Ardisson^ * ^-'•. Their findings 
indicate that such strategies have succeeded in the cardboard 
and stainless steel markets of France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which are considered to be stalemated. Potential for 
the application of product differentiation as a strategy for 
Queensland's coking coal industry merits consideration. 
8.21) Calori, R. and J. Ardisson "Differentiation Strategies 
in Stalemate Industries" Strategic Management Journal 
Vol. 9 (1988) p.267. 
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One example of product differentiation as a strategy for the 
industry is the approach followed by Gordonstone's developers 
in producing the first low ash high fluidity hard coking coal 
in Queensland. In competitive markets, such a product should 
command either an increased price over other export coals, or 
alternatively, increase Australia's market share. 
Unfortunately this has not been confirmed by the pattern of 
pricing behaviour for quality attributes in the Japanese hard 
coking coal market. In fact, the Gordonstone contract price 
has failed to achieve a quality premium over Goonyella or 
Oaky Creek coking coal on an fob or cif basis (see Table 
8.2). Expectations expressed by the developers that 
Gordonstone sales to Japan will not impact existing sales by 
Australian producers, but will be at the expense of future 
mid-volatile coal sales from US producers, are not borne out 
by regression modelling of the Japanese market. The modelling 
studies of Chapter 6 suggest that from 1973 on, changes in 
market share have not been significantly related to coal 
quality or cif costs as far as Australian imports to Japan 
are concerned. Based on such past market behaviour, it seems 
likely that Gordonstone sales will displace sales of other 
Australian coking coal, at announced fob prices which fail to 
reflect the value of this premium coal in the coke blend for 
Japanese ironmakers. This outcome, and the 1991 price 
settlement in which Utah was rewarded by producing a lower 
quality product at Goonyella, are indicative of distortions 
which do occur in the Pacific coking coal trade. Such 
examples are not an isolated incidents, as was demonstrated 
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the quality/price modelling studies of Chapter 6. 
The JSI's oligopsony market power effectively eliminates the 
pricing premium by which competitive markets would reward 
quality related product improvements. This is a particularly 
damaging situation which reaffirms Australia's role as a low 
value add commodity producer to the region. Clearly, for 
Australian coking coal producers to be able to pursue product 
improvement as a differentiation strategy, future strategic 
response to likely changes in the supply/demand of coking 
coals for ironmaking must address demand side market failure. 
Strategies for establishing product differentiation other 
than by individual coking coal brand modification are also 
possible. Superior delivery reliability, superior technical 
assistance to coke battery operators, blending advice and the 
provision of preblended coal mixes are possible areas of 
product differentiation. Such strategies will be more 
effective in the emerging growth markets in less developed 
countries, where end users lack the experience and technical 
sophistication of OECD steelmakers. 
A coordinated approach between firms and state and federal 
government agencies will be required to make product 
improvement a viable differentiation strategy in Pacific 
markets. Anti-oligopsony remedies which are already available 
such as the excise tax, the export contract price approval 
process and Queensland's rail freight resource rent imposts 
are second-best economic policy options. However, given 
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recognition of the existence of market distortion, there is 
no reason that selective use of these remedies could not 
restore a more equitable division of producer and consumer 
surplus in the Japanese market to make product 
differentiation a viable strategic option. 
In the European market, distortion is due primarily to 
subsidy protection of uneconomic coking coal producers within 
the EEC (as shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Like the problem 
with European agricultural protection, solutions require 
direct governmental action by those countries providing the 
subsidies. There is little which Australia's industry 
participants can do other than through GATT and other 
international trade assemblies. 
Unlike the situation in the Japanese coking coal market, the 
findings of Ball and Loncar demonstrate that statistically 
significant cross price elasticities of demand exist between 
Australian and US coals^*^^. EEC markets then, are likely to 
respond to product differentiation strategies based on 
quality improvement and/or increased reliability of supply. 
US coking coal producers provide the bulk of traded coking 
coal to the EEC. To capture sales, Queensland's producers 
must become fully competitive in terms of product value with 
US Appalachian suppliers, which became primarily export 
oriented during the 1982/83 recession. 
8.22) Ball, K. and T. Loncar "European and Japanese Demand 
for Australian Coal: A Systems Approach to Import 
Demand" Proceedings of the Conference of Economists-
University of NSW, Sydney 24-27 September (1990). 
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It is in this EEC market that the findings of Freebairn's^*^^ 
study are germane, and the recommendation to adopt rail 
freight charges based on the cost of service, an appropriate 
policy for sales to countries which do not subsidize their 
domestic production. Such action by the Queensland government 
would offset the ocean freight disadvantage which the state's 
producers suffer relative to US suppliers in this market. 
Other policy actions could also be considered by the 
Queensland government in order to assist producers pursue 
product differentiation strategies. A competitive advantage 
is presently enjoyed by US Appalachian producers due to the 
existence of local power utility demands for the higher ash 
byproducts of the coal washing process. The absence of such 
market opportunities in Queensland (except for the 
Stanwell/Curragh project), limits the ability of most coking 
coal producers to improve prime coking coal cjuality by 
reducing ash content, because of a reduced yield of saleable 
product. Generation planning policies of the Queensland 
Electricity Commission (QEC) which have resulted in the 
development of power station/mine complexes such as the 
Tarong/Meandu and Callide "B"/Boundary Hill should be 
reevaluated in light of this situation. A fully coordinated 
state energy strategy would recognize the potential benefits 
to be gained both in the electricity and the export coking 
coal industries. In adopting the suggested approach, QEC 
8.23) Freebairn, J.W. "Some Effects of Reducing Excess in 
Infrastructure Charges on the Export Coal Industry" 
Economic Record, 191, December (1989) p.345-356. 
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generation planning will also create markets for preparation 
plant byproduct output. The likelihood of eventual 
interconnection between Queensland's electricity grid with 
that of the other eastern Australian states enhances the 
economic attractiveness of this coordinated energy approach. 
Lowering the ash content of coking coals sold into EEC 
markets would enhance the value of the coal in the coke blend 
relative to US coals, while reducing the costs of ocean 
transportation. The approach addresses both major competitive 
disadvantages Queensland's exports presently suffer relative 
to premium US coking coals sold in European markets. 
An additional advantage stemming from the coordinated energy 
strategy approach, relates to synergistic benefits which will 
accrue to Australia's interests. In the present situation, 
higher ash byproduct is sold to the JSI as semi-soft coking 
coal at marginal cost. In Pacific markets such sales displace 
premium quality coking coal sales, given the JSI's defacto 
import cjuota which is levelled against all Australia's coking 
coals. The result is increased competition amongst premium 
coking coal producers, and further erosion of the price 
premium such coals have commanded historically. Creation of 
local sales opportunities may reduce the level of destructive 
competition for export sales which is now endemic in 
Queensland's coking coal industry. 
Competitive pressures to maintain sales volume are liable to 
become more acute in an environment of declining steel 
industry demand from traditional markets. An active supply 
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side management role will have to be adopted by government 
agencies if extreme forms of destructive competition are to 
be avoided. This may require greater vigilance and more 
frequent intervention by the Department of Primary Industry 
and Energy (DPIE) in the monitoring and approval of export 
price settlements with the JSI. The role of Queensland 
government agencies may need to evolve from one of 
unquestioning mine development promotion, to that of 
providing advice to government concerning industry strategies 
aimed at optimizing the state's coking coal resources during 
the decline phase of blast furnace ironmaking. 
Several recent actions of the Queensland government do not 
indicate recognition of the stalemated industry situation and 
the non competitive demand side nature of international 
coking coal markets. The state government failed to enforce a 
requirement in the authority to prospect for an export coke 
plant to be constructed as a condition of approval of the 
development lease for Gordonstone. Also, in approving the 
North Goonyella project, the state government has further 
exacerbated the oversupply situation and the likelihood of 
destructive price competition by existing exporters. 
Successful implementation of a strategy of product 
differentiation by improvement of delivery reliability, will 
also require changes in attitude from the union movement. In 
order to compete with US suppliers in EEC markets, a 
comparable degree of labour flexibility is required. The 
present monopoly of centralized mining unions must give way 
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to enterprise based unions at individual mines. Eventually, 
as has happened in Appalachia, non union mine operations must 
also be permitted. Present union policies aimed at the 
creation of single industry unions will further concentrate 
labour monopoly powers. Such policies are counter to Porter's 
findings regarding international competitiveness. 
Gains from a strategy of improving delivery reliability by 
reducing present union monopoly powers could be significant 
in Pacific markets. Arguments used by the JSI to justify 
present defacto import cjuotas limiting Australian coking 
coals would be weakened by increasing supply reliability, and 
the economic cost of such quota policies increased. 
8.7.2) A Coordinated Industry Strategy Approach^'^^ 
Restructuring of stalemated industries seems particularly 
difficult in societies having a philosophical commitment to 
laissez-faire capitalism. Such difficulties are exacerbated 
when the capital intensity of the industry creates 
significant barriers to exit for companies, and/when the 
labour force is strongly unionized and politically 
influential. 
Bower's study of the restructuring of the petrochemical 
8.24) This discussion draws on Bower, J.L."When Markets 
Quake: The Management Challenge of Restructuring 
Industry" Harvard Business School Press-Boston 
Mass.(1986). Chapter 3. 
345 
industries of the US, EEC and Japan, following the oil shocks 
of the seventies, examines many of the issues about to be 
faced by Queensland's coking coal industry. Like the coking 
coal industry, commodity petrochemicals such as ethylene 
experienced high rates of demand growth in the decade of the 
sixties until the first oil shock. Such growth attracted new 
entrants to the industry mainly from large integrated 
petroleum companies. Following the second oil shock of the 
seventies, demand growth rates declined and a substantial 
overcapacity was created world wide. Like open cut coal 
mines, petrochemical plants are capital intensive with low 
marginal operating costs, and the industry has failed to 
achieve satisfactory returns on employed capital throughout 
the decade of the eighties due to destructive competition 
between participants struggling to maintain high rates of 
plant utilization. The problem will not be resolved by 
waiting for demand to catch up to supply in this industry 
because of the entry by OPEC producers into commodity 
petrochemicals. Such entrants possess an insuperable 
competitive advantage over other participants by virtue of 
access to the world's lowest cost petroleum resources which 
are the key raw material input for petrochemicals. 
If direct smelting replaces the blast furnace for ironmaking, 
a long term disecjuilibrium in coking coal supply/demand will 
be created, analogous to the situation caused by the entry 
into the petrochemical industry by OPEC producers. Bower's 
findings are then of relevance for Queensland's coking coal 
industry under this likely scenario. 
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Supply/demand imbalance and destructive competition in 
Queensland's coking coal industry has been exacerbated by 
several recent events. Revisions in coal industry work 
practices of 1988 by the Coal Industry Tribunal permitting 
six day operations in preparation plants and some other 
critical areas in open cut mines has increased the annual 
productive capacity of existing mines significantly. These 
changes are intended to overcome production losses from 
weather conditions, ecjuipment breakdowns and/or industrial 
disputes, and to permit full year operation without the 
historic two week Christmas shutdown. As a result, there is 
the potential to increase Queensland's hard coking coal 
annual output capacity by about five million tonnes from 
existing mines. 
Relief from the coke making obligation associated with the 
Gordonstone lease will increase the state's hard coking coal 
export capacity two million tonnes by 1992. Approval of the 
North Goonyella project further increases Queensland's supply 
capacity an additional three million tonnes by 1993. Finally, 
the downturn in pig iron production related to slower 
economic growth and lower levels of crude steel production, 
together with increased use of PCI energy coals in the 
blast furnace, has lowered seaborne demands for all types of 
coking coal. A critical element in preventing a collapse of 
the premium historically commanded by hard coking coals, will 
be the policy approach used in restructuring this industry 
over the next decade. As yet there is no sign that the issue 
is fully recognized, let alone seriously considered in 
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developing appropriate government policies relating to the 
state's export coal industry. 
Bower describes difficulties that companies experience in 
making adjustments to productive capacity in a stalemated 
industry situation. Such structural adjustments are painful. 
Higher cost coking coal mines must be closed or product 
differentiation strategies developed to improve margins. 
Employment and wage levels must decline and company assets be 
written down. Bower's findings indicate that historic coking 
coal price premiums will most likely collapse in concert, if 
the present laissez-faire policy approach is adopted. 
8.8) A Recommended Strategy for Industry Restructuring 
Coordinated action will be required to implement an effective 
industry strategy. The destructive pattern involving 
individual Queensland firms selling high cjuality coals below 
comparable cif cost to the JSI relative to US or Canadian 
coals must be discouraged. Export approval should be withheld 
in such circumstances. Failure to exert discipline to prevent 
producers selling on the basis of short run marginal cost to 
gain or even maintain sales volume, encourages the predatory 
pricing spiral. Such actions also eliminate the possibility 
of product differentiation as a strategic option. 
Greater flexibility must be shown in granting rail freight 
and/or export levy relief for producers selling into 
European, Latin American, and other markets in which 
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Australian sourced coals might have a realistic opportunity 
to increase market share. However, vigilance must be 
exercised to detect any tendency for defacto market share 
cjuotas to emerge for reasons of supply security. On no 
account should destructive price or cjuality competition be 
permitted between Australian sellers, in markets which fail 
to reflect the value of higher cjuality coking coals in 
ironmaking due to cjuota limitations, as is the case in Japan. 
Successful implementation of these policies will require 
greater discipline of industry participants, and the firm 
application of existing powers by state and federal 
government agencies. Bower's^*^^ findings indicate that 
MITI's orchestration of a coordinated response by Japan's 
petrochemical industry, was more effective in dealing 
with the restroicturing of industry capacity, than the 
laissez-faire approach adopted for America's petrochemical 
industry. Anderson^'^^ is pessimistic regarding the prospects 
for success of supply side management and/or cartel action by 
Australian or Canadian coking coal industry participants. 
The suggested approach recjuired of Australia's coking coal 
industry is that of the cooperative Japanese model for 
8.25) Bower, J.L."When Markets Quake:The Management Challenge 
of Restructuring Industry" Harvard Business School 
Press-Boston Mass.(1986). p.220-221. 
8.26) Anderson, D.L. "An Analysis of Japanese Coking Coal 
Procurement Policies:The Canadian and Australian 
Experience" Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's 
University Ontario (1987) p.119. 
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structural adjustment rather than that of the laissez-faire 
model of the US. This is recjuired not only for the reason 
that is has been shown to be more successful for a similarly 
stalemated industry. It is because the demand side of this 
industry is already dominated by Japan's interventionist 
management style. Australia has already suffered considerable 
diversion of producer surplus by failing to acknowledge this 
reality. 
The final reason for recommending stronger use of the 
interventionist powers already available to government 
agencies follows from the differing structures of the 
Queensland, Canadian and US coking coal industries. 
Domination of the Queensland and Canadian industries by large 
scale capital intensive operators creates barriers to exit, 
and prevents the type of adjustment achieved in the US 
Appalachian coal fields. There the smaller labour intensive 
US coal operations exhibit far greater flexibility of all 
factors of production. Such an industry structure responds 
effectively to price and demand fluctuations with the 
laissez-faire philosophy, as was discussed in Chapter 7. 
8.9) Summary of Findings 
Queensland's coking coal producers face a sustained period of 
supply/demand imbalance which requires a reevaluation of the 
volume driven competitive strategies used to date. 
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Continued pursuit of such strategies in Pacific markets is 
resulting in a cycle of destructive competition and erosion 
of the premium that coking coals have commanded over thermal 
coals. Further distortion in the division of surplus between 
producers and consumers could result. 
Prevention of more intense destructive competition between 
coking coal producers of Queensland and New South Wales will 
recjuire coordinated action by state and national governments 
to restructure the supply side of the industry. As part of 
this restructuring endeavour, present distortions in Pacific 
coking coal markets must be addressed. 
Product differentiation strategies represent an alternative 
for Australian producers, but the success of such strategies 
depends on the correction of historic market distortions. 
Such corrections must address market power of factors of 
production and distribution as well as distortions within 
export markets. 
8.10) Recommendations for Further Research 
Studies of the behaviour of the Japanese and EEC coal markets 
by ABARE researchers have been cited. Similar studies are 
recjuired for other regional markets such as the Indian sub-
continent, Latin American and the Eastern Mediterranean, to 
test for price discrimination. More importantly, research is 
recjuired in these regional markets to detect the emergence of 
defacto cjuotas, which limit imports from individual supply 
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sources. 
Close monitoring of the results obtained from the several 
direct smelting demonstration projects currently in operation 
is needed. The speed of introduction of new ironmaking 
technologies will be a function of the smaller scale and 
productivity advantages of such processes, compared with 
ongoing advances in blast furnace technology. 
In order for the DPIE to exercise its export contract 
approval powers effectively, price/cjuality models must be 
available which establish differential values for different 
cjuality coals. The models may vary for different regional 
markets, depending on the blends of coking coal utilized. 
These models should be developed and maintained by DPIE with 
market intelligence provided by the export committees of the 
Australian Coal Association, and coke and ironmaking economic 
information obtained from independent sources. Ideally, 
consensus would be obtained regarding the formulation and use 
of these models in establishing price/cjuality differentials. 
Further research into the reasons why the US coal industry 
has so successfully sustained its international 
competitiveness is needed. Close monitoring of the US 
industry is essential for Australia to overcome the tyranny 
of distance and continue to compete in Atlantic markets. 
Improved competitiveness is recjuired of Queensland's coking 
coal industry to match its international rivals, and avoid 
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the rapid demise experienced by Britain's coal industry 
between the first and second world wars. 
Finally, it seems possible that distortions of international 
thermal coal markets also may be developing, in a manner 
similar to that in metallurgical coal markets. If this is the 
case, cjuite similar patterns of price discrimination and 
destructive competition could also take place in this 
industry. The implications of such an outcome, if proven, 
could be serious for Australia's future trade balance, and 
this issue too deserves in-depth analysis. 
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Appendix A 
The Blast Furnace Process and Coke Function in Ironmaking 
The physical and chemical separation functions performed by 
metallurgical coke in the blast furnace process are best 
described by reference to a typical furnace configuration: 
DISTRIBUTOR 
SMALL BELL 
BUSTLE 
MAIN 
GOOSE 
NECK 
BLOW PIPE 
SLAG NOTCH 
SECTION OF A TYPICAL IRON SMELTING BLAST FURNACE SHOWING 
SALIENT FEATURES INCLUDING MATERIAL FLOW COMBUSTION ZONE ETC. 
From:Biawas, A.K."Principles of Blast Furnace Ironmaking" 
Cootha Publishing House, Brisbane (1981) . 
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The cylindrical top portion of a blast furnace shown in cross 
section above is called the "throat", which is lined with 
wear resistant armour to protect the refractory brick against 
falling feed materials^. A "shaft" or "stack" section then 
extends to the largest diameter portion which is called the 
"belly" or "bosh-parallel". Thereafter a conical section 
called the "bosh" extends to the bottom of the furnace which 
is called the "hearth". The furnace feed material called 
"burden" consists of lump, pelletized, or sintered iron ore 
mixed with coke and limestone. Burden is introduced through 
the small and large bell systems at the top of the furnace. 
These materials then flow down the shaft under gravity and 
encounter rising hot gases generated by the burning of coke 
in the torus shaped combustion zone at the top of the hearth 
called the "raceway", opposite a ring of apertures called 
"tuyeres". 
The furnace is lined with refractory brick, with the high 
temperature regions in the lower sections having ancillary 
water or air cooling systems. Air or oxygen enriched air is 
preheated and introduced through the tuyeres where it burns 
the coke and raises temperatures locally from 1800 to 2000°C. 
This tuyere gas at such high temperatures and in the presence 
of carbon is effectively carbon monoxide and nitrogen. 
1) This discussion draws on Biawas, A.K."Principles of Blast 
Furnace Ironmaking" Cootha Publishing House, Brisbane 
(1981). and Walker, R.D."Modern Ironmaking Methods" 
Institute of Metals Publication London (1986). 
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The tuyere gas then rises through the bosh to melt iron which 
has been produced from the oxide ore in the belly and lower 
shaft levels of the furnace by the gaseous reduction reaction 
between the oxides of iron and carbon monoxide. 
Coke is the only component of the charge material which 
descends as a solid to the tuyere level. By combustion the 
coke provides process heat, and carbon monoxide for reducing 
iron oxides. Coke provides carbon for reduction of wustite 
(FeO) and the lowering of the melting point of iron. Also, 
coke acts as the supporting medium for the column of 
descending burden where it is most retjuired in the bosh 
region, in which metal (iron) and slag (gangue) are fusing. 
These materials then flow as licjuids through the interstices 
of the coke lumps to collect in the hearth where they are 
drained off through tap holes as hot metal (pig iron) and 
molten slag. 
The combustion of coke in front of the tuyeres results in the 
continuous creation of the void which extends around the 
periphery of the furnace, permitting the downward flow of 
burden material due to gravity. Beyond this void (or 
"raceway") section, there is a closely packed central column 
of coke called the "dead man". This coke column either floats 
on licjuid iron in the hearth, or extends to the hearth floor 
to provide structural support for the burden being replaced 
through the bell system at the top of the furnace. To perform 
this essential role, coke must exhibit significant strength 
and abrasion resistance at the very high temperatures 
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existing in the lower zone of the furnace. 
In addition to the multiple roles as energy source, carbon 
source, and structural support in the lower portions of the 
furnace, coke plays an essential function as a permeable 
matrix in the belly, bosh and hearth regions. Such a matrix 
material is necessary to permit hot tuyere gases to flow up 
from the combustion zone, and licjuid iron and slag (licjuid 
gangue) to flow down to the hearth where physical separation 
of iron and slag takes place. 
The major chemical reactions taking place in the blast 
furnace are the following: 
3Fe203 + CO = 2Fe304 + CO2 (1) 
Fe304 + CO = 3FeO + CO2 (2) 
FeO + CO = Fe + CO2 (3) 
CO2 + C = 2C0 (4) 
FeO + C = Fe + CO (5) 
The blast furnace can be segmented horizontally into three 
zones as far as these reactions are concerned. The lower zone 
(or melting or processing zone), extends to three to five 
metres above the tuyere level. Coke combustion in the raceway 
opposite the tuyeres generates gas temperatures of 1800 to 
2000°C. The temperatures of molten materials (all burden 
materials except coke) consisting of licjuid iron and slag are 
in the 14 00 to 14 50°C range, and the combustion gases cool to 
800 to 1000°C. In this high temperature region, FeO is 
reduced to iron (ecjuation (5)), CO2 is reduced to CO 
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(equation (4)), and any moisture is reduced to CO and 
hydrogen. Numerous other chemical reactions take place in 
this zone involving such impurities such as silicon, 
phosphorous and sulphur, which may be present in the ore or 
coke. Hot gases consisting mainly of carbon monoxide (CO) and 
nitrogen at 800 to lOOO^C, are the major products from the 
lower zone which permeate up through the descending burden to 
the middle zone. 
The middle (or isothermal) zone may occupy 50 to 60% of the 
furnace volume in a well managed blast furnace operation. It 
may extend to 3/4 the height of the furnace above the tuyere 
level. The temperatures of the descending burden and rising 
gases are nearly identical, in the range of 800 to 1000°C. 
The chemical reactions taking place are those of the gaseous 
reduction of hematite (Fe203) and wustite (FeO) by carbon 
monoxide, according to the chemical ecjuations (1) to (3) 
above. The extent of this zone is important, because the 
wustite should be given every opportunity for reduction by 
carbon monoxide. Also, any water present is reduced to 
hydrogen in this zone, providing another even more reactive 
reductant than carbon monoxide to assist in the reduction 
process. 
The upper (or preheating) zone then extends to the top of 
the burden material in the furnace. In this region, the 
temperature of the ascending gasses drops rapidly from the 
800 to 1000°C range of the middle zone, to 100 to 250°C as 
the burden temperature is raised from ambient to 800°C. The 
358 
main reactions occurring in this zone are the decomposition 
of any carbonates present (except calcium carbonate), 
vapourization of moisture and hydrated water of the burden, 
carbon deposition (2CO = CO2 + C), and partial or complete 
reduction of hematite and magnetite to their lower oxides. 
It takes from six to eight hours for the burden to descend to 
the tuyere level. In contrast, the residence time of the 
gases of combustion in the furnace are less than a minute. 
Blast furnace operations can be continued for long periods, 
and continuous campaigns of ten years or more are not 
uncommon. 
In the upper preheating and isothermal zones of the furnace 
it is important for the coke to resist abrasion to maintain a 
uniform size and permeability for the ascending reduction 
gases. The parameters influencing the performance of coke in 
these zones of the vessel are its potassium content, the 
lower shaft and tuyere gas velocities, the blast temperature, 
and the overall furnace productivity level which influences 
the decent rate of the burden. 
It is in the lower zones where the strength and abrasion 
resistance of coke at high temperatures becomes critical to 
the process performance. Coke is being broken down by the 
reactions of ecjuations (4) and (5), large thermal gradients 
exist, and the pressure of the descending burden is greatest. 
The maintenance of lump size is of great importance to permit 
a uniform upward flow of gases, and the coke being consumed 
in the raceway should generate a minimum of fines. 
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Appendix B 
Japanese 
Brands 
US 
Pittston 
MV 
Pittston 
BS 
VP#4 
Beatrice 
Itmann 
Keystone 
Hard Coking Coal : 
cif* 
cost 
33.26 
32.96 
34.72 
34.33 
33.66 
34.39 
Lancashire 
34.17 
Australian 
Coal Clij 
NSW 
ff 
25.49 
Sth. Bulli 
NSW 
Wolloond; 
NSW 
25.49 
Lily 
22.30 
Goonyella 
Qld. 19.89 
Peak Downs 
Qld. 19.87 
Blackwater 
Qld. 20.40 
Sth. Blackwater 
Qld. 
Moura 
Canadian 
Balmer 
Luscar 
Fording 
24.61 
22.25 
26.39 
23.40 
26.65 
Vicery Creek 
23.13 
F.C. 
% 
66.8 
66.8 
82 
82 
81.5 
79 
77 
76.3 
75.8 
68.5 
71.5 
77 
71 
70 
66.5 
77 
72 
75 
75.5 
FSI 
# 
8 
8 
8.5 
8.5 
8 
9 
9 
6 
6 
5 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Imports 
Fldy 
# 
3000 
3000 
30 
10 
47 
18 
610 
5 
400 
30 
2300 
1200 
25 
25 
300 
40 
15 
6 
7 
- Fiscal Year 1973 
Ash 
% 
6.5 
6.5 
5.5 
4.5 
5.5 
5.5 
6.5 
10.3 
10.3 
10.0 
7.3 
9.3 
8.3 
6.8 
8.0 
9.5 
9.3 
9.5 
11.5 
Sulphur 
% 
.83 
.93 
.8 
.7 
.8 
.8 
.85 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.7 
.7 
.5 
.6 
.6 
.4 
.4 
.5 
.6 
Term 
Years 
17 
17 
15 
15 
12 
16 
15 
9 
9 
9 
17 
16 
14 
19 
17 
19 
19 
19 
7 
CI 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
* where: cif is landed cost to JSI in current $US per tonne 
F.C. is fixed carbon (enhances value) 
FSI is free swelling index 
Fldy is fluidity 
Ash is % ash (detracts from value) 
Sulphur is % sulphur 
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Appendix B (cont .) 
Japanese 
Brands 
US 
Pittston 
MV 
Pittston 
BS 
VP#4 
Beatrice 
Mettiki 
Hard Coking Coal Imports 
cif 
cost 
74.98 
73.39 
74.74 
74.74 
74.98 
Lancashire 
74.49 
Blue Creek 
75.98 
Australian 
Coal Cli: 
NSW 
ff 
61.60 
Sth. Bulli 
NSW 
Tahmoor 
NSW 
Wolloond; 
NSW 
61.60 
60.30 
illy 
60.30 
Goonyella 
Qld. 63.14 
Peak Downs 
Qld. 62.57 
Blackwater 
Qld. 61.60 
Sth. Blackwater 
Qld. 
Moura 
Saraji 
Gregory 
61.60 
61.60 
62.17 
70.31 
Norwich Park 
Qld. 60.08 
German Creek 
Qld. 61.43 
Riverside 
Qld. 65.98 
Oakey Creek 
Qld. 62.20 
F.C. 
% 
66.8 
66.8 
82 
82 
79 
77 
73 
76.3 
75.8 
72 
68.5 
72 
76.5 
73.7 
69.3 
69.5 
78.9 
63.9 
80.8 
76.7 
73.7 
68.2 
FSI 
# 
8 
8 
8.5 
8.5 
8.5 
9 
8.5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
7 
7 
7.5 
6 
7 
8 
8 
9 
8.5 
7.5 
8.25 
Fldy 
* 
3000 
3000 
30 
10 
400 
610 
6000 
5 
400 
2000 
30 
1750 
350 
900 
650 
1400 
140 
2750 
35 
400 
900 
7000 
1 - Fiscal Year 1983 
Ash 
% 
6.5 
6.5 
5.5 
4.5 
6.5 
6.5 
8 
9.8 
9.8 
8.8 
10 
8.5 
9.8 
10.3 
7.3 
8.5 
9.8 
8.5 
9.5 
9 
10.3 
8.5 
Sulphur 
% 
.83 
.93 
.8 
.7 
1.0 
.85 
.8 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.65 
.7 
.65 
.55 
.55 
.7 
.7 
.6 
.66 
.65 
.8 
Term ] 
Years 
7 
7 
15 
15 
1 
15 
15 
13 
1 
1 
1 
13 
13 
1 
15 
1 
10 
15 
8 
10 
14.5 
3 
Dum 
C 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Appendix B (cont 
Brands cif 
cost 
Canadian 
Balmer 64.16 
Luscar 64.16 
Fording 64.75 
Line Creek 
66.30 
Gregg River 
68.99 
Greenhills 
77.18 
Smoky River 
78.48 
Quintette 
83.77 
Bullmoose 
84.78 
.) 
F.C. 
% 
77 
72 
75 
76 
76 
71 
80 
77.5 
75.2 
FSI 
# 
7 
6 
6 
5.25 
6 
7.5 
8 
6 
6 
Fldy 
# 
40 
15 
6 
3 
250 
220 
70 
14 
12 
Ash 
% 
9 
9.25 
9.5 
9.5 
9.5 
7 
7 
9.5 
9.25 
Sulphur 
% 
.4 
.37 
.45 
.5 
.4 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
Term 
Years 
15 
10 
15 
15 
15.5 
3 
2 
15 
15 
Dum 
C 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Appendix fi (cont . ) 
Japanese 
Brands 
US 
Pittston 
MV 
Mettiki 
Drummond 
LV 
Massey 
LV 
Hard Coking Coal Imports 
cif 
cost 
63.46 
62.62 
59.72 
59.72 
Lancashire 
70.65 
Blue Creek 
63.65 
Australian 
Coal Cliff 
NSW 55.16 
Sth. Bulli 
NSW 
Tahmoor 
NSW 
55.16 
55.16 
Goonyella 
Qld. 55.16 
Peak Downs 
Qld. 54.91 
Sth. Blackwater 
Qld. 
Moura 
Saraji 
Gregory 
Curragh 
54.66 
52.66 
54.66 
54.91 
53.16 
German Creek 
Qld. 54.66 
Riverside 
Qld. 54.66 
Oakey Creek 
Qld. 55.16 
Collinsville 
Qld. 52.66 
F.C. 
% 
66.8 
79 
79 
80 
77 
73 
76.3 
75.8 
72 
72 
76.5 
68.6 
69.5 
78.9 
63.9 
76.5 
76.7 
73.7 
68.2 
70.9 
FSI 
# 
8 
8.5 
8.5 
8.5 
9 
8.5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
8 
8 
7 
8.5 
7.5 
8.25 
6 
Fldy 
/ 
3000 
400 
10 
10 
610 
6000 
5 
400 
2000 
1750 
350 
650 
1400 
140 
2750 
150 
400 
900 
7000 
1200 
- Fi 
Ash 
% 
6.5 
6.5 
7.5 
7 
6.5 
8 
9.8 
9.8 
8.8 
8.5 
9.8 
6.5 
8.5 
9.8 
8.5 
7.5 
9 
10.3 
8.5 
9 
seal Year 1988 
Sulphur 
% 
.83 
1.0 
.7 
1.0 
.85 
.8 
.4 
.4 
.4 
.65 
.7 
.55 
.55 
.7 
.7 
.6 
.66 
.65 
.8 
.95 
Term 
Years 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
15 
1 
10 
1 
1 
15 
Dummys 
CI 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
C2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
363 
Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Brands cif F.C. FSI Fldy Ash Sulphur Term Dummys 
cost % / # % % Years CI C2 
Canadian 
Balmer 55.16 77 7 4 0 9 .4 5 1 0 
Luscar 55.16 72 6 15 9.25 .37 10 1 0 
Fording 55.16 75 6 6 9.5 .45 2 1 0 
Greenhills 
55.16 71 7.5 220 7 .5 1 1 0 
Smoky River 
55.16 80 8 70 7 .5 1 1 0 
Line Creek 
65.13 76 5.25 3 9.5 .5 15 0 0 
Gregg River 
68.99 76 6 250 9.5 .4 15.5 0 0 
Quintette 
93.23 77.5 6 14 9.5 .5 15 0 1 
Bullmoose 
93.19 75.2 6 12 9.25 .5 15 0 1 
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Appendix C 
Chow and "F" Testing of Regression Relationships* 
CIF Cost/Quality Model for 1977 
Test for pooling of nine Australian brands with four lower 
tier Canadian brands (Chow test where degrees of freedom are 
insufficient). 
E.S.S.(all brands pooled) = 23.49 k=5 n=13 
E.S.S.(9 Australian brands) = 6.26 k=5 n=9 
^value =2.06 
^crit' ^(4 3) =9*12 (at 5% significance) 
where: E.S.S. is the model's error sum of scjuares 
k is the number of independent variables 
n is the number of observations (brands). 
As the calculated "F" value is less than the critical value, 
this result supports the view that, at at least the 5% level 
of significance, a common regression structure (intercept and 
slopes) exists for these nine Australian and four Canadian 
coals, and this data may be pooled in subsecjuent analyses. 
Test for inclusion of the Smoky River brand with the above 
pooled 13 brands (Chow test where degrees of freedom are 
insufficient). 
E.S.S.(all brands pooled) = 85.39 k=5 n=14 
E.S.S.(without Smoky River) = 2 3.49 k=5 n=13 
Fyalue = ^S-^* 
^crit' ^(1 7) ~ 5.59 (at 5% significance) 
As the calculated "F" value is greater than the critical 
value, this result supports the view that the Smoky River 
brand should not be pooled with the other four Canadian and 
nine Australian coals in subsecjuent analyses. 
Detailed methodologies and formulae used to a^ply 
"F" and Chow testing to regression relationships are 
described in Doran, H.E."Applied Regression Analysis in 
Econometrics" Marcel Dekker Inc. New York (1989) Chapter 
6 pp.114-119, and Chapter 7 pp.146-147. 
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Appendix C (continued) 
Test to determine if the Canadian Smoky River brand can be 
pooled with eight US brands (Chow test where degrees of 
freedom are insufficient). 
E.S.S.(all brands pooled) = 17.44 k=5 n=9 
E.S.S.(without Smoky River) = 15.90 k=5 n=8 
lvalue =0.29 
^crit' ^(1,3) ~ 10.13 (at 5% significance) 
As the calculated "F" value is less than the critical value, 
this result supports the view that a common regression 
structure (intercept and slopes) exists for eight US brands 
and the Canadian Smoky River brand, and this data may be 
pooled in subsecjuent analyses. 
Test for pooling of nine Australian brands and four lower 
tier Canadian brands with eight US brands plus Smoky River. 
E.S.S.(all brands pooled) = 524.88 
E.S.S.(Aust. and 4 Canadian)= 23.49 
E.S.S.(US brands+Smoky River)= 17.44 
Fvalue = 19.71 
^crit* ^(6 10) =3*22 (at 5% significance) 
As the calculated "F" value is greater than the critical 
value, this result supports the view that US brands with 
Smoky River should not be pooled with Australian coals and 
the lower tier Canadian coals in subsecjuent analyses. 
Therefore "Chow" tests support the pooling of Australian 
brands with the four lower tier Canadian brands, and the 
pooling of the Smoky River brand with US brands. However, 
these tests also indicate that structural differences exist 
between the two groups. 
Acquisition cost differences between these two data groups 
could be a result of intercept differences reflecting 
differing outcomes in the bilateral bargaining process, or 
due to differences in the coefficients of the tjuality 
variables and the term independent variable common to both 
regression eguations. Intercept differences, as the source of 
structural difference between regression relationships, seem 
more credible. To argue that differences are likely to be due 
to slope coefficients for tjuality variables would recjuire the 
JSI's use of differing valuation of cjuality parameters such 
as fixed carbon, fluidity, sulphur etc., depending on the 
country source of the coal brand. 
k=5 
k=5 
k=5 
n=22 
n=13 
n= 9 
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Appendix Q (continued) 
Chow tests on these equations can determine if structural 
differences are a result of either significantly different 
intercept values, or slope values, in the regression 
equations. 
Initially include both slope and intercept dummy variables in 
a pooled equation which includes all twenty two hard coking 
coal brands (unrestrained case H-^) . This unrestrained case 
allows for different slopes and intercepts in the two groups. 
E.S.S. ^Hj^ j = 40.93 k=ll n=22 
To test a null hypothesis that slope change is not the major 
explanatory factor for structural differences, the model is 
restrained with fixed slopes for both groups, but with 
variable intercepts (constrained case H Q ) • 
E.S.S. /fjoj = 78.31 k=6 n=22 
Fvalue =1*89 
^crit' ^(5,10)~ 3.33 (at 5% significance) 
As the calculated "F" value is less than the critical value, 
this result supports the view that the null hypothesis should 
be accepted and that slope changes are not the major 
explanatory factors for structural difference. As would be 
expected due to t:he negotiating strategies employed by the 
JSI with Australian and some Canadian producers, intercept 
shift is the principal explanatory factor for regression 
relationship structural differences. The combined regression 
ecjuation should therefore include the dummy variable CI, 
permitting intercept shift to take place, which yields the 
results shown on page 230. 
To test if independent variables other than intercept shift 
(CI), are significant in determining cif values in 1977, "F" 
tests are performed with unconstrained and constrained 
models. The unconstrained model is that shown on page 230: 
E.S.S./jjij = 78.31 k=6 n=22 
The constrained case is determined by removing the 
independent variables FC, A, S, T and FY from that ecjuation 
to yield: 
E.S.S./jjo) =117.83 k=l n=22 
f'value = 1-514 
^crit' ^(5,15)^ 2.91 (at 5% significance) 
As the calculated "F" value is less than the critical value, 
this result supports the view that the null hypothesis should 
367 
be accepted and that quality related independent variables, 
and "T" contractual term, are not significant in determining 
cif costs. This result is consistent with the existence of 
price discrimination in the Japanese hard coking coal market 
in 1977. 
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Appendix D 
Publications and Citations 
Some of the research findings contained in Chapters 1, 2, 6 
and 7 of this dissertation pertaining to the evolution of 
coking coal markets, distortions in these international 
markets, and the competitive response of the Appalachian and 
Queensland industries have been published or accepted for 
publication as follows: 
Koerner, R.J."Queensland's Role in the International Coking 
Coal Trade: An Analysis of Market Development and 
Characteristics" Australian International Business Centre 
Discussion Paper (1990) University of Queensland, Brisbane. 
Koerner, R.J."Pacific Rim Coking Coal Trade" published by the 
Australia-Japan Research Centre of the Australian National 
University in the monogram series "Pacific Economic Papers" 
(#203, January 1992), Canberra. 
Koerner, R.J."The Behaviour of Pacific Metallurgical Coal 
Markets:The Impact of Japan's Acquisition Strategy on Market 
Price" accepted for publication in the March 1993 issue of 
"Resources Policy" Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd., London U.K. 
Koerner, R.J."Competitive Response to Price Decline:The 
Coking Coal Industries of Queensland and Appalachia" is 
accepted for publication in the monogram series of The 
Industrial Relations Research Centre - University of New 
South Wales Kensington (March 1993) Sydney. 
Findings regarding oligopsony distortion in Japanese coking 
coal markets contained in the above AIBC discussion paper 
were cited in the Industry Commision Report #13 "Rail 
Transport" Volume 1: Report AGPS Canberra (21st August 1991) 
pp.275-276. 
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